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Dear readers,
The ‘Growth, Structural Change and Employment’ Commission appointed by the German Federal 
Government convened for the first time on 26 June 2018. In the first quarter of 2019, it is to submit 
an action plan to gradually reduce and phase out coal-fired power generation (including a final 
 deadline), and develop proposals for economic, social, structural policy and remediation-related 
flanking measures. The Commission’s mandate specifies the following key tasks as its remit:
 • Create specific prospects for new, future-proof jobs in the affected regions,
 • Develop a mix of instruments combining economic development, structural change, social ac-
ceptability, societal cohesion and climate change mitigation,
 • Identify necessary investments in the regions and economic sectors affected by the structural 
change, which are to be subsidised via a fund that supplements the existing financing instruments 
and mainly draws on Federal Government resources,
 • Formulate measures to reach the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction target for the energy sector, in 
particular measures related to coal-fired power generation, including a comprehensive impact 
assessment and
 • Formulate measures for the energy industry to contribute to closing the gap to the 2020 target 
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% compared to 1990 by as much as possible.
Relevant aspects of the options and requirements for reducing and phasing out coal-fired power 
generation have been under debate for several years. This process has produced a range of strategies, 
analyses and arguments, outlining how coal use in the energy sector could be reduced and phased 
out in the planned time frame, and determining structural policy measures suitable to support this. 
This Coal Report studies the existing analyses and provides an overview of the state of debate. It is 
intended to provide information on facts and contexts, present the advantages and disadvantages 
of individual courses of action, and reveal the respective scientific backgrounds. It strives to take a 
scientific and independent approach, and present facts in concise language, making it easy to follow 
for readers who are not experts in the field, without excessive abridgements or provocative statements.
Chapter 1 is dedicated to the relevant energy industry aspects of reduction and prospective phase out of 
coal-fired power generation. Starting with the description of the existing coal-fired power plants and 
lignite open-cast mines, it incorporates an overview of the cost structures and pricing, and addresses 
the implications of coal-fired power generation for profitability of gas-fired power plants and risks of 
future grid bottlenecks. It closes with a presentation of the current regulatory framework for plant 
closure, focusing on guaranteeing security of supply and the duties of transmission system operators 
and the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) for monitoring system security to avoid potential critical 
situations and determine intervention options.
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Chapter 2 presents the climate policy framework relevant for the use of coal in the energy sector. It 
outlines the consequences of climate change, the Paris climate targets and international trends in 
use of coal, and derives cornerstones for reducing coal-fired power generation in Germany.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the technical aspects of an energy supply without coal. It covers require-
ments like increased flexibility and energy efficiency, expanding renewable energies and electricity 
grids, using natural gas as a bridge technology and the role of storage systems. It also presents the 
scope and potential solutions to ensure that electricity and heat can be securely supplied at all times.
Chapter 4 considers the transformation costs of phasing out coal. Based on an overview of the local 
economies in lignite regions it points out employment effects and options for successful structural 
change. It also details the impact of the transformation on the electricity wholesale price and on the 
costs of remediating open-cast mines.
The final chapter, Chapter 5, describes potential policy instruments to reduce coal use in the energy sector. 
The Report is supplemented with a list of coal-fired power plants, which provides both technical 
specifications as well as details of the CO2-emissions of all German lignite and hard coal-fired power 
plants with electrical outputs of over 50 MW.
The energy transition process is a complex, challenging transformation. Based on many questions 
and problems, the information currently available presents us with a series of clearly defined jigsaw 
pieces, which we can combine in a variety of ways. We hope that the ‘Coal Report’ will contribute 
to a transparent presentation of the available options and their implications, to promote an evi-
dence-based discussion on reduction and phase-out of coal-fired power generation. In this light, we 
hope you find it an informative and interesting read.
Prof. Dr. Claudia Kemfert Prof. Dr. Manfred Fischedick Dr. Camilla Bausch
German Institute  
for Economic Research
Wuppertal Institute  
for Climate, Environment and Energy Ecologic Institute
l
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In Germany, roughly 21 GW of net nominal capacity from lignite and approx. 24 GW from hard coal-
fired power plants were in operation at the end of August 2018. In 2017, lignite accounted for 23% and 
hard coal for 14% of gross power generation. As a result, the question of the importance of lignite and 
hard coal for security of supply is at the centre of the debate on reducing coal-fired power generation. 
However, recent developments on the German electricity market include drops in electricity prices to 
the disadvantage of gas-fired power plants, as a result of growth in renewable energy. This suggests 
that a reduction and phase-out of coal-fired power generation is not only essential for climate policy, 
but also makes sense with a view to the electricity market.
In order to highlight the background and implications of the current debate for the electricity  market, 
this section firstly describes the existing coal-fired power plants and open-cast mine structures 
(Chapter 1.1). This is followed by a description of the cost structure for coal-fired power generation 
(Chapter 1.2) and a description of pricing and competition on the electricity market (Chapter 1.3). 
Subsequently economic arguments for a reduction of coal-fired power generation are presented 
(Chapter 1.4). The final section describes the current regulatory framework on power plant closures 
and monitoring system security (Chapter 1.5).
COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS AND COST STRUCTURES
The German lignite-fired power plants and lignite open-cast mines are concentrated in the Rhineland, 
Lusatian and Central German coalfields. By contrast, hard coal-fired power plants are widespread 
throughout Germany, but most are situated in Western Germany. The average age of coal-fired 
power plants is 30 to 35. Due to their fuel and firing-specific properties, coal-fired power plants have 
significantly lower efficiencies and higher emissions than natural gas-fired power plants. Combined 
heat and power generation plants based on coal – generally hard coal – are achieving an overall 
efficiency of 85 to 90%.
Most hard coal and gas-fired power plants currently cannot compete with the low costs of lignite. As 
a result, many hard coal-fired power plants are making losses or can only cover their operating costs 
with additional revenues from the heating sector. Compared with hard coal, modern combined-cycle 
power plants (gas and steam power plants) often have lower costs, but costs are still significantly 
higher than the costs of lignite-fired power plans. As a result, gas-fired power plants are rarely used 
in spite of their relatively high flexibility and low CO2 emissions.
The high utilisation rate of lignite means that most lignite-fired power plants can cover their  ongoing 
operating costs. However, if additional investments are necessary the associated costs may exceed 
the slim profits that can be achieved with the expectable low wholesale prices. Integration of  power 
plants and open-cast mines makes the cost structure of lignite unique. As all power plants and open-
cast mines in a lignite coalfield are generally interconnected, individual coalfield sections can be 
operated or closed without affecting continued operation of the others.
PRICING ON THE ELECTRICITY MARKET AND COMPETITION BETWEEN COAL AND NATURAL GAS
Electricity pricing on the spot market is based on a system known as merit order. All participants 
on the electricity market offer electricity at least at their marginal costs. These marginal costs are 
generally based on the variable power generation costs. Power is purchased from the plants in the 
order of their bids, until demand is covered in full. The electricity wholesale price is calculated based 
on the costs of the most expensive power plant required to meet demand at a given point in time.
In Germany, the merit order is typically topped by renewable energy sources, followed by nuclear 
power and fossil energy sources. Besides the efficiency of a power plant, the competitive situation 
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between the fossil energy sources depends largely on the raw material prices and the European 
emissions trading CO2 certificate price (see also Chapter 5.1). If there is a long-term increase in the 
CO2 price to approx. 20 to 50 euros/t CO2, it is assumed that operating lignite-fired power plants will 
be more expensive than other fossil fuels.
ENERGY-ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR A REDUCTION IN COAL-FIRED POWER GENERATION
Due to their high flexibility combined with low CO2 intensity, gas-fired power plants supplement 
fluctuating renewable energy sources ideally for a transitional period (see Chapter 3.3). Conversely, 
lignite-fired power plants and older hard coal-fired power plants can only adapt to fluctuating power 
generation from wind and solar energy to a limited extent. While existing coal-fired plants could 
operate more flexibly, this causes greater material wear and thus leads to higher costs. However, 
gas-fired power plants in Germany currently suffer from a low capacity utilisation of approx. 30%, 
which is why many plants have already been shut down. Hard coal and lignite-fired power plants 
have capacity utilisations of approx. 40% and 75%, respectively. 
The current high level of electricity exports from Germany, much of it electricity from coal, also reduce 
utilisation of gas-fired power plants in neighbouring countries. If coal is phased out in Germany, the 
utilisation of national and international gas-fired power plants, and thus their profitability, would 
increase.
The slight increase in the electricity wholesale price caused by a coal phase-out would also  incentivise 
necessary investments in demand management as well as storage and efficiency technologies. 
Greater price spreads and peak prices can also stimulate investments in the development and use of 
power-to-X applications, synthetic fuels and various battery technologies as well as energy efficiency 
measures. Migration of the most energy-intensive industries out of Germany is unlikely, as changes 
in the electricity wholesale prices are expected to be minor (see Chapter 4.4).
In addition, reducing coal-fired power generation can also limit the strain on the grid situation in 
Germany, in particular in areas where a high continuous supply from coal-fired power plants currently 
coincides with a significant supply from renewable sources. The lack of flexibility of lignite plants 
in particular (conventional minimum generation) places a strain on the electricity grid. Accordingly, 
reducing electricity generation from these plants can help alleviate grid bottlenecks. Studies sub-
mitted to date on the development of the electricity trade balance show that a full coal phase-out 
by 2030 would make Germany at most a minor net importer.
MONITORING TO ENSURE SECURITY OF SUPPLY
Germany has a comprehensive regulatory framework to guarantee security of supply and ensure 
that power plant closures do not endanger it. Planned power plant closures must be announced to 
the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) 12 months before the planned shutdown date. The responsible 
transmission system operator (TSO) then assesses the system relevance of the power plant. If it is 
system-relevant, the power plant must be kept available for power generation, and the costs will be 
reimbursed to the operator. 
In addition, Germany maintains various reserves and load management options with a total capacity 
of 11.3 GW. Moreover, TSOs are required to analyse the power supply system  annually, by investigating 
potential critical threshold situations. The TSO or BNetzA can create additional guaranteed capacity 
by transitioning power plants to a reserve, or building power plants as technical grid equipment. 
Cross-border interconnectors can be expanded to other European countries as a further option.
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At the end of July 2018, lignite-fired power plants totalling approx. 21 GW, and hard 
coal-fired power plants totalling approx. 24 GW were operational in Germany. In 
2017, lignite accounted for 23% of the gross power generation and hard coal made 
up 14% (approx. 150 TWh from lignite and approx. 90 TWh of hard coal) (AG Energie-
bilanzen e.V. 2018). The locations of German coal-fired power plants are shown in 
Fig. 1.1.1. At the same time, they are responsible for 153 million t CO2 (lignite) and 
87 million t CO2 (hard coal). That corresponds to approx. 26% of the German CO2 
emissions in 2016 (UBA 2017a, 2018a). Coal-fired power plants also emitted other 
pollutants like sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides, soot and dust, as well as toxic metals 
like  mercury, lead, arsenic and cadmium (UBA 2017a), which are harmful to humans 
and contaminate the air, soil and water (SRU 2017) (see Chapter 4.4).
In 2017, coal-fired power plants 
accounted for 37% of gross power 
generation.
Coal-fired power plants are 
responsible for 26% of all German 
CO2 emissions.
1.1  COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS AND OPEN-CAST MINES
 » In Germany, 21 GW of lignite-fired and 24 GW of hard coal-fired power plants are operational 
(net rated capacity).
 » Due to their integration with open-cast mines, lignite-fired power plants are highly concentrated in 
specific regions. They are located in the Rhineland, Lusatian and Central German coalfields. Hard coal- 
fired power plants are geographically widespread, in particular in the states of former West Germany.
 » Currently, closures of roughly 5.6 GW have been announced to the Federal Network Agency 
(3.8 GW of hard coal and 1.8 GW of lignite (as part of the lignite security reserve)).
Sources: Own compilation based on BNetzA (2018a) and Tab. 1.1.2.
*Note: Additionally, coal-fired power plants with an installed capacity of less than < 50 MW exist in Germany. These hard coal-fired 
power plants have a total output of 0.4 GW (15 power plant units), the corresponding lignite-fired power plants add up to 0.4 GW 
(15 power plant units). Due to rounding, some totals may not be accurate. 
 Total
small plants*
> 50 MW & 
< 100 MW
Large plants  
> 100 MW









before 1990 40 11.3 10 0.6 30 10.7
Commissioned 
after 1990 15 8.6 1 0.1 14 8.6
In the grid reserve 7 2.3 1 0.1 6 2.2
Scheduled for closure 5 1.5 0 0 5 1.5




before 1990 21 8.7 2 0.1 19 8.6
Commissioned 




transitioned 3 0.9 0 0 3 0.9
To be 
transitioned 5 1.8 0 0 5 1.8
Total of lignite and hard coal 111 44.2 18 1.3 93 43.0
Tab. 1.1.1: Number and capacity of the operational lignite and hard coal-fired power plants 
(public supply and industrial power plants)
23.8 GW of hard coal generation 
capacities are installed in Germany. 
Of that, 23 GW are made up of 55 
large-scale plants (>100 MW) and 
0.8 GW of 27 smaller plants (<100 MW).
The 20.5 GW of lignite-fired power 
plants can be broken down into 
20 GW and 38 large-scale plants 




Due to their integration with open-cast mines, lignite-fired power plants are highly 
concentrated in specific regions. In Germany, they are concentrated primarily in the 
Rhineland coalfields (10 GW). The Central German coalfields also feature 3 GW and 
the Lusatian coalfields have 7 GW of lignite capacity. In autumn 2016, lignite  extraction 
in the Helmstedt coalfields ended after over 140 years. At 79 TWhel, the Rhineland 
coalfields also generate more electricity than the Lusatian (49 TWhel) and Central 
German coalfields (17 TWhel) (data from 2015). As of the end of 2015, the lignite  reserves 
in the approved lignite plans were 4.2 billion t (DIW Berlin et al. 2018). Furthermore, 
the economically attainable reserves, which have not been approved yet, add up to 
a further 36.3 billion t of lignite (Öko-Institut 2017b).
The lignite open-cast mines and power plants in the Rhineland coalfields are operated 
by RWE. In the Federal States of former East Germany, Czech company EPH (Energetický 
a průmyslový holding) operates LEAG (Lausitz Energie Bergbau AG), Mibrag (Mittel-
deutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft mbH) and Saale Energie via various subsidiaries, 
which own all open-cast mines and most of the power plants (DIW Berlin 2017c).
Lignite-fired power plants in Germany differ significantly in their age and  efficiency 
structure (see also Fig. 1.1.2). The average age of lignite-fired power plants is roughly 
35 years (UBA (2017a).
The lignite industry in Germany is 
spread over the Rhineland, Lusatian 
and Central German coalfields.
The lignite-fired power plants are 
almost entirely owned by RWE and 
EPH. EnBW and Uniper only have 
holdings in Lippendorf and Schkopau.




















Closure / transition to security reserve planned for 2020 at the latest*
summed up capacities of multiple power plants in MW
Source: Own compilation based on BNetzA (2018a, 2018c) and Tab. 1.1.2
*Planned means that the operators have notified BNetzA of their intention to shut down.
Coal-fired power plant capacities:
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There is a clear divide between the former Eastern Federal States and those in the 
West. While all power plant blocks in North Rhine-Westphalia, with the exception 
of the three new blocks in Neurath and Niederaußem, were built before 1976, 
 modernised plants have been in use in the former Eastern Federal States since the 
reunification. On average, the power plants in the former Eastern Federal States are 
therefore more modern and efficient than those in North Rhine-Westphalia. Modern 
power plants have efficiencies between approx. 43% and can also operate more 
flexibly than older power plants (UBA 2017a). In 1990, the average efficiencies were 
approx. 34% (UBA 2017e). Fig. 1.1.2 shows all lignite-fired power plants with an  electrical 
capacity of at least 100 MW. The cumulative CO2 emissions of power plants under 
100 MW are to be evaluated as minor (see. Annex, Tab. 1).
Roughly half of the lignite 
capacities was built before 1990, 
and has low efficiencies.
Hard coal-fired power plants and extraction
The locations of the hard coal-fired power plants are spread throughout Germany, 
and have many different operators. Having developed historically, they are  concentrated 
in the former hard coal mining regions in North Rhine-Westphalia and the Saar 
coalfields and, due to deliveries of imported coal, along the river Rhine and on the 
North Sea coast.
As early as 2007, the national and state governments, and the mining companies 
decided to phase out hard coal mining for economic reasons at the end of 2018. At 
this time, about 30,000 employees were still working in eight coal mines (coal in-
dustry statistics 2017a, 2017c). The two remaining hard coal mines are Ibbenbüren 
and Prosper-Haniel (DIW Berlin et al. 2018). Germany has overall hard coal resources 
of roughly 83 million t, of which approx. 12 million t can be extracted by the end of 
2018. In 2015, 55.5 million t of hard coal was imported. Roughly one third of imports 
come from Russia, followed by imports from the USA, Colombia, Australia, Poland 
and South Africa (UBA 2017a).
Hard coal-fired power plants in Germany differ significantly in their age and  efficiency 
structure, too (see Fig. 1.1.3). The average age of hard coal-fired power plants is approx. 
30 years (UBA 2017a). Older power plants like Wedel or Lünen have an efficiency of 
just 36%; by contrast, modern power plant blocks like block 9 in Mannheim achieve 
values of 46%.
The operators and locations of hard 
coal-fired power plants are more 
diverse than for lignite.
Fig. 1.1.2: Structure of lignite coal-fired power plants in Germany
On average, lignite-fired power 
plants in former Eastern Federal 
States are more modern and 
efficient than those in North 
Rhine-Westphalia.
1000 800 600 500 400 300 MW
RWE







Frimmersdorf Niederaußem Boxberg Jänschwalde Buschhaus
Neurath Niederaußem Boxberg Schwarze Pumpe Lippendorf Schkopau
Neurath Weisweiler
C o m m i s s i o n e d  b e f o r e  1 9 9 0
C o m m i s s i o n e d  a f t e r  1 9 9 0
LusatiaRhineland Central Germany Helmstedt
Source: Own compilation based on BNetzA (2018a); Öko-Institut (2017b)
The average age of the hard 




Fig. 1.1.3: Structure of hard coal-fired power plants in Germany
Source: Own compilation based on BNetzA (2018a). The plants are broken down by categories based on the age and CHP use according to the 
BNetzA list, the district heating output according to the UBA power plant list and assumptions for scheduled closure as in the closure table 1.1.2. 
The retrofits described refer to essential repairs to the plants (e.g. boiler or turbine exchange); no sufficient public data is known for a more 
detailed distinction between the various retrofits, e.g. based on the percentage additional investment.
C o m m i s s i o n e d  b e f o r e  1 9 9 0




















The power plants are ordered by age from left to right and from top to bottom in each category, starting with the oldest at the top 
left. The date of initial construction, not the retrot date is the determining factor.
900 700 600 400 300 100 MW
Power plants with closure notification 
(not legally binding)
Retrofit (conducted after 1990)
Power plants with combined heat and power generation
(Installed net electrical capacity
> as district heating output)
Power plants with combined heat and power generation
(Installed net electrical capacity
























































































Most hard coal-fired power plants are located near conurbations and produce heat 
in addition to electricity (known as combined heat and power, [CHP]; see Fig. 1.1.1 
and Fig. 1.1.3). As a result, CHP plants can achieve a fuel utilisation rate of 85 to 90% 
(see Chapter 3.6). However, electricity is the more important output for most of the 
plants; the additional district heat capacity is lower than the installed electrical 
capacity.
Coal-fired power plant blocks under construction and in the planning 
The Datteln 4 hard coal-fired power plant block (1.1 GW), which was originally to be 
commissioned in 2011, has not been connected to the grid yet. Construction was 
delayed due to many (environmental) objections, as well as technical problems 
caused by an innovative steel (T24), which was to permit higher temperatures and 
thus efficiencies. It is not clear when the block is to be connected to the grid; the 
current target is 2020.
In addition to this, a hard coal-fired power plant project is currently being planned 
for an industrial park in Stade (900 MW). According to the operator, the actual 
 decision on whether it will be built will be made in 2019. Since the early 2010s,  there 
have also been plans to build a new lignite-fired power plant with optimised plant 
technology (BoAplus) (1.2 GW) located in Niederaußem.
Closed coal-fired power plants and planned power plant closures
Under the current conditions on the electricity market with lower electricity prices, 
more and more operators are deciding to shut down their power plants before the 
end of the technically possible operating period has been reached. Since 2011, 51 coal 
blocks, with a total rated electrical capacity of 10,600 MW, have been shut down for 
good. In addition, 3 lignite blocks with 900 MW have been transitioned to the secu-
rity reserve and four more coal blocks with another total of 300 MW have been shut 
down on a preliminary basis (BMWi 2018b).
Within the next two years, another approx. 3.8 GW of hard coal-fired power plants 
could be disconnected from the grid. The closures have been announced to BNetzA, 
but can still be revoked by the operators or rejected also on a preliminary basis by 
BNetzA. In addition to this, a total of 2.7 GW of lignite-fired power plants are being 
gradually transitioned to what is known as the ‘lignite security reserve’ between 
2016 and 2019 (see Chapter 5.3). This means that they cease regular production and 
are only kept on the grid as a reserve for a further four years. Tab. 1.1.2 lists the 
 currently planned closures.
Lignite open-cast mine structures
A unique characteristic of the lignite industry is the link between open-cast mines 
and power plants. Coal from the open-cast mines is transported within the coalfields 
to the connected power plants via conveyor belts, railway lines, coal mixing and 
storage facilities. Various local interim storage sites guarantee continuous  operation. 
However, due to the risk of self-combustion, the coal is not buffered/stored for ex-
tended periods. 
The Rhineland coalfields (Fig. 1.1.4) comprises the Garzweiler and Hambach open-cast 
mines, which supply in particular the Neurath, Niederaußem and Frimmersdorf 
power plants (the last is part of the lignite security reserve) and smaller power plants 
like Fortuna-Nord, Frechen, Ville-Berrenrath, Goldenberg and Merkenich via railways 
(Gerbaulet et al. 2012). That makes the open-cast mining operations technically 
 independent of continued operation of specific power plants. The Weisweiler pow-
er plant is supplied exclusively by the Inden open-cast mine (DIW Berlin et al. 2018).
Utilisation of heat from combined 
heat and power generation plays 
an important role for hard 
coal-fired power plants.
It is not clear whether and when 
new coal-fired power plants will be 
connected to the grid in Germany.
Since 2010, 10.6 GW of coal-fired 
power plant capacities were shut 
down by operators. In addition, 
lignite-fired power plants with a 
capacity of 900 MW were 
transitioned to the security reserve.
By 2020, a total of 2.7 GW of 
lignite-fired power plants will 
initially be transitioned to the 
security reserve, and then taken 
from the market.
3.8 GW of hard coal-fired power 
plants have notified their 
intentions to shut down to the 
Federal Network Agency.
In the Rhineland coalfields, all 
power plants and open-cast mines 
are connected. The only exception 
is the Weisweiler power plant, with 
the adjacent Inden open-cast mine.
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Tab. 1.1.2: Scheduled* power plant closure and power plants in the grid reserve until 2020 incl. addition to the security reserve
In the Lusatian coalfields (Fig. 1.1.5), operations will be reduced from the original five 
open-cast mines (Cottbus Nord, Jänschwalde, Welzow-Süd TF 2, Nochten 2,  Reichwalde) 
to three by shutting down the open-cast mines Cottbus Nord in December 2015 and 
Jänschwalde in five years at the latest. All power plants are connected to the open-
cast mines via a coal link railway. The Jänschwalde large-scale power plant is  primarily 
supplied by the Jänschwalde and Welzow-Süd open-cast mines. The Schwarze  Pumpe 
lignite-fired power plant is supplied by Welzow-Süd and with lesser quantities from 
Reichwalde and Nochten. Boxberg is supplied with coal both by Nochten and from 
Reichwalde (Gerbaulet et al. 2012).
In the Lusatian and Central German 
coalfields, all power plants and 
open-cast mines are connected.
Energy source Location Block Closure Net capacity (MW) Age
Hard coal Lünen Lünen 6 31/12/2018 149 56
Hard coal Lünen Lünen 7 31/12/2018 324 49
Hard coal Kiel 2019 323 48
Hard coal Reuter Reuter C 2019 124 49
Hard coal Gersteinwerk K2 2019 614 34
Hard coal Weiher Weiher III Grid reserve, earliest closure 2019 655 42
Hard coal Walheim WAL1 Grid reserve until 31 March 2020 at the latest 96 54
Hard coal Walheim WAL2 Grid reserve until 31 March 2020 at the latest 148 51
Hard coal Heilbronn HLB 5 Grid reserve until 31 March 2020 at the latest 125 53
Hard coal Heilbronn HLB 6 Grid reserve until 31 March 2020 at the latest 125 52
Hard coal Altbach/Deizisau Alt HKW 1 Grid reserve until 31 March 2020 at the latest 433 33
Hard coal Bexbach BEX Grid reserve, earliest closure 2019 726 35
Security reserve plants
Lignite Buschhaus 30/09/2020 352 33
Lignite Frimmersdorf P 30/09/2021 284 52
Lignite Frimmersdorf Q 30/09/2021 278 48
Lignite Niederaußem E 30/09/2022 295 48
Lignite Niederaußem F 30/09/2023 299 47
Lignite Neurath C 30/09/2022 292 45
Lignite Jänschwalde F 30/09/2022 465 29
Lignite Jänschwalde E 30/09/2023 465 31
Total 6572
Source: Own compilation based on BNetzA (2018d), (2018c); Steag (2018a); Uniper (2018); Mark-E 
(2018); Ruhrnachrichten (2018); Wuppertaler Rundschau (2018); S&P Global Platts (2018); Vattenfall 
(2015); Steag (2018b); Power plants > 50MW
Notes:* Scheduled means that the operators have notified BNetzA of their intention to shut down. However, closure is not legally binding and can also be withdrawn by the operators. 
The following power plants still slated for closure in the BNetzA closure list have already been shut down according to local newspaper reports: Kraftwerk Werdohl-Elverlingsen (310 MW), 
HKW Elberfeld (Wuppertal; 85 MW), Kraftwerk Ensdorf (389 MW), HKW I in Duisburg (95 MW) (Westfalenpost 2018; Westdeutsche Zeitung 2018; WAZ 2018; Saarbrücker Zeitung 2017).
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The Central German lignite coalfields (Fig. 1.1.6) consist of the Profen open-cast mine, 
which supplies the Schkopau power plant and smaller buyers in Deuben, Mumsdorf 
and Wählitz. The Vereinigtes-Schleenhain open-cast mine supplies the Lippendorf 
large-scale power plant. Both open-cast mines also supply smaller power plants in 
Chemnitz, Dessau and Könnern (Gerbaulet et al. 2012). There is also the smaller Ams-
dorf open-cast mine with the corresponding power plant, which extracts lignite to 
manufacture crude montan wax (DIW Berlin 2014a).
Fig. 1.1.4: Coal mining and power plants in the Rhineland coalfields (2017)
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Fig. 1.1.6: Coal mining and power plants in the Central German coalfields (2017)
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Power generation from both hard coal and lignite is capital-intensive, but the cost 
structures differ significantly.
Cost structures of power generation from lignite
Lignite-fired power plants have very low variable costs. They include CO2 costs, costs 
for auxiliary materials and supplies, such as the limestone used to treat flue gas or 
the production-dependent component of the recultivation costs (Öko-Institut 2017b). 
The investment costs of both the open-cast mines and most lignite-fired power 
plants have long been amortised.
As part of the study „The German Lignite Industry“, an index was developed to assess 
the economic outlook of the lignite coalfields (‘LignIX’, Öko-Institut (2017b)). The 
 indicator incorporates both the variable costs and the costs of open-cast mines and 
power plants (personnel costs, maintenance and repairs, minor and major overhauls, 
insurance, fuel costs, costs of implementation and expansions of the mining  equipment, 
costs of recultivation). Taking the expected wholesale electricity prices into consi-
deration, profitability trends can be derived from this. According to these trends, 
most lignite-fired power plants can still cover their ongoing operating costs in 2018, 
thanks to the high capacity utilisation. In this, the operators benefit from the CO2 
emission certificates purchased for roughly 5 euros/t in previous years (Bloomberg 2018). 
However, if the variable costs increase, e.g. due to the current increase in the CO2 
certificate prices to over 20 euros/t, continued operation of power plant blocks may 
be uneconomical. Additional costs could result e.g. from technical power plant 
 retrofits to extend the service life or to comply with the new thresholds for indust-
rial emissions (see Chapter 5.1) and from developing new open-cast mine sections.
The domino effect
In some cases, the term ‘domino effect’ is used to describe the concern that an entire 
coalfield will become unprofitable when individual lignite-fired power plant blocks 
are decommissioned, and will therefore have to be shut down. This extreme  assumption 
would mean that gradual phase-out trajectories could not be chosen, only a point in 
time when the entire coalfield would be shut down. However, as all power plants and 
open-cast mines are connected within the lignite coalfields, operation of individual 
power plants or open-cast mine sections remains possible, irrespective of whether 
operation of certain other power plants or open-cast mine sections  continues. One 
exception to this is the Inden open-cast mine with the Weisweiler  power plant, which 
is not connected to other open-cast mines in the Rhineland coalfields (see Fig. 1.1.4).
Lignite-fired power plants have 
very low variable costs. The 
investment costs for lignite-fired 
power plants have already been 
largely amortised.
However, if the variable costs 
increase, e.g. due to the current 
increase in the CO2 certificate 
prices to over 20 euros per tonne, 
continued operation of power 
plant blocks may be rendered 
uneconomical.
As the power plants and open-cast 
mines are interconnected within 
the coalfields, continued operation 
of individual power plants or 
open-cast mine sections is not 
necessarily endangered by the 
closure of individual other facilities.
1.2   COST STRUCTURES OF COAL-FIRED POWER GENERATION 
AND OPEN-CAST MINES
 » In the competition between the fossil energy sources, lignite has significant cost advantages compared 
with hard coal-fired or natural gas-fired plants, if further environmental effects are ignored.
 » Due to the current electricity wholesale prices, hard coal-fired power plants currently at most cover their 
variable costs. Even that is no longer guaranteed if the CO2 price increases further.
 » Operation of the open-cast mines burdens lignite-based power generation with a significant share of 
fixed costs. At the current price structures, the operating costs of the open-cast mines will no longer be 
covered in full starting from CO2 prices of roughly 15 euros/t.
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However, it is true that open-cast mine operation, which is very fixed cost-intensive, 
is only profitable at a minimum extraction quantity. The point at which an open-cast 
mine becomes unprofitable depends on a number of factors, and therefore cannot 
be generalised. Lignite open-cast mines and power plants are often operated  jointly 
by an integrated company. Accordingly, operation of the open-cast mines becomes 
part of the fixed costs of lignite power generation. These fixed costs incurred irre-
spective of the utilisation of power plant capacity must be covered by contribution 
margins from electricity sales. In a study, Öko-Institut calculated that at current price 
structures with a CO2 price of approx. 15 euros/t, the medium-term recoverable fixed 
operating costs of the open-cast mines (such as avoidable costs for relocations or 
large-scale open-cast mining equipment) would no longer be covered. From approx. 
25 euros/t CO2, even the short-term open-cast mining operating costs (e.g. fuel costs 
and other operating and auxiliary materials), as well as recoverable power plant 
fixed costs would only barely be covered (Öko-Institut 2018b). The CO2 price at which 
closure decisions would then be made depends on the efficiency of individual  power 
plant blocks and strategic decisions by operators, among other things.
Cost structures of power generation from hard coal
By contrast to lignite, the hard coal sector in Germany is already under considerable 
economic pressure today. While hard coal-fired power plants have lower capital costs 
than lignite-fired power plants, they have far higher fuel costs. Due to the resulting 
price disadvantage compared with lignite, hard coal-fired power plants ultimately 
have a significantly lower capacity utilisation. As a result, many hard coal-fired 
power plants are already making losses or can only cover their operating costs with 
additional revenues from the heating sector. As this economic outlook is unlikely to 
improve in the years to come either, many operators have already had to make big 
write-downs for newly constructed power plants (IEEFA 2017; Öko-Institut 2017b).
At a CO2 price of just approx. 
15 euros/t, the open-cast mines’ 
fixed operating costs would no 
longer be covered. From approx. 
25 euros/t CO2, the power plants’ 
fixed costs could only barely be 
covered.
The hard coal industry is currently 
subject to significant economic 
pressure. In particular, hard 
coal-fired power plants have far 




The operational sequence of power plants in the merit order
Pricing on the spot market is based on a system known as merit order. All participants 
on the electricity market offer electricity at least at their marginal costs. Marginal 
costs are defined as the costs incurred for one additional production unit, e.g. one 
additional kWh for electricity. To cover the hourly demand for electricity, power is 
purchased from generation plants in the order of their bids (starting with the lowest 
bid) – the merit order – until the demand for electricity is covered in full. The  electricity 
wholesale price paid to all providers who sell their electricity at a given point in 
time, is based on the last bid awarded an order (so called marginal plant).
The marginal costs of wind and solar power plants, which neither need fuel nor emit 
CO2, have marginal costs of zero. In addition, renewable energy sources have a  feed-in 
priority for preferential purchase, transmission and distribution of the electricity. All 
other costs above and beyond the direct production costs, e.g. investment costs or 
fixed costs of power plant operation are not part of the marginal costs, as they do not 
depend on the quantity of electricity produced. Accordingly, they do not form part of 
the bid. Environmental effects of power generation are only incorporated in the 
marginal costs if the operator must make direct payments for them. This is the case 
for CO2 emissions in the form of EU emission trading certificates (see Chapter 5.1).
In exceptional cases, it can be economical for operators of conventional power plants 
to offer electricity at prices under the marginal costs, as the alternative of stopping 
the plant and starting it up again would lead to higher costs (higher plant wear, 
conflicting contractual commitments in the heat or system services sectors). This 
lack of flexibility of conventional power plants results in a conventional minimum 
generation in the electricity system, which has even led to negative electricity prices 
in the past (see Chapter 1.4 - Flexibility of coal and natural gas-fired power plants).
In accordance with the prevailing marginal costs, the merit order is typically topped 
by renewable energy sources, followed by nuclear power and the fossil fuels (see 
Fig. 1.3.1). In recent years, the merit order has shifted away from conventional energy 
sources due to the growth of renewables. Now, the most expensive technologies are 
used less frequently. This ‘merit order effect’ has reduced the electricity wholesale 
price significantly.
In order to meet the electricity 
demand, power is purchased from 
generation plants in the order of 
their bids, known as the merit order. 
The electricity wholesale price is 
calculated from the highest accepted 
bid at a given point of time.
Additional costs for stopping and 
restarting coal-fired power plants 
can lead to negative prices.
1.3   PRICING ON THE ELECTRICITY MARKET AND COMPETITION 
BETWEEN COAL AND NATURAL GAS
 » The merit order of providers on the German electricity market is based on their marginal costs 
(costs incurred for production of one additional kWh of electricity). It is typically topped by renewable 
energy sources, followed by nuclear power and fossil energy sources.
 » The efficiency of the respective power plants and the international raw material and CO2 prices influ-
ence the competition between the fossil energy sources lignite, hard coal, natural gas and oil.  
 » At CO2 prices of 20 to 50 euros/t CO2, lignite-fired power plants are currently competing with hard coal 
and natural gas-fired power plants.
 » Efficient combined-cycle gas turbine power plants have comparable marginal costs with hard coal-fired 
power plants; by contrast, conventional gas-fired power plants are only used to cover demand peaks due 
to their far higher fuel costs.
 » Due to their low marginal costs, continued expansion of renewable energy sources will lead to further 
decreases in electricity wholesale prices in the medium term.
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Competition between the fossil energy sources within the merit order
The sequence of use of fossil fuels (lignite, hard coal, natural gas) depends in  particular 
on German and international raw material prices, and the current CO2  certificate price, 
in addition to the efficiency of a power plant. In recent years, more modern and effi-
cient gas-fired power plants have already overtaken older, less efficient hard coal-fired 
power plants in the merit order (move to the left). Fig. 1.3.2 shows a  schematic com-
parison of average short-term generation costs of power plants in the past three years.
At the current CO2 price in 
European emissions trading, 
modern gas-fired power plants 
overtake hard coal-fired power 
plants in the merit order.
Fig. 1.3.1: Merit Order in Germany 2015
Renewable energy sources top the 
merit order, followed by nuclear 
power and the fossil fuels lignite, 
hard coal and natural gas.










Quelle: DIW Berlin (2017b)
Fig. 1.3.2: Short-term generation costs of hard coal, lignite, conventional gas and 
 combined-cycle power plants
Notes: Efficiencies of between 35% and 43% were assumed for calculations of lignite, and 37% to 43% for hard 
coal. For combined-cycle power plants and conventional gas turbines, the efficiencies assumed are between 
50% and 62% or 33% and 40%, respectively. The fuel prices used for gas and hard coal are the average prices 
published by the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control for the last three years (BAFA 2018b, 2018a). 
For lignite, a fuel price of 4 euros/MWh was assumed, and the emission factors for the fuels correspond to  figures 





































































At a CO2 price of less than 20 euros/t, and ignoring other negative environmental 
effects, lignite has the lowest costs. At CO2 certificate prices of 20 to 50 euros/t CO2, 
lignite’s marginal costs compete with other fossil fuels. Already today – with a CO2 
price of roughly 20 euros (August 2018) – efficient combined-cycle gas power plants 
have lower costs than hard coal-fired power plants; conventional gas-fired power 
plants, on the other hand, are only called upon to cover demand peaks due to their 
far higher fuel costs. The increase in prices of CO2 emissions to almost four times 
the level of the previous year (from just roughly 5.50 euros/t CO2 in August 2017), 
the highest prices in 7 years, is also explained by the reforms of the Emissions Trading 
System. It can be assumed that power supply corporations like RWE have hedged 
the risks of rising CO2 prices by purchasing CO2 emission certificates at low prices 
for years in advance (Bloomberg 2018). Accordingly, the new emissions trading prices 
will not affect the merit order in the short term.
Box 1.1: Capacity instruments
In addition to variable costs, power supply companies must also cover their fixed 
costs, which are incurred irrespective of their capacity utilisation. That applies for 
both conventional power plants and renewable energy sources. Fundamentally, 
different price models are conceivable for covering variable and fixed costs and to 
ensure sufficient capacities at all times (Beckers and Hoffrichter 2014; Matthes et al. 2015). 
As ideal types, the following two organisational models are distinguished:
- In the current ‘energy-only’ system, companies generate their revenues from 
 electricity sales traded on the spot market. To date, renewable energy sources have 
been guaranteed sufficient revenue via the feed-in priority and other subsidy 
 mechanisms. Conventional power plants must offer electricity at prices that can 
cover their total variable and fixed costs in the long term. Lignite-fired power plants 
and nuclear power plants have almost always been used in the merit order to date 
due to their currently relatively low marginal costs. Thanks to this high utilisation, 
they generate enough revenue over the year to cover their full costs (variable and 
fixed costs) in spite of fluctuating electricity wholesale prices. Peak load power plants, 
e.g. gas turbines with comparatively high marginal costs, are only called on for a few 
hours a year, where there is a bottleneck to cover the total electricity demand. In 
these hours, sufficiently high price peaks are required to enable the power plants to 
still cover their entire full costs.
- By contrast, the ‘capacity instruments’ system focuses on a two-stage revenue 
structure. Besides the revenue of the electricity quantities sold, some companies are 
also to be paid for secure provision of electricity generation capacity. This can be 
implemented by TSO-arranged tenders for provision of certain quantities of  guaranteed 
capacity. In this system, the companies are paid to guarantee their ability to provide 
capacity to the TSO as required. The additional costs can be passed on to the end 
consumer via the electricity price.
Due to the high costs of mechanisms like these, the predictable subsidisation of 
excess capacities and foreseeable problems with administration, the German  Federal 
Government has chosen the ‘energy-only’ market design (BMWi (2015), Germanwatch 
(2012); see also the critical take on this of the German Association of Energy and 
Water Industries (BDEW 2017)).
It can be assumed that power 
supply corporations have hedged 
the risks of rising CO2 prices by 
purchasing CO2 emission certifi-
cates at low prices for years in 
advance.
Capacity instruments target a 
two-stage revenue structure, 
where guaranteed provision of 
power generation capacity is paid 
for in addition to the electricity 
volumes sold.
The German Federal Government 
has chosen an energy-only market 
design. Reasons include high costs, 
administration problems and the 
expected support for excess 
capacities when introducing 
capacity instruments.
From CO2 certificate prices of 20-50 
euros/t of CO2 and higher, there 
will also be increasing competition 




Flexibility of coal and natural gas-fired power plants
Due to the increasing percentage of fluctuating renewable energy sources in the  German 
and European electricity mix, the flexibility requirements in the future power supply 
system will increase (see Chapter 3.1). In principle, plants fired with solid fuels are 
 significantly less flexible than plants fired with liquid or gaseous fuels. In particular, 
the flexibility of lignite-fired power plants is restricted by their slow start-up processes 
and their high minimum loads (Öko-Institut 2017b). As in the case of the efficiency of 
the plants, the year of construction also plays a significant role here (see Tab. 1.4.1).
The comparatively high technical inflexibility of coal-fired power plants prevents them 
reacting quickly to changes in generation of renewable electricity. In particular, it  prevents 
deactivation of unrequired generation capacity (known as conventional minimum 
 generation). This leads to price drops, even including negative electricity prices (in 2017 
for 146 hours, and for 15 hours in 2011), and an additional strain on the electricity grids, 
and therefore to additional costs for the overall system (Consentec 2016).
In conventional minimum generation, roughly 70% of which is accounted for by 
 lignite-fired and nuclear power plants, ‘system-supporting minimum generation’ and 
the ‘conventional generation base’ are distinguished. ‘System-supporting minimum 
generation’ includes the components required for the electricity system to provide 
positive and negative redispatch and balancing energy (for details on the terms, see 
the ‘Alleviating grid bottlenecks’ section below and Chapter 3.5) and is specified as 3 to 
5 GW for Germany in 2015 by BNetzA (2017). On the other hand, the ‘conventional ge-
neration base’ adds a further 19 to 24 GW, required for operational reasons (long start-
up times and minimum runtimes), commercial reasons (additional costs from stopping 
and starting plants) or heat-related feed-in from CHP plants (accounts for 7 to 8 GW).
There are many technical means to increase the flexibility of power plants. Many 
 coal-fired power plants have used them to improve their flexibility in recent years. Even 
if the operation of coal-fired power plants (esp. hard coal) can adapt more flexibly to 
renewable generation than in previous years, they remain far less flexible than gas- fired 
plants (Öko-Institut 2017b). Also, more flexible operation of coal-fired power plants 
Due to the increasing volatility of 
power generation caused by the 
growth in fluctuating renewable 
energy sources, the flexibility 
requirements in the future 
electricity supply system 
are also rising.
As renewable energy sources 
become more abundant, the lack of 
technical flexibility of coal-fired 
power plants lowers electricity 
prices and puts additional strain on 
the grid.
The ‘conventional generation base’ 
comprises 19 to 24 GW, required for 
operational or commercial reasons 
(start-up times, minimum runtimes, 
wear) and heat-related feed-in due 
to combined heat and power 
generation.
There are many technical means to 
increase the flexibility of coal-fired 
power plants. However, flexible 
operation leads to higher costs and 
wear for the plants.
1.4   COST STRUCTURES OF COAL-FIRED POWER GENERATION 
AND OPEN-CAST MINES
 » The lack of technical flexibility of coal-fired power plants results in decreases of electricity prices, even 
including negative electricity prices and additional strain on the electricity grid, as renewable energy 
sources continue to grow. 
 » Measures to reduce and phase-out coal-fired power generation increase utilisation of less CO2-intensive, 
more flexible gas-fired power plants.
 » The slight resulting increase in the electricity wholesale price due to measures of this kind will  stimulate 
additional essential investments in demand management, storage and efficiency technologies. Greater 
price spreads and occasional higher peak prices could serve as incentives for investments in power-to-X 
applications, synthetic fuels and different battery technologies, with just a minor increase in prices for 
consumers.
 » A decrease in coal-fired power generation leads to a reduction in grid bottlenecks, as renewables are 
currently competing with conventional fuels for grid capacities.
 » A reduction of the coal-fired power generation would decrease electricity exports, which also adversely 
affect gas-fired power plants in neighbouring European countries with their high percentage of coal- (in 
particular lignite-) fired power. Domestic coal-generated electricity would only be replaced by foreign 
coal and nuclear power to a minor extent.
23
ENERGY ECONOMICS
Tab. 1.4.1: Potential speed of capacity adjustment of fossil-based power plant types 
between minimum and full load
Source: Prognos and Fichtner (2017)
*Note: Cold start capability means that the power plant has been shut down for over 48 hours 
previously. The greater temperature differences place a greater thermal stress on power plant 
components, which is why the power plant must be ramped up more slowly. Warm start capabil-
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Older lignite-fired power plants 1-2 % 8-10 hours 4-6 hours
Older hard coal-fired power 
plants 1.5-4 % 5-10 hours 2.5-3 hours
New lignite-fired power plants 2-6 % 5-8 hours 1.25-4 hours
New hard coal-fired power plants 3-6 % 3-6 hours 80 minutes – 2.5 hours
Open gas turbines 10-15 % 5-11 minutes 5-11 minutes
Combined-cycle power plants 
(natural gas-fired) 4-8 % 2-4 hours 30-90 minutes
causes increased thermal loads and thus rising operating and maintenance costs, and 
reduce the service lives of individual components (Prognos and Fichtner 2017). It also 
reduces the efficiency, as the electrical efficiencies when operating at partial loads 
decrease (Öko-Institut 2017b). Major retrofits may entail significant investment costs 
(Glensk and Madlener 2016).
Higher market shares for flexible natural gas-fired power plants as partner to 
renewable energies
Due to the low electricity wholesale prices, gas-fired power plants were only  operational 
on average for approx. 2,700 hours in 2017 (lignite-fired power plants ran almost two 
and a half times longer at over 6,600 hours; on average, hard coal-fired power plants 
ran for 3,600 hours). Under these conditions, it was difficult for gas-fired power plants 
(and also for hard coal-fired power plants) to earn the contribution margins for the 
fixed costs above and beyond the variable costs. As a result, many natural gas-fired 
power plants were shut down, or announced their intentions to shut down, in recent 
years (BNetzA 2018c). However, thanks to their comparatively greater flexibility and 
low CO2 intensity, gas-fired power plants could be an ideal supplement to fluctuating 
renewable energy sources for a transitional period (see Chapter 3.3).
Studies assume that a coal phase-out will increase utilisation of gas-fired power plants 
(ewi 2016; PwC 2016; enervis energy advisors 2015; DIW Berlin 2014a). The Cologne 
 Institute of Energy Economics (ewi 2016) calculated that a coal phase-out would lead 
to additional revenue of approx. 2.4 billion euros for gas-fired power plants, and ad-
ditional revenue of 5.1 billion euros for  renewable energy sources.
In recent years, it has often proved 
impossible to operate gas-fired 
power plants profitably.
It is to be expected that the coal 
phase-out will result in greater 
utilisation of gas-fired power plants.
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Economic incentives for further technologies
In the short term, an accelerated coal phase-out could result in a slight increase in 
electricity wholesale prices (DIW Berlin 2014e; PwC 2016) (see Chapter 4.4). Potential 
migratory effects of energy-intensive industries out of Germany are unlikely due to the 
expected electricity wholesale prices (Germeshausen and Löschel 2015; Agora Energie-
wende 2014b; SRU 2017; DIW Berlin 2014c). A slight increase in the electricity  wholesale 
price could stimulate urgently needed investments for the future electricity system. 
Besides lower-CO2 power plant technologies, this could also include advancing storage 
technologies, demand management options and energy efficiency measures. For 
 example, due among other things to the low price peaks or insufficient price spread, 
load  management is virtually non-existent in the industrial sector, although there is a 
 considerable technical potential for it, for example in the aluminium electrolysis/air 
fractionation industries, electric steel and paper/cardboard production (UBA 2015b). 
Investments in storage technologies outside of self-supply solutions are only  incentivised 
if price spreads send the right messages. Higher electricity prices are required as an in-
vestment incentive in particular for the development and use of power-to-gas or synthetic 
fuels (Agora Energiewende 2014a; Agora Energiewende and Agora Verkehrswende 2018). 
Power-to-heat can also benefit from higher electricity prices via various battery techno-
logies (Agora Energiewende 2017b). Higher prices can also offer incentives for greater 
energy efficiency, both for households and industrial consumers (DIW Berlin 2018a).
Alleviation of grid bottlenecks and grid expansion requirements
Electricity transport is subject to the laws of physics. For example, electricity always 
chooses the path of least resistance to the centres of consumption, which is in most 
cases the shortest route. This often leads to grid bottlenecks at locations where both 
significant renewable energy sources and major conventional plants like nuclear  power 
plants or coal-fired power plants feed into the grid (BNetzA 2018b). TSOs must then 
take system stability measures like curtailing renewables (feed-in management) and 
redispatch. Redispatch means that power generation plants upstream of the grid 
bottleneck are curtailed and systems downstream of the grid bottleneck provide the 
supply. The resulting costs totalled roughly 1.4 billion euros in 2017 (BNetzA 2018b). An 
analysis by BMWi and BNetzA (2017) indicates that a reduction of coal-fired power 
generation could alleviate the grid situation in Germany, enhancing security of supply 
and saving costs for system services.
The lack of technical flexibility of existing conventional power plants exacerbates this 
problem, as power plants cannot be shut down completely. Grid operator 50Hertz, 
whose supply region includes both the Lusatian and the Central German coalfields, has 
therefore incorporated various sensitivities for the speed of the coal phase-out etc. for 
future grid expansion requirements. The results show that an accelerated lignite 
 phase-out would lead to a 5% lower need for grid expansion without endangering 
security of suppy (50Hertz 2016).
Effects on the energy mix in neighbouring countries
In Germany, net electricity exports, i.e. the difference between exports and imports has 
increased continuously in recent years. In 2017 the figure was just under 60 TWh, or 
roughly 10% of the German power consumption (see also Fig. 1.4.1) (Fraunhofer ISE 
2018a; Agora Energiewende 2018). The increase can be traced back to the comparati-
vely low prices on the German electricity exchange (Prognos and Öko-Institut 2017). 
The average electricity export price in 2017 was 35.57 euros/MWh, while the import 
price was 38.31 euros/MWh (Fraunhofer ISE 2018a).
With its significant percentage of coal power, especially lignite power (era 2017), German 
electricity exports also place a strain on Germany’s European neighbours (energate 2017). 
This is forcing gas-fired power plants from the market, not only in Germany, but also 
in neighbouring countries like the Netherlands and Italy. These effects could be 
Coal phase-out can incentivise the 
required investments 
 in renewable energy sources, 
storage  technologies, 
demand  management options and 
energy efficiency measures.
Grid bottlenecks arise in particular 
where major conventional plants 
like nuclear power plants or 
coal-fired power plants feed 
electricity into the grid in addition 
to renewable energies.
50Hertz assumes that an 
 accelerated coal phase-out would 
lead to a 5% reduction in the need 
for grid expansion.
Germany’s electricity exports have 
risen sharply in recent years and 
are now roughly 10% of domestic 
consumption.
With their significant coal share, 
much of it lignite, German power 




 exacerbated further by upgraded electricity cables from Germany to Norway, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Austria (Agora Energiewende 2017c).
Box 1.2: Effects of a reduction of coal-fired power generation in Germany on electricity imports
In the event of a reduction in coal-fired power plants, Germany would initially only 
reduce its exports of coal-based power, and not automatically import nuclear power 
from France or coal-based power from Poland (Energy Brainpool 2017; PwC 2016). 
Various studies have been submitted, indicating that even in the event of a comple-
te coal phase-out by 2030 Germany would at most only become a minor net importer 
or could have an neutral electricity balance, (öko-Institut 2018b; Agora Energiewen-
de 2017c; DIW Berlin 2015b). According to one analysis, Germany could even remain 
a net electricity exporter (Energy Brainpool 2017a).
Electricity imports are only worthwhile for buyer countries if domestic electricity 
production is more expensive. As a result, low-cost German coal-based electricity is 
currently replacing lower-emission gas-fired power plants in other countries in par-
ticular. In the event of a decrease in German coal-fired power generation, increases 
in electricity production from gas-fired power plants in other European countries are 
to be expected, and not from the nuclear and lignite-fired power plants, which are 
currently working to capacity. Model results show that a reduction of coal-fired pow-
er generation in Germany would not lead to an increase in the use of nuclear power 
in France, even in 2030, and only to a minimal increase in coal-fired power genera-
tion in neighbouring European countries. In Europe, the lower German coal-fired 
power generation would also lead to a significantly greater utilisation and far higher 
expansion of renewable energy sources (DIW Berlin 2018b).
Fig. 1.4.1: Development of German electricity exports and imports and the exchange 
electricity price











Foreign electricity trade balance
Electricity exports
Electricity exchange price (right axis)
A coal phase-out would reduce 
German electricity exports, but not 
necessarily increase imports of 
nuclear power from France or 
coal-based power from Poland.
26
Chapter  1
Germany has a comprehensive regulatory framework to guarantee security of supply 
and to ensure that power plant closures do not lead to security of supply shortfalls.
Monitoring of power plant closures
All intended power plant closures must be announced to the BNetzA 12 months  before 
the planned closure date per Section 3 b of the Energy Industry Act (EnWG). The  Federal 
Network Agency first forwards the closure application to the TSO, which assesses the 
system relevance of the power plant. If it is found to be system relevant, closure can 
be prevented; the power plant must then be kept on standby for an initial 24-month 
period. This period can be extended indefinitely by a further 24 months. The costs in-
curred for maintaining a state of standby are reimbursed to the operator (per Section 
13 c of EnWG). These costs are charged on as part of the grid fees. Currently, 26 power 
plant blocks with a net nominal capacity of roughly 6.9 GW are classified as system 
relevant. At 13 power plant blocks and an overall capacity of 3.0 GW, most of these 
plants are natural gas-fired. Seven power plant blocks, with a capacity of 2.3 GW, are 
hard coal-fired. There are a further six power plant blocks which run on crude oil pro-
ducts, accounting for 1.6 GW.
Reserves
The regulatory framework also requires the establishment of various reserves and load 
management (EnGW Section 13 b, d, e, f and Section 11 Par. 3):
 • The grid reserve is designed to provide sufficient flexible generation capacity for 
grid-supporting bottleneck management for the winter term. It includes both 
redispatch capacities and measures to maintain voltage or to restore the supply 
after a failure in Germany or other countries. The grid reserve aims in particular 
to rectify grid bottlenecks from north to south.
 • Moreover, grid stability plants are to be provided to the TSOs from 2020 on, as special 
network operating equipment to rectify faults in the German  transmission grid.
 • Besides securing grid-side faults, the capacity reserve will provide support in 
unusual and unpredicted situations from 2019 on. For example, this would take 
effect if electricity generation and consumption cannot be balanced on the Ger-
man power markets. In order to minimise the volume of the strategic reserves, 
the capacity reserve is dovetailed with the grid reserve at the request of the 
European Commission. Power plants can qualify for both security mechanisms 
simultaneously if they have a grid-supporting location.
 • The TSOs can also contract switchable loads and reduce their electricity supply 
if necessary with payment, in order to react to generation or grid bottlenecks. 
Providers of switchable loads include industrial companies connected in the 
medium, high or ultra-high voltage grid. The compensation is worthwhile for 
companies whose production is not disrupted, or only disrupted to a minor extent, 
Intended closures of power plants 
must be announced to the Federal 
Network Agency with 12 months’ 
notice. If the power plant is found 
to be system-relevant, it must be 
kept on standby. The operator is 
reimbursed for the resulting costs.
Various reserves and load 
management offer further security.
1.5  MONITORING TO ENSURE SECURITY OF SUPPLY
 » The right to reserve approval for closure (assessment by the Federal Network Agency) and reserve capa-
cities ensure that a sufficiently guaranteed capacity can be provided in Germany even in the event of 
extensive closures of coal-fired power plants.
 » The transmission system operators are obliged to conduct an annual system analysis to study potential 
critical limit situations of the power supply system (extreme load, generation and grid assumptions).
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by a temporary decrease or stoppage of their power procurement.
 • In the event of supply-side bottlenecks due to extreme and prolonged  predictable 
weather situations, the lignite security reserve, provided by lignite-fired power 
plants shut down on a preliminary basis, can be activated as the final security 
mechanism. In light of the current excess power plant capacities and the low 
flexibility of these plants, they are unlikely to be used in the security reserve 
phase (UBA (2017a), and Chapter 5.3).
The various reserves and load management options – excluding the lignite security 
reserve – have a total capacity of 11.3 GW, comprising the grid reserve (6.6 GW for 
winter 2018/19), grid-stabilising plants (1.2 GW from 2020 on), the capacity reserve 
(2 GW) and switchable loads (1.5 GW). The total capacity of the reserves can be decrea-
sed by max. 2 GW due to the combination of the grid and capacity reserve, where  power 
plants qualify for both security mechanisms.
The lignite security reserve currently comprises 0.9 GW and will grow to max. 2.7 GW 
in 2019. It will then decrease until 2023 and be phased out. Given the low flexibility of 
lignite power plants, it is unlikely to be used.
Intervention options
In the event of a foreseeable shortfall, BNetzA and the TSOs have short- and medium-term 
options:
 • Expansion of the capacity reserve per Section 13 e of EnWG
 • Construction of power plants (e.g. gas turbines) as special grid equipment (im-
plementable in the short-term, incorporated in Section 11 Par. 3 of EnWG)
By amending the Federal Requirement Plan Act (BBPlG), cross-border interconnectors 
to other European countries could also be expanded.
The extent of the individual security measures is based on an annual system analysis, 
in which the TSOs investigate potential critical limit situations of the power supply 
system. These analyses are based on various extreme load, generation and grid assump-
tions. The analysis is made for a short-term perspective of the upcoming winter period, 
i.e. the time of year with the highest electricity demand. It is also conducted for the 
long term for at least one more of the following four years under review, and confirmed 
by the BNetzA.
Germany has reserve capacities 
and demand management options 
of approx. 11.3 GW.
If a shortfall is foreseeable, the 
Federal Network Agency has 
various options for sourcing secure 
capacity, such as expanding the 
capacity reserve or building 
gas-fired power plants.
The Federal Network Agency and 
transmission system operators 
conduct regular system analyses to 
investigate critical limit situations 
in the power supply system. These 
analyses are based on extreme 
load, generation and grid 
 assumptions.
The energy transformation in Germany and worldwide is driven by man-made global climate change 
caused by greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and the national and international climate policy targets 
that have been developed in response. 
As well as describing the impact of climate change (Chapter 2.1), this Chapter also explains interna-
tional climate policy targets and the concept of a limited carbon budget (Chapter 2.2) and outlines 
trends in the global use of coal (Chapter 2.3). Subsequently, it presents German targets and progress 
made so far in the field of climate change mitigation (Chapter 2.4) and derives the climate policy 
framework necessary to facilitate the reduction and phase-out of coal-fired power generation in 
Germany (Chapter 2.5).
GREENHOUSE GAS NEUTRALITY BY THE MIDDLE OF THE CENTURY
Evidence supports the fact that the intensity of the climate change we observe is due to human 
activity. Its consequences will directly or indirectly impact all areas of life and economic activity 
worldwide. The macroeconomic costs of unabated climate change significantly exceed the costs of 
timely climate change mitigation.
Under the Paris Climate Agreement, the rise in average global temperature is to be limited to well 
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and efforts are to be pursued to restrict the rise in temperature 
to 1.5 °C. To implement the Paris climate targets, the German Climate Action Plan has adopted the 
goal of general GHG neutrality by the middle of the century, i.e. energy-related GHG emissions are 
to be almost eliminated by 2050. The key GHG in this respect is CO2.
Studies conducted on behalf of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) and others show that an 
80% reduction of GHG emissions by 2050 would - at the very least - be cost-neutral for Germany. 
Alliances with international partners, resulting for instance in lower costs of new technologies, 
will be crucial if the 95% target is to be attained. However, already short- and medium-term climate 
change mitigation measures must be designed such that the 95% target by 2050 remains achievable.
TRANSFORMATION OF ENERGY SUPPLY AT NATIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVEL
While Germany was long seen as a pioneer in the field of global climate change mitigation, national 
GHG emissions have failed to go down in the last years. According to current forecasts, Germany is 
expected to miss the 2020 climate policy target (40% reduction of GHG emissions compared to 1990) 
by a margin of 8 percentage points. Coal-based power makes up a larger percentage in Germany than 
in the USA. Germany is by far the biggest consumer of lignite worldwide. By contrast, other countries 
are significantly reducing their use of coal. Over the last five years, the UK has cut the share of coal-
based power from 39 to 2%. China, the biggest consumer of coal-based power worldwide, has also 
stopped the growth trend of the last few decades.
The speed and extent to which Germany can reduce its dependence on coal is of central importance 
for global advances in climate change mitigation, because many countries are closely observing 
Germany’s energy transition. If this affluent country and technology leader fails to demonstrate how 
the conversion to a high percentage of renewable energy is possible, faith in the feasibility of the 
Paris climate targets could be shaken. In consequence, the ambition of climate change mitigation 
efforts could be weakened in many countries.
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Summary
MEDIUM TERM - THE 2030 TARGET
The German climate policy target for 2030 provides for a minimum total GHG emission reduction 
of 55% compared to the year 1990. Under the German Climate Action Plan, the 2030 target is broken 
down by sector, with the energy industry slated for a minimum reduction contribution of 61 to 62%. 
In terms of power generation, the required savings must essentially be delivered through a reduction 
of coal-based power. Using less natural gas in the short- to mid-term would not be appropriate, since 
gas is less CO2-intensive and gas power plants are more flexible than coal-fired plants when it comes 
to responding to fluctuations in solar and wind power generation. Hence, the percentage of gas in the 
electricity mix is expected to rise until 2030. Against this background, the conclusion is that annual 
coal-fired power generation must decline by at least 60% by 2030 compared to today to ensure that 
the 2030 target can be reached. Under scenarios aiming for a 95% reduction of GHG emissions by 
2050 - the Federal Government’s upper target range for the year 2050 -, coal-fired power generation 
would have to drop by approx. 70 to 85% by 2030.
CLOSURE OF THE LAST COAL-FIRED POWER PLANT AND SHORT-TERM REDUCTION  
CONTRIBUTIONS
The debate about possible phase-out trajectories for coal-based energy must also account for the 
fact that, from a climate physical perspective, there is a substantial difference between earlier and 
later closures of power plants. Because the key parameter is the emissions cumulated over the years. 
This means that ambitious short-term reductions allow a certain leeway for keeping the last power 
plants on the grid for a longer period. Then again, the longer the delay in the reduction measures, 
the steeper the reduction will have to be.
Consequently, the ‘climate policy gap’ arising from the failure to reach the 2020 target must be closed 
as soon as possible. According to the current trend, the 2020 target would be missed by 8 percentage 
points, which corresponds to approx. 100 million t of CO2. Through reduced coal-fired power  generation 
the energy industry has a higher potential to save significant amounts of CO2 in a relatively short 
time compared to other sectors.
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Man-made climate change is undisputed fact
The earth’s climate has always been dominated by long-term variations. In the course 
of millions of years, periods of warmer average temperatures alternated with  periods 
of colder average temperatures. A range of different phenomena precipitates these 
natural fluctuations, for instance different degrees of solar activity, natural disasters 
such as erupting volcanoes or changes in the oceans’ heat circulation. However, the 
rise in GHG in the atmosphere and the associated warming of average global tem-
peratures in the last 100 years cannot be explained with natural causes alone. 
Current climate change is demonstrably man-made and results from the growing 
greenhouse gas effects triggered by GHG emissions since the beginning of the age 
of industrialisation (IPCC 2014). With very few exceptions, all climate experts agree 
on this point, with the level of agreement rising in line with the scientists’  expertise 
(Cook et al. 2016).
Climate change is caused by 
man-made greenhouse gas effects 
triggered by higher GHG emissions.
There is a clear link between CO2 
levels in the atmosphere and the 
rise in average global air 
 temperatures.
Fig. 2.1.1: Surface air temperature - global average annual values from 1860 to 2005.
Source: (Kasang o. J.) based on IPCC (2007)
 » Our climate is already changing: Average global temperatures have risen by more than 1°C over pre- 
industrial levels. Evidence supports the fact that the intensity of the climate change we are observing 
is due to human activity. 
 » Global effects include extreme weather events, such as heavy rainfall, storms, heat waves or droughts. 
Sea levels are rising and the oceans are acidifying. 
 » These trends have a host of negative effects on ecosystems, human health, infrastructure, cities,  agriculture, 
tourism and energy production. Not restricted to the global south, they are also making themselves felt 
in Germany. 
 » Furthermore, Germany and Europe may also be affected by indirect consequences of climate change as 
food crises may reinforce international conflicts and lead to increased migration, while extreme local 
weather events may affect global trade. 
 » The macroeconomic costs of unchecked climate change significantly exceed the costs of timely climate 
change mitigation.
2.1  IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN GERMANY AND 
WORLDWIDE
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND MITIGATION TARGETS
Fig. 2.1.1 juxtaposes the global average annual temperature with the average tem-
perature over a 30-year period (using the years 1960 to 1990 as base period). Aside 
from the absolute value, the change in the average global temperature is also highly 
relevant in terms of global warming and its impact. Disregarding temporary 
 fluctuations in individual years, average annual temperatures in the past 100 years 
show a distinct upward trend and hence a development that coincides with the 
trend in GHG emissions (small illustration, bottom left).
At approx. 1.1 °C above pre-industrial levels, 2016 was the warmest year since tem-
perature records began (Jones 2017). The 20 warmest years since records began all 
occurred in the period after 1990 (UBA 2018d). In general, land temperatures have 
risen faster than sea temperatures. In some individual regions, global warming 
substantially exceeds the world’s average. For instance, in the past 100 years 
 temperatures in the Arctic rose at double the rate of the global average (UBA 2013b).
Impacts of climate change
Since climatic conditions are crucial in determining where and how human  civilisations 
and ecosystems develop, climate change will completely transform life on earth. 
This is not just a case of gradual changes in temperature, it is a fundamental  upheaval 
of basic climatic structures (Schleussner et al. 2016) - specifically of established 
 atmospheric conditions which are a central prerequisite for predictable food  production. 
The consequences of climate change will directly or indirectly impact all areas of 
life and economic activity. Among the direct impacts are:
 • Extreme weather events: It is already clear that global warming has led to more 
extreme weather events, including heat waves and frequent storms as well as 
longer droughts and heavy rainfall.
 • Health: Heat affects the circulatory system, especially among older people and 
those with chronic illnesses, and can have lethal consequences. Changes in 
 climate zones also allow disease carriers, e.g. malaria mosquitoes, to proliferate 
in regions where they previously did not exist (Stöver 2015).
 • Water supply: A temperature increase of over 1.5 °C will have drastic consequen-
ces, not least for the Mediterranean region. It is now assumed that a  temperature 
increase of 1.5 °C or above will result in a 10% to 20% drop in precipitation ( Iglesias 
et al. 2006), which will have a massive impact on the availability of water in the 
entire Mediterranean region.
 • Sea levels: If global warming rises between 1.5 °C and 2 °C, sea levels are expected 
to rise by a further 10 cm to 50 cm by 2100 compared to the year 2000. Any rise 
in sea levels of up to one meter will have a direct impact on the Maldives, the 
Nile delta in Egypt, the city of Shanghai and numerous island states (Schröter 
2013; Germanwatch 2002). However, many other densely populated coastal areas 
will also be affected, for instance in the north-east of the USA and parts of Asia 
(Munich RE n.d.).
 • Urban areas and infrastructure: More than half of the global population lives in 
cities which are often situated on rivers or coasts. The hurricanes which have 
swept the USA in the past few years have clearly shown that rising sea levels 
and extreme weather conditions pose a direct danger to populations, urban 
infrastructure and companies alike (Mooney 2017). However, even cities which 
are not located directly on the coast will have to deal with climate impacts, 
especially in the form of consistent heat (Rosenzweig et al. 2015).
 • Agriculture: Vegetation periods will shift as a consequence of climate change. 
Extreme weather conditions can jeopardise entire harvests. Some food producing 
regions, for instance the southern Mediterranean, will no longer be usable for 
this purpose. Migrating pests can lead to lower yields and increased use of 
 pesticides which, in turn, may have a negative impact on health.
At 1.1 °C above pre-industrial levels, 
2016 was the warmest year since 
records began. The 20 warmest 
years since records began all 
occurred in the period after 1990.
Climate change is not just a case of 
gradual changes in temperature, it 
is a fundamental overthrow of 
basic climatic structures, especially 
of established weather conditions, 




 • Tourism: Climate change is expected to result in drastically different climatic 
conditions in many regions. This will have significantly negative effects on the 
economic performance of tourism-dominated regions.
 • Energy production: With big power plants requiring large amounts of cooling 
water, which typically comes from rivers, extended heat periods threaten the 
security of supply provided by fossil and nuclear power plants. The river water 
used for this purpose must not exceed a certain maximum temperature.
Generally, the impact of climate change increases disproportionally with rising 
temperatures rather than on a linear basis. On top of this, certain effects are irrever-
sible and trigger developments that cannot be contained (so-called ‘tipping points’), 
for instance the release of methane in thawing permafrost regions (PIK 2007).
Aside from the direct consequences arising from changes in climatic conditions, 
there are also a number of indirect effects, for instance:
 • Conflicts, possibly wars, triggered by competition for food and water (Anton 2017),
 • Migration caused by food scarcities, fights for water resources and climate 
disasters (Pinzler 2017),
 • Economic crises and adverse effects on global trade due to recurring weather 
disasters (Jahn 2015; van Asselt 2017; Darby 2015).
The majority of climatic changes and adverse effects are expected to occur in the 
global south. At the same time, the countries which are most likely to be affected 
have the lowest economic and technological capability to adjust. However, in  Germany 
too, the effects of climate change are already noticeable, for instance in the increased 
frequency of heat waves, storms, flooding through heavy rainfall or droughts. Even 
if certain consequences do not directly affect Europe, significant economic and  social 
impacts on Europe and Germany can be expected due to progressive globalisation 
(economy, migration).
Cost of climate change
The more pronounced the impact of climate change, the higher the macroeconomic 
cost. Sir Nicholas Stern, former chief economist at the World Bank, put the cost of 
global warming in a range of 2°C to 3°C at 5% to 20% of global GDP. The cost of doing 
nothing is thus significantly higher than the cost of effective climate change which 
Stern estimated to be 1% of GDP per year (Stern 2006). The longer we hold back on 
combating climate change and implementing adjustment measures for consequen-
ces that can no longer be avoided, the higher the cost will be. In contrast, early  climate 
change mitigation measures can even result in economic benefits for Germany 
(Fraunhofer ISI et al. 2012).
Climate change effects are not 
increasing at a linear rate. Higher 
temperatures can trigger 
 irreversible developments.
The cost associated with climate 
change significantly exceed the 
cost of climate change mitigation.
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Paris climate policy targets
Under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, “the increase in the global average 
 temperature [is to be held] well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and efforts 
[are to be pursued] to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial 
levels” (UNFCCC 2015, Art. 2).
To implement the Paris climate policy targets, 169 countries had adopted  Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) as per March 2018 and submitted them to the 
UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2018). The current NDCs are expected to result in a global rise of 
temperatures of over 3 °C (CAT 2018). Pursuant to estimates of the UN Environment 
Programme, global GHG emissions would have to be cut by a further 22 to 38% beyond 
the countries’ current NDCs by 2030 if the Paris climate policy targets are to be reached.
According to the scenarios researched by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), maximum warming of 2 °C is unachievable unless global (net) GHG 
emissions are reduced to zero before 2100 (IPCC 2014). Compliance with the 1.5 °C 
target requires the complete elimination of global emissions between 2055 and 2075. 
As well as many 2 °C scenarios, most scenarios compatible with the 1.5 °C target 
assume that the second half of the century will see ‘negative emissions’ (Rogelj et 
al. 2018). So-called negative emissions are technically feasible and could be achieved 
through direct air capture or capture and storage (CCS) of CO2 emissions from 
GHG-neutral sources (bioenergy with carbon capture and storage). However, the 
respective technological processes are either not yet commercially available, asso-
ciated with high costs or leading to conflicts of use (e.g. food production)  (Wuppertal 
Institut, Fraunhofer ISI and IZES 2018; Heck et al. 2018; Smith et al. 2016).
Aside from these long-term targets, it will also be necessary to reduce global  emissions 
in the short-term to ensure that the total available carbon budget is not exceeded. 
Global energy-related CO2 emissions must reach their peak between 2020 and 2030 
and decline thereafter (Rogelj et al. 2018; IEA 2017d, 78; UNEP 2017; IPCC 2014).
Carbon budget
Climate policy targets are frequently formulated in the form of reduction targets for 
a specific date. Germany, for instance has adopted the aim of reducing its GHG 
emissions by a minimum of 55% by 2030 compared to the year 1990. From a political 
perspective, this is a logical approach to formulating targets since it is easy to com-
municate and verify an ‘x% reduction by 20xx’. However, from a climate physical 
perspective, such a target is insufficient. The decisive factor that determines the 
degree of global warming is not the GHG emissions at a certain point in time but 
the cumulated emissions over a period. Many climate experts therefore talk about 
a maximum available ‘carbon budget’.
Greenhouse gas emissions must 
decline to zero in the second half of 
the century if the Paris climate 
policy targets are to be reached.
The decisive factor that determines 
the degree of global warming is 
not the emissions at a certain point 
in time but the cumulative 
emissions over a period.
 » According to the Paris Climate Agreement, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced to zero by the 
second half of this century at the latest.
 » In terms of climate change mitigation, the key factor is not the greenhouse gas emissions at a certain 
point in time but the total emissions quantity over a period (carbon budget approach).
2.2  INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY TARGETS AND 
AVAILABLE CARBON BUDGET CONCEPT
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The carbon budget concept clearly shows that low-key climate change mitigation 
today will require much more significant reductions in GHG emissions tomorrow 
(see first curve in Fig. 2.2.1). Ambitious measures taken at an early stage, on the other 
hand, can create leeway for less drastic reduction trajectories in the future (see second 
curve in Fig. 2.2.1).
According to the IPCC, global CO2 emissions between 1870 and 2100 may not exceed 
approx. 2,900 Gt if we want to keep global warming below 2 °C. By 2011, global CO2 
emissions had already exceeded 1,900 Gt (IPCC 2014) and a further 215 Gt were  emitted 
between 2012 and 2017 (own calculation based on the Global Carbon Project 2017; 
World Bank 2018). To comply with the 2 °C target, cumulative emissions between 
2018 and 2100 must be lower than 785 Gt of CO2. If we aim for 1.5 °C, the carbon  budget 
is as low as 180 Gt of CO2 (based on Rogelj et al. 2018). Given the fact that global CO2 
emissions currently amount to approx. 35 Gt per year, an immediate reduction of 
emissions is evidently required.
In 2015, the world’s coal-fired power plants accounted for 14.5 Gt of CO2, i.e. 45%, of 
global energy-related CO2 emissions (IEA 2017a, 2018d). If all coal-fired power plants 
currently in existence, under construction or planned were in operation until the end 
of their technical lifetime, they would emit a total of approx. 234 Gt of CO2  (CoalSwarm, 
Sierra Club and Greenpeace 2017). Hence, the climate policy targets will not be reached 
unless CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants are substantially reduced.
To comply with the 2 °C target, the 
world may emit another 785 Gt of 
CO2 until 2100. Current global CO2 
emissions amount to approx. 
35 Gt of CO2 per year.
Coal-fired power plants are 
responsible for 45% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Source: Own compilation based on SRU (2017)
Early reduction of GHG emissions creates certain leeway in the future
Delayed climate change mitigation results in higher future requirements
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Coal growth has peaked
Following close to two decades of substantial growth, the global coal sector has seen 
a trend reversal since 2015. In the years 2015, 2016 and 2017, coal mining recorded the 
biggest decline since 1971. Demand for coal has dropped consistently by 2% year-on- 
year and the number of newly constructed power plants has decreased significantly 
(IEA 2017c). China, Europe and the USA are mainly responsible for this development. 
In 2016, coal production in the USA dropped by an estimated 17% from the previous 
year (IEA 2017c) while India and China together abandoned over 100 planned power 
plant projects in 2016 (CoalSwarm, Sierra Club and Greenpeace 2017). Worldwide, the 
number of new power plant construction projects decreased by 29% year-on-year in 
the past two years. At the same time, growing numbers of power plants were shut 
down in the last decade (CoalSwarm, Sierra Club and Greenpeace 2017).
Future growth in the demand for coal, which was still considered a certainty just a 
few years ago, is now in doubt: In its contribution to the Paris Agreement, China, the 
biggest coal consumer worldwide, has undertaken to reach the peak of its coal-fired 
power plants emissions by 2030. However, the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
assumes that China has already reached its coal consumption peak (IEA 2016; see 
also Green and Stern 2017).
In the USA, the future of coal is also uncertain: Although the Trump government 
has promised the coal industry its full support, natural gas is increasingly challenging 
the competitiveness of coal-fired power (IEA 2017c). The share of coal in the US 
 electricity mix has dropped from 53% in 2000 to 34% in 2015 (IEA 2018c).
Even India and South-East Asia, for a long time the great hope of coal exporters, no 
longer offer any certainty when it comes to further growth in coal demand. The 
reasons are the rapidly declining cost of renewable energy and protests against air 
pollution (IEA 2017d).
In the period 1990 to 2007, the EU generated approx. 1,000 TWh of coal-based pow-
er a year. Between 2007 and 2015, this figure declined to 826 TWh (IEA 2018b).  Hence, 
the share of coal in total power generation has dropped from 30% to 26%. Eastern 
and western European countries show substantial discrepancies: With the  exception 
of Germany and Spain, all western European countries have already phased out coal 
production and use or are phasing it out within the next ten years (UNEP 2017). Most 
notably, the UK has cut the share of coal-based power from 39% (2012) to 2% (2017) 
in just a few years (CoalSwarm, Sierra Club and Greenpeace 2017). In May 2018, the 
Dutch government announced that the use of coal in power generation would be 
prohibited within the coming decade and that two of its five coal-fired power plants 
would be closed by 2024 unless they converted to different fuels (Meijer 2018). 
Global demand for coal is seeing a 
significant decline.
The International Energy Agency 
assumes that China has already 
reached its coal consumption peak.
The share of coal in the US 
electricity mix has dropped from 
53% in 2000 to 34% in 2015.
The UK has cut its high coal 
percentage from 39% (2012)  
to 2% (2017) in five years.
Die Netherlands will close down all 
coal-fired power plants by 2030.
 » Following a long phase of expansion, the coal sector is now going through a trend reversal. China, the 
biggest coal consumer worldwide, has broken the growth trend of the last few decades.
 » With the exception of Germany and Spain, all western European countries have either completed or are 
preparing their phase-out of coal. Over the last five years, the UK has cut the share of coal-based power 
from 39% to 2%.
 » Coal-based power makes up a larger percentage in Germany than in the USA. Germany is by far the 
biggest consumer of lignite worldwide.
2.3 GLOBAL TRENDS IN COAL-FIRED POWER GENERATION
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By contrast, the majority of central and eastern European countries persist with 
their domestic coal production (UNEP 2017).
If the current trends continue, the annual number of closures of coal-fired power 
plants will exceed the number of new constructions as of 2022, kicking off an  overall 
decline in the number of global coal-fired power plants (CoalSwarm, Sierra Club and 
Greenpeace 2017).
Powering Past Coal Alliance
Under the leadership of the UK and Canada, the Powering Past Coal Alliance was 
established in 2017 with the aim of swiftly advancing global phase-out programmes 
and substantially limiting global warming. According to the Alliance, to achieve this 
objective, all OECD countries must phase out coal-fired power generation by 2030 
and all non-OECD states by 2050. By December 2017, the initiative had brought to-
gether over 35 countries and regions all of which have committed to phasing out 
coal by 2030 or earlier. On top of this, 24 companies and organisations have joined 
the Alliance who have pledged to discontinue all investments in coal-fired power 
plants operating without carbon capture and storage (CCS). Aside from the UK and 
Canada, members also include Mexico, New Zealand, several US states and European 
countries consisting of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and 
Switzerland (Powering Past Coal Alliance 2017). Although coal already plays a minor 
role in many member countries, there are some (for instance the Netherlands or the UK) 
in which coal was previously a significant part of the electricity mix.
Coal use in Germany in international comparison
As shown in Fig. 2.3.1, at 425 g of CO2/kWh, the CO2 intensity of electricity generation 
in Germany is significantly higher than the average of the EU countries (276 g CO2/kWh). 
Only five EU states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Poland, Czech Republic) have a higher 
share of coal-based electricity (IEA 2018b; World Bank 2018). The large proportion of 
lignite, which is particularly CO2-intensive, plays a significant role. At 20% of global 
production, Germany is the world’s biggest lignite consumer by far (see Fig. 2.3.2). 
The quantity of lignite produced in Germany is approx. 2.5 times that of other big 
coal-producing countries, such as Russia, Australia, Poland and the USA.
35 countries and regions have 
joined the Powering Past Coal 
Alliance and have committed to 
phasing out coal by 2030 or earlier.


































































































































































































The CO2 intensity of electricity 
generation in Germany exceeds the 
European average.
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Box 2.1: Germany - a climate pioneer?
Germany was long seen as a pioneer in the field of global climate change mitigation. 
Subsidisation of renewable energy in Germany (and other progressive countries) has 
resulted in a massive decline in technology costs that has facilitated the global spread 
of wind and solar energy. The term Energiewende has become a technical term the 
world over.
However, in recent years, the international perception has changed. The word ‘pioneer’ 
is not being used anymore (Vahlenkamp et al. 2018). Although Germany was long 
seen as a champion of climate change mitigation, it has been criticised for failing to 
reduce its GHG emissions in recent years. At around 37%, Germany has a higher share 
of coal-based electricity than for instance the USA at 34% (World Bank 2018; IEA 2018a). 
Although Germany receives relatively good marks for a number of indicators on 
McKinsey’s Energy Transition Index, in terms of overall ranking, it now occupies 12th 
place among the European states under review. In global comparison, Germany lags 
far behind on the ‘energy system structure’ indicator where it comes 110th out of 114 
countries. The main reason is Germany’s substantial share of coal-based  electricity 
which leads to a high CO2 intensity of its electricity mix (see Fig. 2.3.1).
With all eyes on the German energy transition, the international impact of Germany’s 
climate change mitigation efforts is far greater than its actual CO2 savings. If  Germany, 
an affluent and highly industrialised country, fails to implement further measures 
to reduce GHGs and reach its climate policy targets – so the argument goes – how 
are other, especially economically weaker, countries expected to manage?
Climate change mitigation in Germany thus plays a crucial role in demonstrating 
the technological, energy structural and economic feasibility of transforming a 
country’s energy system and thereby contributes to a reduction in global emissions 
beyond the country’s borders.
A successful energy transition in 
Germany can advance global 
climate change mitigation.
Fig. 2.3.2: Global use of lignite – the ten countries with the highest use of lignite in Mt per 
year, 2015


















































German climate policy targets
Based on international climate protection commitments, Germany adopted its first 
national climate policy target as early as 1995 and decided in 2007 to reduce GHG 
emissions by at least 40% by the year 2020 (compared to 1990). Since then,  Germany 
has underpinned its efforts to mitigate climate change by a series of targets and 
concrete measures (BMUB 2007; Bundesregierung 2010). In 2016, the German  Climate 
Action Plan adopted the concept of GHG neutrality by the middle of the century 
(BMUB 2016). Furthermore, specific targets for 2030 were adopted for individual 
sectors (energy, industry, buildings, transport and agriculture). The target for the 
energy industry is a 61% to 62% reduction compared to 1990.
Tab. 2.4.1: Germany’s Climate Action Plan 2050 (reference year: 1990)
2020 2030 2050
German climate  




reduction 80 to 95% reduction
Source: BMUB (2016)
Tab. 2.4.2: 2030 emission reduction targets by sector according to Climate Action Plan 2050
Sectors Percentage reduction by 2030 (compared to 1990)
Energy industry 61 to 62% 
Buildings  66 to 67% 
Transport  40 to 42% 
Industry 49 to 51% 
Agriculture 31 to 34% 
Sub-total 54 to 56% 
Other 87% 
Total 55 to 56%
Source: BMUB (2016)
 » Since 1990, Germany has reduced greenhouse gas emissions by close to 28%.
 » However, the decline in GHG emissions has stalled since 2014. It is expected that Germany will  significantly 
fail the 2020 target of 40%.
 » To implement the Paris climate policy targets, the Federal Government’s Climate Action Plan calls for 
greenhouse gas neutrality in Germany by 2050.
 » Short to medium-term climate change mitigation measures must be designed so as to ensure that the 
long-term 95% emission reduction by 2050 remains feasible.
 » The energy sector plays a crucial role in achieving short and medium-term climate policy targets. Unless 
the electricity supply is decarbonised, other sectors cannot follow suit.
2.4  IMPLEMENTATION OF CLIMATE POLICY TARGETS IN 
GERMANY
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Climate change mitigation record
Over the past decades, Germany has achieved much in the field of climate change 
mitigation. However, in the last few years, progress has stalled. In 2017, GHG  emissions 
amounted to approx. 905 million t of CO2 equivalent, which corresponds to a 28% 
reduction compared to 1990. However, since 2014, GHG emissions have not really 
gone down (see Fig. 2.4.1).
To reach the 2020 target of a 40% reduction in emissions compared to 1990, the 
Federal Government adopted the ‘Climate Action Plan 2020’ in December 2014 (BMUB 
2014). However, despite the measures defined therein, Germany is expected to fail 
its 2020 climate policy target. According to the Federal Government’s current  Climate 
Action Report, Germany will miss the target by approx. 8 percentage points (BMU 
2018). This corresponds to a shortfall of approx. 100 million t of CO2 a year.
From a climate change mitigation perspective, the key factor is the cumulative total 
emissions over a period rather than the emissions in a specific target year (budget 
approach, see Chapter 2.2). Hence, once the 2020 target has been missed, it is not 
sufficient to aim for the next target in 2030. On the contrary, Germany will have to 
implement extensive short-term measures to return as soon as possible to the  original 
target trajectory.
German climate policy targets in relation to Paris
A more stringent implementation of the GHG neutrality concept by the middle of 
the century depends on a 95% reduction of GHG emissions by 2050 and hence 
 alignment with the upper margin of the target range defined by the Federal 
 Government in its 2010 ‘Energy Concept’ for GHG emission reductions. The 55% 
 reduction trajectory for GHG emissions by 2030 and the 70% reduction by 2040 as 
described by the Federal Government’s interim targets will not result in a 95% 
 reduction of GHGs in 2050 (see Fig. 2.4.1). To reach this objective, the reduction target 
for 2030 would have to be closer to 58 or 59%. Given this background, there have 
been calls for an adjustment of interim targets (DENA 2018).
Fig. 2.4.1: Trend in GHG emissions in Germany from 1990 to 2016 and reduction trajectory 





































































































Source: Own compilation based on historical data (UBA 2018g) and climate policy targets for 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050 (BMWi 2017c)
Emissions in Germany have 
declined only marginally since 2014. 
Germany is expected to fail the 
2020 climate policy target by 8 
percentage points (32% instead of 
40%).
The 2020, 2030 and 2040 German 
climate policy targets do not result 




According to current studies conducted, among others, on behalf of the Federation 
of German Industries (BDI), compliance with the current German climate policy 
targets along the 80% trajectory would be at least cost-neutral for the economy and 
may even have a positive impact due to the associated innovation and investment 
momentum (BCG and Prognos 2018). Climate alliances with international partners, 
which would for instance result in lower combined costs of new technologies, will 
be crucial if the much more ambitious 95% target is to be attained. However, in any 
event the short and medium-term climate change mitigation measures must be 
designed such that the 95% target can be reached by 2050.
Trends in greenhouse gas emissions by sector
A breakdown of GHG emissions by sector (see Fig. 2.4.2) shows that the energy  sector 
produces the largest quantities by far at 36%, followed by industry (21%), transport 
(19%), households (10%), agriculture (8%), commerce, trade and services (5%) and 
finally waste and wastewater (1%).
Tab. 2.4.2:  Trend in GHG emissions in Germany from 1990 to 2016 by sector and climate 




















































































































































905 Min. 40% reduction 
compared to 1990
Min. 55% reduction
































Energy industry Households Transport
Commerce, trade, services Industry
Agriculture Other emissions Objectives of the Energy Concept 2010
Source: UBA (2017h)
The sectors have followed heterogeneous trends since 1990:
 • Although GHG emissions have declined by 30% in the energy sector as a whole, 
emissions associated with electricity generation only decreased by 22% (UBA 2018e).
 • In the fields of industry (-32%) and buildings (-38%), reductions come closest to 
the overall 40% target by 2020, with industry having implemented numerous 
successful structural changes after the German reunification. However, in the 
last few years, emissions have stagnated in these sectors.
 • By contrast, the transport sector did not record any reduction at all – emissions 
have even gone up by 5% since 1990. Any technological progress made in this 
sector in the last few decades has been offset by increased demand (both in terms 
of traffic volume and engine power of cars).
To date, German greenhouse gas 
emissions have been cut by approx. 
30% compared to 1990 in the 
energy sector as a whole and by 
22% in the area of electricity 
generation.
Although the industry and 
buildings sectors have recorded the 
highest cuts, progress has stalled in 
recent years.
GHG emissions in the transport 
sector are now higher than in 1990.
An 80% reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2050 is, at the 
least, cost-neutral from a 
 macroeconomic perspective. 
For the 95% target to be achieved 
international alliances will be 
crucial, in order to reduce costs of 
new technologies.
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Reduction potentials in the different sectors
If the current energy policy framework remains unchanged, Germany is likely to 
fail its 2050 climate policy target. According to various analyses, instead of GHG 
neutrality, the expected GHG reduction by 2050 will range between 61 and 65% 
(compared to 1990) (BCG and Prognos 2018; Prognos, EWI and GWS 2014).
Hence, available reduction potentials must be exploited in all sectors. Barriers to 
implementation hold back progress in a number of sectors, especially in the short-
term (Prognos, EWI and GWS 2014): In the industrial sector, for instance, new techno-
logies and processes (e.g. hydrogen-based steel production) must be developed and 
implemented in line with the market. With climate change mitigation ultimately 
depending on changes in consumers’ eating and consumption habits, technological 
solutions are limited in the fields of agriculture and land use.
By contrast, in the field of energy generation, emissions can be reduced in the short-
term. A consistent rise in the share of renewable energy sources in Germany’s 
energy supply is feasible (see Chapter 3.2). Close to 60% of the country’s coal-fired 
power plants are over 30 years old, and almost one third were commissioned more 
than 40 years ago (see Chapter 1.1). On top of this, Germany has generated substan-
tial surplus energy for many years now. In 2017, the country’s export surplus of 
55 TWh was equivalent to almost one-tenth of its gross power consumption. In the 
medium to long-term, the use of (by then low-carbon) electricity in the transport, 
buildings and industrial sectors will also result in a further reduction of GHG  emissions 
(sector coupling, see Chapter 3.1). However, this approach specifically depends on a 
timely reduction of lignite and hard coal-fired power generation to achieve a signi-
ficant contribution to climate change mitigation (BCG and Prognos 2018). The rising 
trend in electricity consumption due new consumers (e.g. electromobility) cannot 
result in net GHG emissions reductions unless there is a further reduction in the CO2 
intensity of electricity generation (via a substantial increase of renewables in the 
electricity mix).
All sectors must make considerable 
reduction contributions in order to 
reach the targets under the 
German Climate Action Plan.
The electricity sector can reduce 
emissions in the short term and 
can play a key role in the decarbo-




An assessment of the coal sector’s contribution to the achievement of Germany’s 
climate policy targets throws up three central questions that have been addressed 
(in the same order) in the appointment resolution of the Commission on Growth, 
Structural Change and Employment:
 • To what degree does coal-fired power generation have to be reduced by 2030 to 
ensure compliance with the German climate policy targets?
 • By which year does coal-fired power generation have to be phased out entirely?
 • What potential short-term contribution can the reduction of coal-fired power 
generation make to the 2020 climate policy target?
To answer these questions, the following aspects will have to be reviewed for each 
of the above time frames: technological feasibility in connection with security of 
supply (see Chapter 3), transition costs in connection with electricity prices,  employment 
and structural change (see Chapter 4) and choice of implementation tools 
(see Chapter 5). This section primarily focuses on the target aspects arising from 
Germany’s climate policy targets.
Box 2.2: Carbon sequestration/carbon capture and storage (CCS)
Among the technological options suitable to reduce emissions from fossil energy 
sources is the sequestration and storage of CO2 (carbon capture and storage - CCS), 
for instance in deep geological formations. Some 15 years ago, Europe had high hopes 
for this process and launched several research and pilot projects, among other 
 countries in Germany. Although the relevant technologies were proven to be feasible, 
a number of barriers prevent their large-scale use. These barriers include the  relatively 
low degree of maturity of individual key technologies, the fact that overall CO2 ab-
atement costs are relatively high and the limits to the storage of large quantities of 
CO2 (Wuppertal Institut 2010; Wuppertal Institut, Fraunhofer IS, and IZES 2018; Oei 
and Mendelevitch 2016). Germany faces another significant hurdle, namely lack of 
acceptance among the population. Given this background, it must be assumed that 
CCS technology will not be a feasible option for German coal-fired power plants 
(Wuppertal Institut, Fraunhofer ISI and IZES 2018; Hirschhausen et al. 2012).
This assessment should not be confused with the debate about the use of CSS in 
other sectors, such as reducing GHG emissions in industry e.g. in steel or cement 
production (acatech 2017), and should be distinguished from strategies aimed at 
achieving negative emissions worldwide through CCS of biomass or direct air  capture 
of CO2 (see Chapter 2.2).
Carbon capture and storage is not a 
feasible option for German 
coal-fired power plants.
 » A complete phase-out of coal-fired power generation is necessary to achieve the aim of greenhouse gas 
neutrality.
 » By 2030, emissions caused by coal-fired power generation must decline by around 60% to 85% compared 
to 2017.
 » A reduction of the share of coal in Germany’s electricity mix can contribute to a mitigation of the ‘ climate 
policy gap’ caused by the breach of the 2020 target in a relatively short period of time.
 » A swift reduction of coal-based power allows for the longer operation of fewer power plants while main-
taining the carbon budget.
2.5   PATHWAYS TOWARDS A REDUCTION OF COAL-FIRED 
POWER GENERATION IN GERMANY
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Coal-fired power generation - 2030 reduction target
According to the German Climate Action Plan, GHG emissions in the overall energy 
sector (predominantly electricity production, but also including combined heat and 
power and fugitive emissions of the energy sector) are to be cut by 61 to 62% by 2030 
compared to 1990 levels. Assuming that Germany must achieve the emission  reduction 
in the field of electricity generation solely via a reduction of GHG emissions caused 
by lignite and hard coal, while GHG emissions caused by natural gas may even rise 
for some time (see Chapter 3.3) and the overall quantity of electricity generated re-
mains constant, the GHG emissions arising from coal-fired power  generation must 
be cut by at least 60% by 2030 compared to the year 2017. If we also assume a rise 
in electricity consumption, GHG emissions from coal-fired power generation must 
decline even further.
However, the 2030 sector target under the German Climate Action Plan lags behind 
the reduction necessary to achieve GHG neutrality by 2050: Fig. 2.5.1 provides an 
overview of coal-based electricity quantities in climate change mitigation  scenarios 
describing a 95% reduction of emissions by 2050 which are, therefore, compatible 
with the Paris Agreement and the objective of extensive GHG neutrality by the 
middle of the century. According to these scenarios, coal-based electricity  generation 
must be cut by around 72 to 84% by 2030 compared to 2017. A reference scenario 
(Fraunhofer ISI, Consentec GmbH and ifeu 2017) compares this with Germany’s 
current trajectory, underlining the urgent need for action.















Range in the 2030 scenarios






Source: Wuppertal Institute diagram based on ‘Actual’ (AG Energiebilanzen 2018a), ‘Reference scenario’ (Fraunhofer ISI, Consentec 
GmbH and ifeu 2017), ‘95% trajectory’ (BCG and Prognos 2018), ‘KS 95’ (Öko-Institut and Fraunhofer ISI 2015), ‘UBA’ (UBA 2017c)
Note: Some scenarios only include net power generation figures. For comparative purposes in this diagram, the figures were 
converted to gross power generation based on the assumption of a simplified average internal power consumption of 10% for 
coal-fired plants.
 
Phase-out of coal-fired power generation
The long-term aim of climate neutrality cannot be achieved unless emissions in the 
electricity sector decline towards zero. In this context, it would be expedient if gas- 
fired power plants, which are associated with lower CO2 emissions and more  flexible 
operations, should run longer than coal-fired power plants, which are more CO2- 
intensive and less flexible (see Chapter 3.3). From a climate mitigation perspective, 
the overall emission reductions over the whole period are decisive (see Chapter 2.2). 
Early emission reductions can therefore form the basis for an extension of the carbon 
budget available in terms of coal-fired power plants / electricity generation as a 
whole in order to keep individual power plants on the grid for longer periods and 
To achieve the energy sector target 
under the German Climate Action 
Plan, coal-fired power generation 
must be reduced by 60% by the 
year 2030.
To achieve the aim of climate 
neutrality by the middle of the 
century, coal-fired power genera-
tion must be reduced by 72% to 
84% by the year 2030.
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thus guarantee security of supply. On the other hand, the later coal-fired power 
generation is reduced, the steeper the required subsequent decline in coal-based 
generation.
At the same time, the energy and climate mitigation scenarios at hand provide a 
reference point in regard of the period in which coal-fired power generation should 
be (extensively) phased out if Germany is to reach its climate policy targets. The 
scenarios with a 95% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050 are based on an 86% to 
100% cut in coal-fired power generation by 2040 (UBA 2017c; BCG and Prognos 2018; 
Öko-Institut and Fraunhofer ISI 2015). In addition, a number of studies have directly 
derived statements on the future use of coal in Germany and Europe from the Paris 
climate policy targets (see Tab. 2.5.1). Depending on the assumed maximum  admissible 
global warming (below 1.5°C, below 1.75°C or below 2°C) and the specific assumptions 
regarding the distribution of the remaining carbon budgets among different count-
ries and individual sectors, the majority of the scenarios require a full phase-out of 
coal-fired power generation between 2030 and 2040.
Tab. 2.5.1: Data relating to coal phase-out in various climate scenarios compatible with 
the Paris Climate Agreement
Study
Assumption of climate 
policy target
- maximum warming








(Prognos und Öko-Institut 2017) Below 2° Coal phased out by 2035
GreenEE scenario  
(UBA 2017a) 95% reduction in 2050
Coal phased out by 
2040
95% climate trajectory (BCG and 
Prognos 2018) 95% reduction in 2050 
96% reduction of 
coal-based power by 
2040 compared to 2017
Climate change mitigation scenario 
– KS 95 (Öko-Institut and Fraunhofer 
ISI 2015)
95% reduction in 2050 
87% reduction of 
coal-based power by 






Below 2 Degrees Szenario der 
Internationalen Energieagentur (IEA 
2017c)
Below 1.75° Coal phased out by 2030
Sustainable Development Szenario 
des World Energy Outlooks 2017 (IEA 
2017d)
Below 2°  
86% reduction of 
coal-based power by 
2040 compared to 2016
(Climate Analytics 2017) 1.5° to 2° Coal phased out by 2030
Short-term greenhouse gas reduction potential
At present, Germany is expected to fail the 2020 reduction target by 8 percentage 
points (approx. 100 million t of CO2 equ.) (see Chapter 2.4). The ‘available carbon 
budget’ concept (see Chapter 2.2) calls for the swift and extensive closure of this 
‘climate policy gap’.
Reducing the share of coal in Germany’s electricity mix can contribute to a mitiga-
tion of the climate policy gap. In contrast to other sectors, this area could save signi-
ficant amounts of CO2 in a relatively short time (see Chapter 2.4). The last few years 
have seen the publication of a number of studies on this subject which assume that 
the coal sector has a short-term reduction potential of around 50 to 80 million t which 
can be contributed to the 2020 climate policy target (Prognos und Öko- Institut 2017; 
Agora Energiewende 2017c; Öko-Institut 2018b). With respect to the associated impacts 
on the energy industry and the regional economies, we refer to Chapters 1 and 4.
The majority of the scenarios that 
are compatible with the Paris 
climate policy targets involve a 
complete coal phase-out between 
2030 and 2040.
The reduction of coal in electricity 
generation can make a substantial 
contribution to the closure of the 
German ‘climate policy gap’ by the 
year 2020.
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The energy sector is undergoing fundamental changes worldwide, not just in Germany, in pursuit 
of a greenhouse gas-neutral power supply. This process focuses on avoiding fossil energy sources, 
 transitioning the system to renewable energy sources and making more efficient use of energy. In 
Germany and Europe, other trends are influencing the restructuring of the energy sector:  liberalisation 
and Europeanisation of the electricity market, digitalisation and break-up of sector borders,  specifically 
the use of electricity in the heat and transportation sector. All of that has an immense impact on 
generation and distribution of energy.
All analyses of German climate targets show that their implementation is technically feasible 
and economically viable, including coal and nuclear phase-outs. What is more, coal and nuclear 
 phase-outs are vital to the success of the energy transition. The technologies required for the upcoming 
phase-out of coal-fired power generation are already available, or their development is sufficiently 
advanced that they will be available in the relevant energy transition phase. Chapter 3 presents the 
key aspects for an energy supply without coal: increased flexibility and sector coupling (Chapter 3.1), 
expansion of renewables (Chapter 3.2.), natural gas as a bridge technology (Chapter 3.3) and storage 
(Chapter 3.4). Furthermore, it also covers the implications of a reduction and phase-out of coal as an 
energy source for a secure electricity and heat supply (Chapters 3.5 and 3.6).
THE ENERGY SYSTEM OF TOMORROW
The transition to a climate-friendly power supply entails a fundamental system transition.  Accordingly, 
there will be fewer and fewer base load power plants using fossil energy sources or uranium. Instead, 
fluctuating renewable energy sources can and will deliver energy, guarantee supply reliability and 
provide system services. For this purpose, the electricity system as a whole must become more flex-
ible on the generation and demand side. Implementation includes grid expansion and extensive 
 digitalisation of local distribution networks (e.g. transformer stations), expansion of load management 
(demand-side management) and storage, as well as – for a transition period – increased flexibility in 
the remaining conventional power plants. Another way to increase flexibility and simultaneously 
reduce CO2 emissions is to increase use of electricity in the heat and transportation sector, for example 
through electromobility or heat pumps for buildings and industrial applications (sector coupling).
EXPANSION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES
In the electricity sector in Germany, the percentage of renewables increased from 6.5% in 2000 to 
36.4% in 2017. At the same time, the costs of solar and wind power have decreased dramatically in 
recent years. Accordingly, the electricity production costs for wind and solar electricity today are 
roughly the same or even lower than new fossil-fired power plants. It is important that we do not 
ease up in this area, but continue to develop the technology-specific expansion trajectories for wind 
and photovoltaics (PV) at the pace stipulated in the coalition agreement of the current German 
 government, which sets a target of reaching 65% of renewable electricity by 2030.
THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS AND SYNTHETIC GAS
Even where coal-fired power plants have been retrofitted to increase flexibility in recent years,  gas-fired 
power plants are technically better suited than coal-fired power plants to deliver electricity flexibly, 
and can do so at significantly lower specific CO2 emissions. As a result, natural gas-fired power plants 
are an important factor in security of supply during the energy system transformation.
However, achieving the objective of a greenhouse gas-neutral power supply by the middle of the 
century means that ultimately also fossil-based natural gas must be replaced with renewable  energy 
sources. In the long term, applications for which natural gas is used today could continue with 
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 synthetic CO2-neutral gas (generated from renewable electricity). However, it must be considered 
that high energy conversion losses restrict synthetic gas use. 
Temporarily, higher utilisation of existing gas-fired power plants may make up for decreasing 
 percentages of coal-based electricity and heat. Construction of new plants must be kept to a  minimum, 
as these new gas-fired power plants will primarily serve just as backup capacities in future, or be 
retained to cover peak loads for the corresponding short runtimes.
SIGNIFICANCE OF STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES
Development of electricity storage facilities is  an important factor to the overall success of the 
 energy transition. However, it is not a limiting factor in how quickly coal-fired power generation 
can be reduced. Electricity storage is just one of several components to balance supply and demand. 
With a long-term perspective, there is a need for research and development, especially for storage 
systems that can store high quantities of energy for very long periods. However, options like sector 
coupling, electricity-based combined heat and power (CHP) and demand-side management (including 
heat storage systems) are available today and sufficient to balance increasing flexibility demands 
at the current stage of the transition process. The availability of electricity storage is therefore not 
a limiting factor for the coal phase-out.
SECURITY OF SUPPLY AS PART OF A TRANSFORMATION OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
A secure, disruption-free power supply is crucial for Germany’s economic competitiveness, and must 
not be compromised, even as decarbonisation increases during the energy transition. A wide range 
of technologies is already available today to ensure this is the case. Both the guaranteed capacity 
and other system services currently provided by conventional power plants can be delivered by a 
mix of renewable energy sources, reserve plants and gas-fired power plants, short- and long-term 
storage facilities and flexible loads within the European electricity system.
TRANSFORMATION IN THE COAL-FIRED HEATING SECTOR
As part of the power supply transition, heat supply security must also be taken into consideration, as 
some fossil-fired power plants also generate heat for households or the industrial sector in addition 
to electricity. There are alternatives for all of these applications, for example substitution with other 
energy sources (natural gas, waste), use of industrial waste heat and reduction in  consumption via 
increased energy efficiency. However, substitution measures of this kind are longer-term projects, 
taking several years to plan and implement. In spite of this, a secure heat supply is not a barrier 
to a timely reduction of coal-fired power, as there are enough coal-fired power plants that do not 
supply heat, or only do so to a minimal extent. Where alternative heat supply must be built, it may 
be necessary to keep hard coal-fired power plants operational for a transitional period and with 
minimal load. In large-scale lignite-fired power plants, multiple blocks are often operated at the 
same  location. When older power plant blocks are shut down, newer blocks can take over the heating 
supply  function on a transitional basis.
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Core elements of the energy system ‘of tomorrow’
A fundamental technological restructuring of our energy system is inevitable for 
climate change mitigation reasons. There are several studies on how the future 
energy system could and should be structured. A central statement of all studies is 
that a 95% reduction of greenhouse gases by 2050 is technologically feasible 
(e.g. BCG and Prognos 2018; DENA 2018; BMUB 2016). At the same time energy 
 efficiency must be increased sustainably in all sectors, to implement the energy 
transition with optimised costs (BMWi 2017b).
The switch to a power supply primarily based on renewable energy sources entails 
a fundamental system change. In the long term, there will no longer be any base 
load power plants using fossil energy sources or uranium in continuous operation. 
Instead, a variety of renewable energy sources will provide electricity at different 
times and in different volumes. Where the power supply was previously  characterised 
by the fact that the (electricity) supply always had to follow the volatile demand 
(load), the transformation of the power supply to renewable energy sources is 
 expected to lead to increasing volatility on the supply side.
Phases of the transformation
Based on the increasing percentage of renewable energies in the energy system, three 
phases of the transformation can be derived (see Fig. 3.1.1). In the first phase, which has 
now been completed, the focus was on innovation and cost reduction in renewables.
We are currently in the second phase, which is primarily about integrating renewable 
energy sources better into the system. With an increasing share of volatile supply from 
wind and PV, the remaining fossil-based energy generation in particular must become 
more flexible. Where it is expedient and viable, an increase in flexibility of demand 
also helps integrate renewables into the overall system. The focus is not only on 
 technological issues, but also on issues of the electricity market design and the gen-
eral political conditions. The technologies required in this phase are either already 
 available, or being developed with foreseeable market maturities.
Long-term storage facilities will not be needed until the renewable energy sources 
account for a high percentage of electricity generation (phase III). Relevant technologies 
are still in development (see Chapter 3.4 for details).
For climate change mitigation 
reasons, the energy system must 
be transformed.
A 95% reduction of greenhouse 
gases by 2050 is technologically 
feasible.
The transition to renewable energy 
sources entails a fundamental 
system change in the power supply.
The current challenge is to 
integrate renewable energy 
sources better into the system. 
It means also that electricity 
consumption and generation must 
become more flexible.
Long-term storage will not be 
required until renewables reach a 
very high share of the supply.
3.1 THE ENERGY SYSTEM OF TOMORROW
 » The entire energy industry is faced with a fundamental transformation. To achieve the climate  objectives, 
Germany’s power supply must be derived entirely from renewable energy sources. Sun and wind will 
be the primary energy sources for electricity generation.
 » In addition, a significant increase in energy efficiency is necessary to reduce energy consumption and 
make the transition to 100% renewables viable.
 » In the medium term, electricity will also be increasingly important in heating provision and transpor-
tation (sector coupling). Sector coupling will only lead to emission decreases if CO2 emissions from 
electricity production are reduced rapidly.
 » The current challenge is integration of renewable energies into an increasingly flexible electricity  system. 
The technologies required in the short and medium term (such as demand-side management, grid 
 expansion and short-term storage in particular) are available.
 » Digitalisation will make new business models possible and necessary.
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Increasing flexibility of electricity consumption
The challenges arising from an increasingly fluctuating supply from renewables 
must be met via a combination of various technologies and approaches on the 
 consumption and generation side. On the generation side, diversification of the 
 renewable plant locations and a corresponding expansion of the electricity grids are 
necessary. On the consumption side, there are various ways to achieve an  increasing 
flexibility of the electricity sector: This includes in particular demand-side  management, 
comprehensive digitalisation of local distribution grids (e.g.  transformer stations), 
increasing European integration of the electricity markets, and – for a transitional 
period – increased flexibility in the remaining conventional power plants. The 
 expansion of electricity storage facilities is another option (of many) to balance 
supply and demand (Krzikalla, Achner and Brühl 2013; acatech, Akademienunion 
and Leopoldina 2015).
There is great potential for demand-side management, especially in industrial 
 companies (Arnold et al. 2016). According to various studies, the potential for  short-term 
reduction of current consumption (positive load shift potential ) here is between 
0.5 GW and 2 GW and between 0.7 and 4.4 GW for additional consumers in times of 
high supply availability (Krzikalla, Achner, and Brühl 2013). As part of the spread of 
‘intelligent’ electricity applications, the household sector also offers a growing load 
shift potential, e.g. in washing machines, dryers, refrigerators and freezers (Krzikalla, 
Achner, and Brühl 2013). According to the Dena Grid Study II, a maximum positive 
load shift potential for the household sector of 6.7 GW and a maximum negative 
potential of 35.3 GW can be achieved (DENA 2010). This gives industry in Germany 
an opportunity to develop new business models and technological innovations, 
which could also be suitable for export markets (Energieagentur NRW 2016).
Sector coupling
A central element of the energy system of tomorrow will be a far stronger  dovetailing 
of the energy demanding sectors. In the past, the demand sectors electricity, heat, 
transportation and industry were generally considered separately. Accordingly, 
specific technical solutions and political frameworks were largely developed  separately. 
A range of technologies and 
approaches to make the electricity 
system more flexible are available 
already today.
There is a high demand side 
management potential 
 in various sectors.
The use of electricity for mobility 
and heat (sector coupling) makes a 
reduction of CO2 emissions possible.
Fig. 3.1.1: Phases of the energy transition - Transformation of the energy system and 
 expansion of renewable energy sources
Source: Own compilation based on (acatech 2017; Henning et al. 2014)
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By contrast, cross-sectoral solutions are required for an efficient, flexible and robust 
energy system of the future. Sophisticated sector coupling makes the following 
possible:
 • Transitioning mobility and heat to renewable energy sources, to reduce the CO2 
emissions in these fields and
 • Creating additional flexibility by opening additional applications for wind and 
solar power, especially in the areas of mobility and heat, including cost-effective 
storage options (especially as part of electromobility).
It will take innovation in various fields to implement sector coupling (for example 
electromobility), and entail investments in new infrastructure (e.g. charging stations 
for electric vehicles). For the electricity sector, sector coupling is a paradigm shift in 
many cases, for example if our energy system is increasingly dominated by  decentralised 
units, interconnected via intelligent control systems (e.g. charging and discharging 
cycles of electric vehicles) and no longer by large central units.
This increasing networking of sectors via the key energy source electricity – based 
on its versatility – will also lead to an increase in electricity demand (BCG and  Prognos 
2018; Prognos and Öko-Institut 2017). This must be counteracted by increasing  energy 
efficiency, to minimise the additional energy demand. The CO2 intensity of power 
generation must also decrease. That is why reducing and phasing out coal-fired 
power generation are requirements for a successful sector coupling.
Energy efficiency must be improved 
to minimise the increase in 
electricity consumption.
The CO2 intensity of electricity 
must decrease, for sector coupling 
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Fig. 3.1.2: System elements of a digitalised energy industry
Source: Wuppertal Institut (2018)
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Digitalisation and decentralisation in the energy sector
Already today power supply companies are developing from classic power suppliers 
to comprehensive energy managers and service providers (see Fig. 3.1.2). The 
 requirement to provide CO2-free energy is just one driver in this transformation 
process, calling for sector coupling and increasing the demand for flexibility. The 
increasing digitalisation of the economy and society, and increasing European in-
tegration of the electricity markets are just as important. Smart system services will 
be developed for grid monitoring and economically optimised operation of various 
generation systems. In addition, rising decentralisation will blur the lines between 
power supply companies and energy consumers. So called ‘prosumers’ will be both 
consumers and and producers of electricity simultaneously.
In this environment of a more digitalised and sector-spanning energy industry, there 
are many opportunities for companies. Ecologically and economically sustainable 
service concepts in which customers are actively involved can expand the range of 
roles taken on by power supply companies. By contrast, operating (large-scale) 
power plants, which has been the ‘classic’ business model to date for many power 
supply companies, will become less and less important, and has to be replaced with 
other innovative business models.
The scope of activities in the energy 





Today, there is a broad scientific consensus that it will be technically and  economically 
viable to meet the electricity requirements primarily via domestic renewable  energy 
by 2050. That remains true even if there is an increase in electricity demand due to 
greater use of electricity (e.g. via electromobility and heat pumps) in the medium 
to long term (see Fig. 3.2.1). Whereas renewables accounted for just 6.5% of gross 
electricity consumption in 2000 at 38 TWh, this figure had risen to 218 TWh and 
36.4% in 2017 (AG Energiebilanzen 2018a). The net electricity output from all energy 
sources in Germany is currently 566 TWh (AG Energiebilanzen 2018b). According to 
various studies (BMVI 2015; UBA 2013a; Scholz 2010; UBA 2017c; BCG and Prognos 2018), 
the annual power generation from renewable energy sources could be increased to 
at least 700 to 800 TWh, with the greatest potential for expansion in onshore and 
offshore wind energy and PV.
Energy and climate scenarios
According to various studies (BCG and Prognos 2018; UBA 2017c; Öko-Institut and 
Fraunhofer ISI 2015), further expansion of renewable energy sources by 2030 will 
not only compensate for the power generation lost in the nuclear power phase-out, 
it will also compensate for fossil-based power generation. Figure 3.2.1 shows that 
the diminishing power generation from nuclear, lignite and hard coal-fired power 
plants, could be offset in particular with a further expansion in wind and solar  energy 
by 2030. All scenarios require that the efficiency potential is tapped. In some of the 
scenarios, this even leads to a decrease in electricity demand.
All scenarios were based on detailed electricity system models with hourly  breakdowns, 
so that they describe development trajectories with a high degree of security of 
supply. According to the scenarios, the challenge related to ensuring a constant and 
reliable power supply associated with high percentages of fluctuating renewable 
energies can be resolved in particular by increasing demand flexibility, expansion 
and/or modification of the transmission and distribution grids and use of back-up 
natural gas or synthetic (from renewable electricity) methane-based  power plants 
(which only run for a few hours a year). The system services currently still provided 
by coal-fired power plants can be replaced in the future, by renewable energy among 
other sources (see Chapter 3.5).
By 2050, Germany’s electricity 
demand can be covered fully by 
renewable energy.
The greatest potential for 
expanding renewable energy is in 
wind energy and photovoltaic 
systems.
Further expansion of renewable 
energy sources can compensate 
diminishing contributions of both 
nuclear and fossil-based power 
generation.
Increasing flexibility of electricity 
consumption and peak load 
gas-fired power plants play an 
important role for future security 
of supply.
3.2  EXPANSION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND 
ELECTRICITY GRIDS
 » Renewable energy sources now meet more than one third of the German energy requirements.
 » Germany has sufficient potential to continue to increase power generation from renewable energy sources in 
the decades to come, and to replace electricity from both nuclear power and coal-fired power plants entirely.
 » A power supply based largely or fully on renewable energy sources is technically and economically 
feasible until 2050 and, according to studies, will be no more expensive than a fossil-based system.
 » The power generation costs for renewable energy sources have decreased significantly in the past 20 
years and are now at the same level as fossil fuels.
 » Achievement of the Federal Government’s medium to long-term climate targets requires increased 
construction of additional renewable plants in accordance with the expansion targets set forth in the 
Coalition Agreement (65% renewables in the electricity sector by 2030).
 » Delays in grid expansion are not a limiting factor for phasing out coal.
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Adaptation of installation rate for renewables
A transformation of the electricity system, which is in line with the long-term climate 
targets of the Federal Government, will require a further dynamic expansion of 
renewable energy sources in the decades to come. The aim corresponds with target 
of 65% renewables in the electricity sector by 2030, put forth by the current German 
government in its coalition agreement. Accordingly, the specific expansion  trajectories 
for wind and PV must be adapted.
Renewable energy sources and grid expansion
Transition of the power supply and construction of new renewable plants creates 
new challenges for the grid infrastructure. Among other things, this applies for 
transporting electricity from the main generation areas in the north to the  consumption 
centres in the south, and increasingly decentralised feed-in of renewable electricity 
into the distribution grids.
As early as 2009, the passing of the German Power Grid Expansion Act (EnLAG) placed 
the focus on accelerating the grid expansion at the ultra-high voltage level. The grid 
development plan, managed by the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA), was introduced 
to plan new routes. In 2011, the ‘Grid Expansion Acceleration Act for the Transmission 
System’ (NABEG) was passed to speed up the planning and approval processes. In 
addition, the Federal Demand Planning Act provided binding specifications for the 
energy industry need and priority (expansion) demand for specific projects.
The overall length of the cables resulting from EnLAG is currently roughly 1,800 km. 
Taking into account the second quarter of 2018, a total of roughly 1,150 km has been 
approved, and roughly 800 km of those has been constructed, equivalent to just 
under 45% of the overall length. The total length of the additional 43 projects 
 nationwide under the Federal Demand Planning Act is roughly 5,900 km. Of those, 
roughly 3,050 km is categorised as grid reinforcement/optimisation, and around 
2,800 km as new routes. Overall, roughly 600 km has been approved as of the end 
of the second quarter of 2018, and roughly 150 km has been built. BNetzA expects 
‘Südlink’ and ‘Südostlink’, the major north-south lines, to be completed in 2025.
In future, further dynamic 
expansion of renewables will be 
necessary.
Fig.3.2.1: Net electricity production and consumption by energy source in 2017 and by various 
scenarios in 2030 and 2050 (in TWh, without pumped storage electricity, incl. net import)
Source: Compilation: Wuppertal Institute based on ‘Actual’ (AG Energiebilanzen 2018a), ‘ZS’ (Prognos, EWI, and GWS 2014), ‘80% 
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While grid expansion has suffered from delays to date, in particular in the crucial 
north-south lines, at the same time, grid expansion is not a limiting factor for further 
construction of additional renewable plants and phasing-out of coal. The goal of a 
renewable energy percentage of 65% in the electricity sector by 2030 is already 
being incorporated in the current grid development plan: In the 2030 scenario 
framework approved by the Federal Network Agency in June 2018, as of 2019, this 
renewable target was assumed for all scenarios, and thus forms the basis for future 
grid expansion requirements. In the Coalition Agreement (2018 Coalition Agreement 
between CDU, CSU and SPD), stronger regional management of the renewable  energy 
expansion was agreed to improve synchronisation of the expansion of renewable 
energy sources and grid expansion. In addition to this, approval procedures are to 
be accelerated and simplified and short-term reinforcement and optimisation 
 measures are to be used to a greater extent. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy has already announced its intention to submit an amendment with 
corresponding measures.
Development of electricity production costs
Existing studies (including Fraunhofer IWES 2014; Agora Energiewende and Öko-In-
stitut 2017) assume that, given appropriate general conditions, a power supply based 
fully or largely on renewable energy sources will cost (even ignoring external costs) 
slightly less by the middle of the century than a power supply based largely on 
fossil energy sources. 
The investment trend in the past 20 years, stimulated among other things by the 
German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), has triggered significant learning 
effects and economies of scale, thus playing a key role in reducing the specific in-
vestment costs and therefore also the electricity production costs, in particular of 
PV and wind turbines. The electricity production costs of new onshore wind turbines 
(4.0 to 8.2 ct/kWh) and ground-mounted PV systems (3.7 to 6.8 ct/kWh) in Germany 
are at a similar level to new lignite-fired power plants (4.6 to 8 ct/kWh), and, in good 
to medium locations, even lower than new hard coal-fired power plants (6.3 to 9.9 ct/kWh) 
and new natural gas-fired combined-cycle power plants (7.8 to 10.0 ct/kWh) (ISE 2018). 
The costs specified here for fossil-based power plants in 2018 assume an average 
emission trading certificate price of 5.3 euros/t CO2 (ISE 2018).
These cost considerations do not include external costs (health problems and envi-
ronmental damage), which would generally tilt the balance further in favour of 
renewable energy sources. The cost comparison also does not take into consideration 
the system costs caused for example by electricity grids and measures to ensure a 
continuous and reliable power supply in the overall system (Samadi 2017). These 
system costs are higher on average for high proportions of fluctuating renewables, 
but cannot be attributed precisely to individual generation technologies.
In future, further decreases in technology costs are expected for PV systems and wind 
turbines. Now that EEG 2017 requires tenders for wind turbines and PV systems with 
capacities of over 750 kW and for new biomass systems, cost reductions due to com-
petitions can be expected. In addition, after the last reform of the European Emissions 
Trading System, the CO2 certificate prices have increased and will probably continue 
to rise in future (see Chapter 5.1 on the development of certificate prices). That will 
further tilt the competitive conditions in favour of renewables in future.
Delays in grid expansion are not an 
obstacle to phasing out coal.
In the long term, a power supply 
based on renewable energy will 
cost less than using fossil fuels.
Power generation costs from wind 
and solar power are currently equal 
to or even below those of new coal 
and gas-fired power plants.
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Lower emissions as a benefit of natural gas-based power generation compared to coal
In Germany, natural gas is currently primarily used to provide space and process heat, 
and to generate electricity. Natural gas-based gross power generation has more than 
doubled between 1990 and 2017, from 36 TWh to 87 TWh (AG Energiebilanzen 2018a). 
In 2017, this was equivalent to just over 13% of overall German gross  electricity gener-
ation. At 27 GW, the natural gas-based power plant capacity installed in  Germany is 
roughly equivalent to the scale of the installed capacity of hard coal-fired power plants.
From an ecological perspective, natural gas is significantly less harmful than coal. 
In particular, its adverse climatic impact is lower: The CO2 emissions of one kilowatt 
hour of electricity from natural gas-fired power plants (391 g/kWh) are less than half 
the emissions from hard coal-fired power plants (863 g/kWh), and only roughly one 
third of those from lignite-fired power plants (1,151 g/kWh) (UBA 2017d). Even taking 
the greenhouse gas emissions associated with providing the energy sources into 
account (i.e. the emissions from the upstream chain), natural gas retains a clear 
advantage over coal (Lambertz et al. 2012; Heath et al. 2014). Only natural gas extract-
ed by means of fracking releases relatively high quantities of harmful methane into 
the atmosphere, leading to an overall climate impact that can be almost as poor as 
coal-fired power plants. Emissions of harmful substances like sulphur dioxide, ni-
trogen oxide and mercury are also far lower in natural gas-fired power plants 
(per kilowatt hour generated) than in coal-fired power plants (de Gouw et al. 2014).
Gas-fired power plants are suitable as balancing power plants
Gas-fired power plants have multiple properties that make them ideal for providing 
a variety of energy system services. Accordingly they are well suited to  compensating 
for fluctuating electricity generated by wind and solar power plants, and can  therefore 
make an important contribution to securing the power supply (see Chapter 3.5). 
For example, gas-fired power plants are technically more suited to quickly respond 
to changes in electricity demand compared to coal-fired power plants (see Chapter 1.4, 
Tab. 1.4.1). The specific investment costs are also lower than those of coal-fired power 
plants. As a result, gas-fired power plants are more economical at low  capacity 
 utilisation levels. This means that, from a technical and economical perspective, gas-
fired power plants are well qualified to take on responsibilities for security of supply.
Accordingly, studies on the implementation of the climate targets for the period 
until 2030 prescribe a rapid decrease in coal-fired power generation, while  electricity 
generation from natural gas increases slightly in most scenarios (see Fig. 3.3.1). 
The CO2 emissions from power 
generation from natural gas are far 
lower than those from coal.
Gas-fired power plants can be 
operated more flexible allowing for 
a greater range / quicker change in 
power supply and have lower 
specific investment costs than 
coal-fired power plants.  
As a result, they are well suited to 
taking on responsibilities for 
security of supply.
Up until 2030 natural gas  
will increase its role in the 
electricity mix, however, in the long 
term its share will shrink.
3.3 THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS AND SYNTHETIC GAS
 » Natural gas-fired power plants cause far lower CO2 emissions, are more adjustable and less costly to 
build than coal-fired power plants. In a transitional period away from coal, gas can take on an important 
role in securing electricity supply.
 » During the next decade power generation from gas-fired power plants will increase temporarily to 
partially offset phased-out or reduced power generation from nuclear and coal-fired power plants.
 » In the medium term, gas power plant capacity will increasingly serve as rarely used ‘back-up’ power plants.
 » In a greenhouse gas-neutral energy system in line with the climate targets, fossil-based natural gas can 
no longer be used. After 2040, CO2-neutral gas generated synthetically from renewable electricity could 
at most replace individual applications currently implemented with natural gas due to the high  conversion 
losses and corresponding high costs.
58
Chapter 3
 Between 2030 and 2050, these studies assume a decrease in the volume of  electricity 
produced with natural gas. While the CO2 emissions of natural gas are lower than 
coal, even natural gas must be replaced with CO2-free energy sources to achieve the 
long-term goal of greenhouse gas neutrality. Accordingly, natural gas is only a 
 relatively short bridge to a greenhouse gas-neutral future.
Fig. 3.3.1: Net electricity production from coal and natural gas in 2017 and by various  scenarios 







































Source: Compilation: Wuppertal Institute based on ‘Actual’ (AG Energiebilanzen 2018a), ‘80% or 95% trajectory’ (BCG and 
Prognos 2018), ‘KS80 or KS95 (Öko-Institut and Fraunhofer ISI 2015), ‘UBA 95’ (UBA 2017c)
However, the significant decrease in natural gas-based power generation between 
2030 and 2050 prescribed in the scenarios is not accompanied to the same extent 
with a decrease of installed gas power plant capacity, as even in the middle of the 
century, natural gas capacities will still be required as a ‘back up’ to ensure secure 
and continuous power generation in times of very low PV and wind feed-in due to 
the weather. Still, the full-load hours of gas-fired power plants must decrease 
 continuously after 2030 at the latest, to ensure that the CO2 emissions decrease in 
accordance with the climate targets.
Synthetic gas
In the long term, from roughly 2040, an increasing volume of synthetic gas could be 
used for power generation instead of natural gas. This gas could be produced domes-
tically or abroad based on hydrogen produced with renewable energy and added CO2 
(known as ‘Power-to-Gas’, PtG) and is potentially climate neutral – depending on the 
source of CO2 used. However, the relatively high energy conversion losses during the 
generation process must be noted (DBI Gastechnologisches Institut et al. 2017). They 
restrict production, at least on the basis of domestic renewable energy sources. The 
corresponding technologies are currently still under development, so that there are 
still significant uncertainties regarding the costs.
Synthetic gas could be used in particular where electrification is difficult (e.g. for 
aircraft, ships, lorries). It is also advantageous that the existing gas infrastructure 
(grids and storage) can still be used. However, different scenarios include very  different 
percentages of synthetic gas (and synthetic fuels overall) (see for example DENA 
2018). In summary, it can be noted that PtG will have a place in the energy sector of 
the future, in particular due to its storage capabilities. However, it cannot be assumed 
that it will replace natural gas on a wide scale due to the high conversion losses alone.
The decrease in power generation 
from natural gas between 2030 
and 2050 is not accompanied with 
a corresponding decrease in the 
installed gas power plant capacity, 
as the natural gas capacities are 
still required as a back-up.
Synthetic gas can be produced in a 
climate-neutral manner, but the 
process results in relatively high 
energy conversion losses.
80% scenarios 95% scenarios 80% scenarios 95 %scenarios 
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Grid-connected electricity storage facilities vs. flexible electricity consumers 
and non-grid-connected energy storage facilities
To assess which role storage plays in the transformation process, a distinction must 
be made between grid-connected electricity storage systems and flexible electricity 
consumers. The key characteristic of a grid-connected electricity storage system is 
that electricity can be fed-in and in particular withdrawn again. This distinguishes 
grid-connected electricity storage systems from items like batteries for laptops, 
mobile phones etc., which do not feed electricity back into the electricity grid. 
 Examples of established technologies for grid-connected electricity storage systems 
include pumped storage power plants, batteries (e.g. rechargeable batteries in  electric 
vehicles), flywheels etc.
There are a series of energy storage facilities in contact with the electricity system - 
but which cannot feed electricity into the grid. Heat storage facilities are one example. 
Since storing heat is often cheaper and more efficient than storing  electricity, heat 
storage can be used to increase the flexibility of electricity demand, e.g. for industrial 
production processes. Another example are Power-to-X systems that are currently 
being developed. They produce fuels (e.g. hydrogen) synthetically using electricity 
(see Chapter 3.3). Here too, there is the option to shift production to times when solar 
and wind power are in plentiful supply and demand is low. While the synthetically 
produced energy source can be converted back into electricity  subsequently, use in 
other sectors is more economical. Producing these energy sources based on electrici-
ty from fossil fuel-fired power plants only leads to additional CO2 emissions due to 
the high conversion losses. Furthermore, it must be noted that depending on the 
technology used, some energy storage facilities can entail significant energy losses.
Storage demand and options
The majority of the electricity storage capacity is currently provided via pumped 
storage power plants. The details on the storage capacity vary between 6 and 11 GW, 
with a storage volume of approx. 40 GWh due to the different evaluations (BCG and 
Prognos 2018; Deutscher Bundestag 2017).
Due to the future increase in fluctuating renewable energy sources, the storage 
requirement will also increase to balance supply and demand. There are very  different 
applications, from short-term storage facilities, which store electricity for less than 
a second for grid stabilisation, right up to seasonal storage facilities, which must be 
Grid-connected electricity storage 
systems make controlled electricity 
feed-in back to the electricity grid 
possible.
3.4  SIGNIFICANCE OF STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES
 » Storage technologies that allow electricity to be stored and fed into the grid when required will become 
increasingly important in the future.
 » For short-term applications, storage technologies are already very technologically mature and their costs 
are decreasing rapidly.
 » With a long-term perspective, development is required, in particular for seasonal storage facilities, which 
can store high volumes of energy for extended periods.
 » However, in the medium term, other options for increasing flexibility, such as sector coupling, electri-
city-driven combined heat and power and demand-side management (also using heat storage facilities), 
will be even more cost-effective than electricity storage facilities.




able to store large volumes of energy cost-effectively and with only minimal losses 
over long storage times (see Chapter 3.4.1).
Without being able to go into details on specifics and development statuses here, it 
can be said that research and development is required in particular for seasonal  storage, 
while many short-term storage systems are already very  technologically mature 
(Wuppertal Institut, Fraunhofer ISI and IZES 2018; VDI 2017; Fraunhofer 2015).
Fig. 3.4.1: Comparison of various energy storage systems: Storage capacity and retrieval period
Source: Own compilation based on Sterner and Stadler 2017
* excluding industry and CTS; electricity demand per person: 1.45 MWh p.a. The data clouds indicate the capacity ranges of 
existing plants in Germany.
A significant demand for seasonal storage is projected in most studies only at a 
later stage of the transition for an energy system that is primarily supplied with 
electricity from renewable sources (VDI 2017; Agora Energiewende 2014; acatech, 
Akademienunion and Leopoldina 2015). Until then, the rising demand for increasing 
flexibility can be met via cost-effective options like increasing flexibility of  electricity 
consumption (incl. heat storage facilities), grid expansion, short-term electricity 
storage and gas-fired power plants (see Chapter 3.1). Seasonal storage systems 
(e.g. Power-to-X) will not be necessary until a phase-out of natural gas-based power 
generation takes place. Accordingly, the availability of electricity storage systems is 
not a limiting factor for the phase-out of coal.
In the medium to long term, the greatest potential for battery storage systems is 
expected to come from electric vehicles and household PV systems (acatech, Akade-
mienunion and Leopoldina 2015). The costs there have decreased significantly in recent 
years and the International Energy Agency (IEA) assumes costs will fall by a further 
60% by 2040 (IEA 2017c). Battery storage technologies for PV systems are already 
competitive today provided they are used to optimise the percentage of own use.
Many short-term storage systems 
are already technologically very 
mature. Development is required in 
particular for seasonal storage.
Seasonal storage systems will not 
be required until renewable energy 
sources account for a very high 
percentage of the electricity mix.
Until 2040, a 60% decrease in the 
costs for short-term storage 
systems is to be expected, e.g. for 
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A secure and interruption-free power supply is a key success factor for Germany’s 
economic competitiveness. Security of supply is broken down into various  dimensions: 
The priority is availability of a sufficient, secure capacity in the long term. At the 
same time, major system parameters (voltage, frequency) must also be kept stable 
at short term in their respective nominal range (grid and system stability). This must 
be distinguished from active grid management via redispatch, i.e. short-term  adjustment 
of power plant operations compared to the original plan (see Chapter 1.4).
Methodological approaches for calculating the guaranteed capacity
In the entire electricity system it must be ensured at all times with a high degree of 
probability that every load that occurs can be covered with corresponding generation 
capacity. Classically, this is proven via capacity balances, which include the  following 
elements:
 • Conventional thermal power plants available,
 • Pumped storage power plants,
 • Renewables-based power plants,
 • Grid reserve and security reserve power plants,
 • Unusable power plants, plants being overhauled and in downtime,
 • Ways to reduce contracted loads,
 • Reserve of power plant capacity for system services.
Depending on the methodological approach, the capacity balance may also include 
other elements:
 • Guaranteed capacity via rooting in an overall European system,
 • Power plants from the reserve that can be reactivated,
 • Standby generating systems (emergency power systems),
 • Market-based load adjustment,
 • Decentralised storage.
For a longer-term consideration, the future demand and generation capacity 
 development due to new plants and closures will be incorporated in any form of 
 capacity balance.
Security of supply includes both 
guaranteed capacity and other 
short-term system services.
There are different methodological 
approaches to calculate the 
guaranteed capacity.
3.5  SECURITY OF SUPPLY IN THE POWER SECTOR
 » Security of supply has various dimensions: The priority is on the guaranteed capacity available in 
 accordance with the load requested and the grid and system stability (which must be secured via the 
so-called system services, among other things).
 » Due to existing surplus capacities, further steps can be taken in Germany to reduce coal-fired power 
generation, even as nuclear power is phased out simultaneously. Sufficient guaranteed existing  capacity 
can be provided via a combination of renewable energies, reserve and gas-fired power plants, short and 
long-term storage systems, flexible loads and exchanges with other countries.
 » The system services currently provided by coal-fired power plants can be taken over by other  technologies 
available today (gas-fired power plants, renewable energy sources, storage facilities).
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Development of guaranteed capacity and scope for additional power plant 
closures
The issue of future security of supply requires forecasting based on the power plants 
currently in existence. In 2017, roughly 216 GW of net power plant capacity was 
 installed (BNetzA 2018a; UBA 2018a). Of that capacity, roughly 118 GW was  attributable 
to power plants that can in principle make a substantial contribution to the  guaranteed 
capacity. For future considerations, assumptions must be made on decommissioning 
of power plants and installation of new power plants. In this respect, the closure of 
the last nuclear power plants at the end of 2022 and the phase-out of the lignite 
security reserve in October 2023 (together 12.2 GW) must be taken into account. In 
addition, a currently unknown number of power plants will be shut down for 
 economic reasons. By 2020/2023, this will be offset by construction of roughly 2 to 
4 GW of power plant capacity (BNetzA 2018a).
Accordingly, to assess the question of how quickly coal fired power plants can be 
closed down without endangering security of supply, the year 2023 is an important 
milestone. However, the answers are very different based on the different  methodological 
approaches mentioned above.
The transmission system operator’s (TSO) approach led to the following result for 
the current year: For 2018, the TSOs assume a guaranteed capacity of 87 GW. The 
maximum load including the power plant capacity required to provide system 
services and the load reduction possible today is estimated to be roughly 82 to 84 
GW for 2018. For the longer term, the TSOs conclude that the guaranteed capacity 
will decrease continuously and be at the same level as the maximum load in 2020 
(50Hertz et al. 2017). The closure of the last nuclear power plants by 2022 would 
therefore lead to a gap in coverage of the guaranteed capacity without additional 
measures. However, this consideration ignores several of the options for delivering 
guaranteed capacity mentioned above, or makes very conservative estimates for 
them. For example, the availabilities of conventional and renewable power plants 
assumed in the TSOs’ analysis represent more of a lower limit for the probable 
availabilities (BNetzA 2018).
The German Association of German Energy and Water Industries (BDEW) also 
 concludes that there will be a coverage gap in 2023. For 2025, it is assumed that 
roughly 75 GW of conventional power plant capacity will be operational, roughly 15 
GW less than in 2018. According to calculations by BDEW, the available  conventional 
capacity will therefore be below the maximum load of over 80 GW (BDEW 2018). 
However, this estimate ignores both the availability of generation units other than 
conventional thermal plants, like waste combustion plants, pumped storage power 
plants, biomass and run-of-river power plants etc., which currently make up an 
 installed capacity of over 11.8 GW, and switchable loads.
Agora Energiewende uses the TSOs’ capacity balance, but taking additional  capacity 
contractable in other countries into consideration and assuming higher availability 
probabilities of the energy converters, it concludes that in 2023, in spite of the planned 
decommissioning of the last nuclear power plants and the phase-out of the lignite 
security reserve (see Chapter 5.3) totalling 12.2 GW, there will still be a surplus  capacity 
of guaranteed capacity of 10 to 15 GW. In this, Agora Energiewende takes the imple-
mentation of market-based demand-side management potential into consideration 
(Agora Energiewende 2017c).
Studies on periods extending beyond 2023 reveal ways to provide sufficient  guaranteed 
capacity even with a transformation of the energy system in accordance with the 
climate targets. They use detailed fundamental models of the European energy 
market and power plant availability and calculate power plant use broken down by 
the hour. General assumptions in these studies are, that renewable energy sources 
will be expanded, storage facilities based on existing technologies will be installed 
and demand-side management and a strong integration in the European electricity 
Of the 216 GW of power plant 
capacity in Germany, 118 GW 
contribute to the guaranteed 
capacity.
2023 is an important milestone for 
the assessment of security of 
supply, as the last nuclear power 
plants will have been taken off the 
grid at that point.
There are various estimates on the 
guaranteed capacity to be expected 
in 2023 (if no further measures 
were undertaken).
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market will be implemented. Construction of gas-fired power plants will only be 
required to a very limited extent, primarily exclusively as back-up power plants 
(due to the low capital costs but high production costs) (Prognos and Öko-Institut 
2017; IZES 2015; Öko-Institut 2017c; Energy Brainpool 2017a). To assess the options for 
plant closures as well as to determine the need for construction of gas-fired power 
plants, the geographical distribution of the power plants must be considered to 
account for grid stability issues.
Beyond the issue of the technical capacities in place for supply security covered here, 
we refer explicitly to Chapter 1.5, which presents the institutional processes with 
which Germany ensures that power plant closures do not endanger security of supply.
Provision of system services
Above and beyond this, system services are essential for ensuring that the  electricity 
system is stable and robust. They ensure frequency and voltage stability and help 
to restore supply after a power failure. Coverage of electricity demand is also ensured 
via a phased regulation mechanism. Fig. 3.5.1 shows the system services tendered 
on the market. Besides these, there are other system services which are provided 
implicitly today or ensured via specific contracts with the TSOs. Among others, they 
include the momentary reserve, reactive power management, black start capability 
and the provision of short-circuit currents (see Box 3.1).
These system services are currently provided almost exclusively by conventional 
power plants. As coal-fired power generation is phased out, these system services 
can be provided increasingly by technologies already available today (gas-fired 
power plants, renewables, storage facilities).
Fig. 3.5.1: Grid requirements of power plants for primary and secondary balancing power 
and minute and hourly reserves
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Source: Own compilation based on (Görner 2016)
Very few additional gas-fired 
power plants, will have to be built 
(exclusively as backup power 
plants).
The system services provided today 
by coal-fired power plants can be 
taken over by other technologies 
which are available (gas-fired 






Capacity buffer determined based on market needs, 
provided by all TSOs active on the electricity grid, 
which must be available in full after 30 seconds at the 
latest and for up to 5 minutes.
Secondary balancing 
power: :
Capacity buffer determined based on market needs, 
provided by all TSOs affected by a fault, which must 
be available in full after 5 minutes at the latest.
Minute reserve: : Capacity determined based on market needs to be 
provided in full within 15 minutes.
Hourly reserve: : Not a product on the balancing energy market. If a 
balance deviation cannot be rectified by its originator 
within 60 minutes, the originator of the deviation itself 
is responsible for compensating it via intraday trading 
on the spot market or via OTC (over the counter) trading.
Momentary reserve: Reserve available in the generators of conventional 
power plants immediately when a fault occurs due to 
the inertia of rotating masses in the system.
Reactive power 
 management:
In order to guarantee security of supply, specific  voltages 
must also be maintained throughout the entire grid. 
This is implemented via reactive power management, 
currently provided primarily via conventional power 
plants (synchronous generators).
Short-circuit currents: : In the event of a short circuit of a cable or  transformer, 
it is automatically disconnected from the grid via 
permanently installed protective devices. For these 
protective devices to trigger, a short-circuit current 
must flow between the grid and the fault location, 
which is now automatically provided from the syn-
chronous generators of the thermal power plants. 
Reduction of the conventional power plant capacity 
will decrease the short circuit level in principle.  However, 
the grid expansion to be implemented in the next few 
years will reduce the need for short-circuit current. In 
the medium term, no need for action to provide addi-
tional short-circuit current is seen  (BNetzA 2015).
Box 3.1: System services
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Provision of heat by coal-fired power plants
Many coal-fired power plants are CHP plants. That means that the waste heat 
 produced when generating electricity is harnessed, for example for space and water 
heating, or for production processes (e.g. process steam). This combination  increases 
the degree of utilisation of the primary energy used. When phasing out coal  capacities, 
the fact that many coal-fired power plants also provide heat must be taken into 
consideration.
However, overall, coal plays a relatively minor role as a source of energy for heating 
(see Tab. 3.6.1). Coal-based CHP plants account for 3.5% of the total heat used. Of the 
overall CHP heat generation totalling 224 TWh in 2016, only 31.4 TWh was  attributable 
to hard coal and 18 TWh to lignite, with the rest provided largely by natural gas and 
biomass. In the CHP heating market, coal accounted for only 22%. However, there is 
a structural dependency for consumers in certain regions (e.g. via connection to 
heating networks). While replacement is fundamentally possible here, a suitable 
lead time is generally required.
When considering heat supply, three power plant categories can be distinguished 
(see Tab. 3.6.1):
I. Lignite and hard coal-fired power plants that do not provide heat
The installed capacity of hard coal-fired power plants that do not provide heat is 
currently 4.9 GW. Of those, 0.7 GW are already scheduled for closure (final closure 
notifications for the Gernsteinwerk and Lünen 6 blocks have been submitted to 
BNetzA) (BNetzA 2018c). This means that in 2020, the installed capacity of hard coal-
fired power plants without CHP will be roughly 4.2 GW. Of those, 2.7 GW were built 
before 1990. 1.5 GW are produced by newer power plants which have only been 
commissioned in the past few years (see also the description in Chapter 1.1, Fig. 1.1.3). 
The installed capacity of lignite-fired power plants that do not provide heat is 
 currently 7 GW. Of that, a generation capacity of 0.9 GW will be transitioned to the 
lignite security reserve by 2020.
In 2020, lignite power plants without heat provision are expected to have an installed 
capacity of 6.1 GW.
When phasing out coal capacities, 
the fact that many coal-fired power 
plants also provide heat must be 
taken into consideration.
Coal plays a relatively minor role 
for heating supply in Germany. 
Coal-based CHP plants account for 
just 3.5% of the total heat used.
Currently, 4.9 GW of hard coal-fired 
power plants are used to produce 
electricity only (without heat).
3.6  TRANSFORMATION IN THE COAL-FIRED HEATING SECTOR
 » As part of a phase-out of coal-fired power generation, also heat supply security must be taken into 
 consideration.
 » Via combined heat and power generation (CHP), coal-fired power plants produce 3.5% of all heat  demanded 
in Germany. This heat includes both to heat buildings and in industrial production processes.
 » Some of the larger power plant blocks typical in the coal sector do not provide any or very little heat 
(exceptions include the lignite-fired power plants Schwarze Pumpe, Schkopau, Lippendorf). As a result, 
it is comparatively easy to replace the heat production of larger power plant blocks (where applicable) 
or to only shut down the blocks that do not contribute to the supply of heat.
 » In the medium term, coal-based heating supply can be eliminated entirely. Technological alternatives 
are available to replace coal-based combined heat and power (substitution with natural gas or waste, or 
use of industrial waste heat). A period of 4 to 5 years must be expected for approval procedures, tenders 
and construction of alternative plants. The climate targets ultimately require a transition to  greenhouse 
gas-neutral heat generation from renewable energy.
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II. Large-scale lignite and hard coal-fired power plants
Many large-scale power plants (> 200 MW) are primarily used to produce electricity 
and provide heat only to a limited extent (see Tab. 3.6.1). Multiple blocks are often 
operated at the same location. When deactivating older power plant blocks, the 
 remaining newer power plant blocks could take over heating supply. Where alter-
native plants must be built, one option could be that power plants continue to run 
at a reduced rate for a transitional period as required to maintain the heating supply. 
The capacity of these large-scale hard coal-fired power plants with minor CHP output 
is 6 GW. Of that, 3.5 GW are generated by plants commissioned after 1990 and 2.5 GW 
by plants commissioned before 1990. In most large-scale lignite-fired power plants, 
usable CHP heat accounts for less than 3% of the electricity production energy volume. 
Only three power plants have higher heat use percentages: At Schwarze Pumpe and 
Schkopau, they are 21% and 14% respectively (primarily industrial heat use) and 8% 
for Lippendorf (heat fed into district heating networks) (Öko-Institut 2017b).
III. Small lignite and hard coal-fired power plants primarily used for heat 
 production
Most of the heat produced with coal is provided by small CHP plants (< 200 MW). 
These are frequently municipal plants that feed into local heating networks and are 
primarily operated for heat production. Their total electrical output is just 3.9 GW.
Tab. 3.6.1: Capacity of coal-fired power plants, CHP plants and heat provision
Energy source Electrical capacity  (GWel)
Of which CHP plants  
(GWel)
2016 heat production  
(TWhth)
Lignite  20.0 12.9 18.0
Of which  > 200 MW 18.9 11.9 5.8
Of which  ≤ 200 MW 1.0 1.0 12.2
Hard coal 21.9 17.0 31.4
Of which  > 200 MW 18.8 14.1 11.5
Of which   ≤  200 MW 3.1 2.9 19.9
Sources: a Data on electrical capacity based on the list of power plants in the annex (capacity of the plants in operation at the end 
of 2017) and also power plants with a capacity < 50 MW (+ 0.4 GW for the hard coal-fired power plants and + 0.4 GW for the lig-
nite-fired power plants) b Data on heat production: Block-specific data based on Öko-Institut (2018), scaled based on Umweltbun-
desamt (2018);
Transformation of the heating supply from coal-based CHP
There are technical alternatives to coal-fired CHP. For example, they include substi-
tution with other energy sources (natural gas, waste, waste heat), ideally in combi-
nation with a reduction in consumption via increased energy efficiency. In some 
cases, other generation facilities at the same location could take over heating supply. 
A period of 4 to 5 years must be expected for approval procedures, tenders and con-
struction of alternative plants. In the medium to long term, it must be noted that the 
climate targets ultimately require a transition to fully greenhouse gas-neutral heat 
generation, e.g. utilising waste heat and renewable energy sources.
Currently, the CHP Act offers significant incentives to replace older coal-based CHP 
plants. It subsidises new CHP plants, which are to be commissioned by 31/12/2022 
Many large-scale power plants 
provide heat to a limited extent. 
Only three power plants (Schwarze 
Pumpe, Schkopau, Lippendorf) are 
operated with significant 
heat use percentages.
Two thirds of coal-fired heat 
production is restricted to smaller 
power plants with capacities 
< 200 MW.
There are technical alternatives to 
coal-fired CHP. 
A period of 4 to 5 years must be 
expected for approval procedures, 
tenders and construction of 
alternative plants.
Many operators already plan to 
replace existing CHP power plants 
with newer, lower-CO2 plants by 2022.
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and which are based on the use of natural gas, liquid fuels, biomass or waste. A bonus 
is also paid for replacement of coal-fired power plants. Many operators plan to replace 
existing CHP power plants with newer, lower-CO2 plants by 2022 (e.g. in Kiel, Cottbus, 
Chemnitz, Herne). For example, the Jänschwalde power plant will soon no longer be 
required to supply heat to the city of Cottbus, as the municipal utility company is 
currently building an alternative plant. Some cities have already started processes 
for a full phase-out of coal-fired power generation (e.g. Munich, Berlin).
The alternative plants constructed will depend on regional factors. Flexible gas mo-
tors are to be installed in Kiel, Cottbus and Chemnitz. In Herne, Steag plans to build 
a natural gas-based combined-cycle power plant. In Hanover, a district heating 
pipeline is to be built to harness waste heat from a waste incinerator. This has already 
been implemented in Wuppertal, and the old coal-fired heating power plant has 
been decommissioned. In Munich, a long-term transition of the district heat provision 
to geothermal energy is planned.
Box 3.2: Wuppertal: energy switch in CHP heat supply
Until recently, the city of Wuppertal had two separate district heating networks. One 
of these networks was supplied from the Elberfeld coal-fired power plant and not 
only delivered heat for many households, it also supplied the Bayer chemical plants. 
The power plant has been in existence since 1900, and was modified multiple times. 
It was run on natural gas between 1969 and 1989. The current coal-fired block built 
in 1989 has now reached the end of its technical lifetime and is to be shut down.  
In order to continue to operate the district heating network, a 3.2 km long connection 
pipeline to the municipal waste incinerator was built. It was officially commissioned 
on 7 July 2018 and cost the municipal utility company roughly 40 million euros. That 
marked the end of the 120-year era of coal-fired power generation in Wuppertal. The 
municipal utility company assumes that the overall measures will reduce annual CO2 
emissions by 450,000 t.
An accelerated coal phase-out initiated by politics entails transformation costs, but also leads to 
 significant benefits, that far outweigh these costs. In order to illustrate the challenges of a coal phase-out 
for regional economies, Chapter 4.1 gives an overview of the regional economy in the  lignite regions. 
Chapter 4.2 then considers the employment effects of the phase-out of lignite and hard coal-based 
power generation. Chapter 4.3 shows options for successful structural change. Chapter 4.4 presents 
the costs and benefits of a coal phase-out, including the temporary increase in electricity wholesale 
prices on one hand and the avoided open-cast mine expansions on the other. Chapter 4.5 looks at 
the renaturation costs for open-cast mines.
REGIONAL ECONOMY IN THE LIGNITE REGIONS
The lignite industry is concentrated in the Rhineland coalfields (North Rhine-Westphalia), the Lusatian 
coalfields (Brandenburg and Saxony) and the Central German coalfields (Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt). 
It dominates the structure of some districts. They include in particular the Rhein-Erft-Kreis (district) 
and the Rhein-Kreis Neuss in the Rhineland, the Spree-Neiße and Görlitz districts in Lusatia and the 
district of Leipzig, the Burgenlandkreis and Saalekreis in Central Germany.
If we not only look at the coalfields, but on the broader, economically interconnected regions, we see 
that the relative economic significance of lignite in the Rhineland and in Central Germany is compar-
atively rather low. In both regions, there is a diversified industry and a well-developed  infrastructure, 
which is why they can cope more easily with a coal phase-out. By contrast, lignite plays a relatively 
important role in structurally weaker Lusatia. Irrespective of the coal phase-out, the demographical 
changes in all regions, in particular in rurally-dominated regions, lead to a decrease in the workforce 
and a specialist shortfall.
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE COAL PHASE-OUT
In recent centuries, the employment figures in both the lignite and hard coal industry have decreased 
significantly, and will also continue to decline due to market factors in the years to come. This  process 
can be speeded up with a politically induced coal phase-out. Currently, there are still roughly 18,500 
people employed directly in the lignite-fired power plants and open-cast mines; another 4,000 
to 8,000 persons work in the hard coal-fired power plants. If we include the indirect and induced 
employment, i.e. employment at suppliers to the coal industry or the use of employees’ wages and 
salaries for consumption purposes, add a further 11,000 persons in the coalfields for the lignite sector. 
Nationwide, this figure is increased by a further 22,000 persons. 4,800 - 9,600 indirect and induced 
employees are assumed for the hard coal sector.
As indirect and induced jobs due to a decrease in coal-fired power generation will be partially 
 compensated by other economic developments, they do not necessarily have to be lost. For example, 
in recent years, roughly 100,000 new jobs were created in the renewables sector in the Federal States 
most affected by the coal phase-out. As a result, adding the direct, indirect and induced workplace 
effects overestimates the employment effect of the pending coal phase-out.
A coal phase-out does not mean unemployment for everyone who works in the coal industry. Roughly 
two thirds of the direct employees in the lignite industry in 2018 are already over 46 years old. As a 
result, much of the employment decline can be compensated by regular retirement. Employment 
opportunities in recultivation of open-cast mines have an additional absorbing effect. Accordingly, 
the coal phase-out can be implemented with minimal adverse effects on the current generation of 
employees. For future generations, the structural changes must be actively shaped to create new 
future-proof jobs in the regions.
STRUCTURAL CHANGE  
AND TRANSFORMATION COSTS
Summary
OPPORTUNITES FOR A SUCCESSFUL STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The negative consequences of the coal phase-out can be reduced with a targeted structural policy. 
A successful structural change requires both measures for younger current employees in the coal 
industry who cannot retire for age reasons, and in particular investments into future-proofing the 
lignite regions beyond the coal industry. 
For a successful structural change, a package of measures that specifically addresses science and soft 
location factors in addition to classic structural support for the economy and infrastructure expansion 
would be ideal. Positive employment prospects, for example through the energy transition, can more 
than compensate the lost jobs in the regions. 
Financing for the measures is to be integrated in the existing funding structure (e.g. EU funds) and 
supplement them appropriately. A structural change fund financed from national government 
 resources is conceivable for this.
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE COAL PHASE-OUT
Gradual decommissioning of all coal-fired power plants could lead to a slight electricity wholesale 
price increase. Assuming that the capacity utilisation of the gas-fired power plants will be increased 
anyway in the following years, an additional coal phase-out will only lead to a minor additional in-
crease in electricity wholesale prices. The exact level of the rise depends among other things on the 
development of the raw material prices and other market developments. As increasing  electricity 
wholesale prices automatically reduce the shared contributions under the German Renewable  Energy 
Sources Act (EEG), the electricity price effects of a coal phase-out for domestic customers and  companies 
which are not exempt from the EEG shared contribution will be compensated appreciably. Potential 
redundancy plan costs for coal industry employees who cannot retire for age reasons are another 
cost item. In addition, some municipalities will have to expect trade tax shortfalls.
On the other hand, an accelerated coal phase-out leads to a series of positive effects: Besides the im-
portance for climate change mitigation, there will be no need to tap new open-cast mines or mine 
sections and thus relocate some towns and destroy further landscapes. Another benefit is reduced 
environmental and health costs via reduced emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollutants like 
mercury, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulate matter. The electricity wholesale price for 
a kilowatt hour of coal-based electricity currently covers less than one quarter of these external costs.
ENSURING RENATURATION OF OPEN-CAST MINES
Operators of lignite mines are legally obliged to bear the follow-up costs of lignite mining, and 
form corresponding provisions in their balance sheets. However, figures on the level and timing 
of  follow-on costs are based on company-internal calculations. Most of the costs are not incurred 
until the open-cast mine closes. This results in the risk that the current provision system will not 
be expedient, in particular in the context of an accelerated coal phase-out. In order to ensure that 
the follow-up costs are actually borne by the lignite companies and not the general public, various 
measures like a public law fund are being discussed.
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In the lignite coalfields and regions in particular, the coal phase-out will be  challenging 
for the regional economy. Lignite coalfields are defined as districts with active 
 open-cast mines and/or power plants with net capacities of over 50 MW. Lignite 
regions also include districts linked to lignite coalfields via significant flows of com-
muters (DIW Berlin et al. in press; see Fig. 4.1.1 on regional demarcation of coalfields).
There are three lignite coalfields in Germany: The Rhineland coalfields in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, the Lusatian coalfields in Brandenburg and Saxony and the  Central 
German coalfields in Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt (see Fig. 4.1.1). The Rhineland coal-
fields are the largest lignite coalfields in Germany by lignite extraction volume and 
the number of employees in the lignite industry, followed by the Lusatian coalfields 
and – by a clear margin – the Central German coalfields.
The extraction volumes and employment figures in all three lignite coalfields have 
been decreasing since 1990 (see Fig. 4.1.2). The decreases in the Lusatian and Central 
German coalfields were particularly significant after the economic and currency 
union in 1990. As this process also caused structural upheaval, there is greater 
 scepticism on the pending coal phase-out in Eastern German Federal States. In ad-
dition, irrespective of the coal phase-out, demographical changes in all regions are 
leading to a reduction in the available workforce and a shortage of skilled workers.
Rhineland coalfields: Good conditions for economic realignment
The Rhineland coalfields comprise the Rhein-Kreis Neuss district, the city of Cologne, 
the district of Düren, the Rhein-Erft district and the district of Euskirchen (see Fig. 
4.1.1). Besides the Rhineland coalfields, the superordinate lignite region of Rhineland 
comprise the cities of Düsseldorf, Krefeld, Mönchengladbach and Leverkusen, the 
Aachen metropolitan region and the district of Mettmann, the district of Viersen, 
the district of Heinsberg and the Rheinisch-Bergisch district.
Within the Rhineland coalfields, lignite is structurally dominant in particular for 
the Rhein-Erft district and the Rhein-Kreis Neuss district. The Niederaußem,  Fortuna 
Nord, Frechen, Ville-Berrenrath and Goldenberg large-scale power plants are con-
centrated in the Rhein-Erft district. It also includes part of the Hambach open-cast 
mine. The Rhein-Kreis Neuss district is home to the Garzweiler open-cast mine and 
the Frimmersdorf and Neurath large-scale power plants. In both districts, the  mining, 
energy and water supply sector (MEWS) accounted for the highest percentages of 
gross value added in 2015, at 13% and 11%, in the districts associated with the coalfields 
(own calculations based on VGRdL (2017)).
In the Rhineland lignite region, the relative economic significance of lignite is  rather 
low. Relative to the net power generation, it contributes 0.6% to value creation (DIW 
Berlin et al. (2018), see Tab. 4.1.1).
The coal phase-out is a challenge 
for regional economies in the 
lignite regions.
Since 1990, the extraction 
quantities and employment figures 
in all three lignite coalfields have 
decreased. The decrease in the 
Lusatian and Central German 
coalfields was particularly 
significant.
The Rhineland coalfields comprise 
the four districts on the left bank of 
the river Rhine and the city of 
Cologne.
In economic terms, lignite is 
relatively insignificant to the 
Rhineland lignite region.
 » The Rhineland and Central German lignite coalfields are well positioned to cope with structural change 
thanks to the economic structure in the regions around the coalfields.
 » By contrast, conditions in the structurally weaker and more rural Lusatian coalfields and the surrounding 
regions are more difficult. Compared with the other coalfields, they have fewer other industrial sectors, 
and the infrastructure is mediocre.
 » Irrespective of the coal phase-out, demographic changes are resulting in a declining workforce and a 
shortage of skilled workers in all regions.
4.1   REGIONAL ECONOMY IN THE LIGNITE REGIONS
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In 2017, fewer than 10,000 persons, or roughly 0.3% of the entire working population, 
were employed directly in the lignite industry in the Rhineland lignite region. As an 
estimate, it can be assumed that the lignite industry generates another 0.6 jobs in  indirect 
employment within lignite regions (RWI 2017; Öko-Institut 2017b) (see Chapter 4.2).
The Rhineland lignite region has an above-average per capita gross domestic  product 
(GDP) and a highly developed service sector (see Tab. 4.1.1). However, compared with 
national figures, there is a slightly above-average unemployment rate that has 
hardly decreased since 2002 (DIW Berlin et al. in press).
The Rhineland lignite region has a diversified industry. For example, this includes 
energy-intensive industries like aluminium and chemicals, logistics and technology 
as well as agriculture and the food sector. The region is characterised by strong in-
novation potential, as evidenced by an active start-up scene and the presence of 
many major corporations’ research and development departments (Regionomica 
2013; SRU 2017). The Rhineland also has a strong infrastructure. Almost two thirds 
of the North Rhine-Westphalia’s 72 higher education institutions and many tech-
nology and energy research institutions are located here (DIW Berlin u. a. 2018). The 
region is also well connected to North Rhine-Westphalia’s transportation network, 
i.e. to the densest network of roads and the second longest rail network in Germany, 
to major European waterways and two international major airports. The Rhineland 
is also home to major conurbations (like Aachen, Cologne and Düsseldorf), and is 
close to the Ruhrgebiet region.
Overall, it can be assumed that the Rhineland lignite region will cope comparably 
well with a coal phase-out. On one hand, the lignite industry only makes a limited 
contribution to the region’s economic output in spite of its absolute size. On the 
other hand, there are numerous other industrial sectors, urban areas and research 
centres, which can be used to economically re-align the Rhineland coalfields towards 
future-proof sectors like renewable energy sources and energy efficiency.
Lusatian coalfields: The lignite industry provides a significant portion of eco-
nomic output
The Lusatian coalfields consist of the city of Cottbus and the Elbe-Elster, Oberspree-
wald-Lausitz, Spree-Neiße and Görlitz districts; the Lusatia lignite region comprises 
the Bautzen district in addition to the Lusatian coalfields (see Fig. 4.1.1).
The lignite industry is of structural significance in particular for the Spree-Neiße 
(Brandenburg) and Görlitz (Saxony) districts. In the Spree-Neiße district, the MEWS 
sector accounted for 44% of the gross value added in 2015; in the Görlitz district, it 
reached just over 16% (internal calculations based on VGRdL (2017)). The Spree-Neiße 
district contains the Jänschwalde open-cast mine and part of the Welzow-Süd open-
cast mine. It is also home to part of the Cottbus-Nord open-cast mine, which was 
shut down at the end of 2015. In addition, the Spree-Neiße district is home to the 
Jänschwalde and Schwarze Pumpe large-scale power plants. The Görlitz district is 
home to the Nochten, Reichwalde and Boxberg large-scale power plants.
In the structurally weaker and more rural Lusatia lignite region, the lignite industry 
plays a relatively important role. The lignite industry’s gross value added share in 
Lusatia in 2014 was just under 4%. Also, roughly 8,000 direct employees worked in 
the Lusatian lignite industry in 2017, though that is just 1.8% of the total working 
population in the region. If you add indirect employees per the 1:0.6 ratio in RWI 
(2017), this increases the percentage of employees to roughly 2.9%. While there are 
relatively few other dominating industrial sectors besides lignite in the Lusatia region, 
it would be inaccurate to call it an industrial monostructure (Markwardt et al. 2016).
The per capita GDP in the Lusatia lignite region is far below the national average 
(see Tab. 4.1.1). The Lusatia lignite region is characterised by the manufacturing 
 industry and population ageing to a greater extent than Germany as a whole. 
The Rhineland lignite region’s gross 
domestic product is above-average.
The Rhineland lignite region has a 
diversified industry, high innova-
tion potential and a strong 
infrastructure.
The Rhineland lignite region is in a 
good position to cope with the coal 
phase-out.
The Lusatian coalfields cover parts 
of Brandenburg and Saxony.
Lignite has a relatively high 
economic significance for the 
overall rather structurally weak, 
homogeneous and rural Lusatia 
lignite region; however this is not 
tantamount to an industrial 
monoculture.




The high percentage of over-50-year-olds in Lusatia is due in particular to extensive 
emigration of young people in the 1990s (DIW Berlin et al. in press; Markwardt et 
al. 2016). The unemployment rate in Lusatia is almost twice the national average. It 
decreased at an above-average rate between 2002 and 2014, which can be traced 
back to the decline in the working population (DIW Berlin et al. in press; Markwardt 
et al. 2016).
Infrastructure in Lusatia is limited: The region only has two higher education 
 institutions, both of which specialise in engineering and natural sciences. Lusatia 
has neither a relevant airport nor a good connection to fast trains and road networks 
(DIW Berlin et al. in press). 
Accordingly, the conditions for structural change are more difficult in the Lusatia 
lignite region than in the two other lignite coalfields.
Central German coalfields: Germany’s smallest lignite coalfields well positioned 
for economic realignment
The Central German coalfields comprise the cities of Chemnitz and Leipzig and the 
district of Leipzig, the Burgenlandkreis district, the Mansfeld-Südharz district and 
the Saalekreis district (see Fig. 4.1.1). Outside the Central German coalfields, the 
Central German lignite region also comprises the city of Halle (Saale), the Erzgebirgs-
kreis district and the districts of Mittelsachsen, Zwickau and Nordsachsen. The lignite 
industry is structurally relatively insignificant within the Central German coalfields 
for the Leipzig district (Saxony) and for the Burgenlandkreis and Saalekreis 
(Saxony-Anhalt) districts. In 2015, the MEWS sector accounted for almost 13% of gross 
value added in the Leipzig district; the figure in the Burgenlandkreis and Saalekreis 
districts was roughly 10% (own calculations based on VGRdL 2017). The Leipzig district 
is home to the Vereinigtes Schleenhain open-cast mine, part of the Profen open-cast 
mine and the Lippendorf large-scale power plant. The Burgenlandkreis district 
contains the Lützen open-cast mine, part of the Profen open-cast mine and the 
Wählitz and Deuben industrial power plants. The Saalekreis district is home to the 
Schkopau large-scale power plant.
Both in absolute and relative terms, lignite is of restricted importance for the Central 
German lignite region. In 2014, the lignite industry only accounted for just over 0.4% 
of the gross value added of the region (see Tab. 4.1.1). In 2017, the lignite industry in 
Central Germany also employed just over 2,000 people, equivalent to just under 0.2% 
of all of the region’s working population. If jobs indirectly dependent on lignite are 
added, the percentage of the workforce increases to roughly 0.3% (see RWI (2017)).
The per capita GDP in Central Germany is slightly higher than in Lusatia, but far below 
the national average (see Tab. 4.1.1). Services and the manufacturing industry are of 
similar significance for the region as for Germany as a whole. Even though it is lower 
than in Lusatia, the percentage of over 50-year-olds in Central Germany is above the 
nationwide average. Here too, emigration of young people is the main reason (DIW 
Berlin et al. in press). In Central Germany, the unemployment rate is significantly 
higher than the national average. In the last years, it decreased at an above-average 
rate due to the decline in the working population (DIW Berlin et al. in press).
Due to the central location near Leipzig, and the area’s chemical and automotive 
industry, the economy in Central Germany is far more diversified than in Lusatia 
(SRU 2017). Central Germany also has a far better infrastructure. In addition to twelve 
higher education institutions, there are many research institutions in the energy, 
buildings and environmental technology sector there. With Leipzig/Halle airport, 
Central Germany also has Germany’s second-largest freight airport, and one of the 
most modern transshipment points for express air freight. In summary, it can be 
assumed that Central Germany will cope relatively well with a coal phase-out due 
to the number of alternatives available.
The region has just two higher 
education institutions and 
relatively poor transport 
 connections and infrastructure.
The smallest lignite region, Central 
Germany, covers parts of Saxony 
and Saxony-Anhalt.
Lignite is of restricted importance 
for the Central German lignite 
region.
The per capita gross domestic 
product in the Central German 
lignite region is slightly higher than 
in Lusatia, but far below the 
national average.
Thanks to the diversified industry 
and the good infrastructure, the 
Central German lignite region will 
cope relatively well with 
a coal  phase-out.
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Percentage of the MEWS sector in 
gross value added
 < 5 % 
  5  – 10 %
  10  – 20 %
 > 40 %
MEWS = Mining, Energy and Water 
Supply, data for 2015.
Fig. 4.1.1: Gross value added contribution of the MEWS sector at a district (Kreis) level in the lignite coalfields and regions
Source: Own compilation based on DIW Berlin et al. in press
Fig. 4.1.2: Lignite extraction and number of employees in the lignite industry
Sources: Some values rounded. Own calculations based on Öko-Institut (2018a, 2017b); SRU (2017); GWS, DLR, and DIW Berlin 
(2018); RWI (2017); Coal Industry Statistics (2018, 2017).
Notes: The number of employees refers to the status at the end of the year. It is not directly comparable over time. The data for 
1990 only includes employees in lignite mining. In contrast, employees in the lignite-fired power plants for public power supply 
are included in 2017. Also, the restriction to power plants with a net capacity of over 50 MW does not apply for the employee  figures. 




Tab. 4.1.1: Socio-economic performance indicators of the lignite regions for 2015
Rhineland Lusatia Central Germany Germany









population over 50 43 % 55 % 48 % 43 %
Unemployment rate* 7.3 % 11.0 % 9.2 % 5.7 %





















Mining, Energy and 
Water Supply (MEWS)




25 % 37 % 32 % 30 %
Contribution of 
services 75 % 62 % 68 % 69 %
Workforce 3,060,197 459,214 1,451,409 43,057,000
Contribution of 
lignite*** 0.31 % 1.81 % 0.18 % 0.05 %
Contribution of 
Mining, Energy and 
Water Supply (MEWS)




19 % 29 % 26 % 24 %
Contribution of 
services 80 % 69 % 73 % 74 %
Sources: Coal Industry Statistics (2017b); VGRdL (2017); DIW Berlin et al. in press, own calculations 
Notes: * Reference year 2014; ** Only relative to the net power generation DIW Berlin et al. in press; *** Employees in lignite mining 
and the lignite-fired power plants for public power supply.
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In 2018, approx. 18,500 persons are employed directly in the lignite industry 
(power plants and open-cast mines). Of those, 8,900 work in the Rhineland coalfields, 
7,800 in the Lusatian coalfields, and 1,900 in the Central German coalfields. Another 
approx. 150 people still work in the shut-down Helmstedt coalfields, 600 people for 
the  Lausitzer und Mitteldeutsche Bergbau-Verwaltungsgesellschaft (LMBV), which 
is responsible for renaturation of the former GDR open-cast mines, and 300 people 
work at the Romonta montan wax factory. As coal mining is far more labour-intensive 
than work in power plants, and almost all hard coal-fired power plants run on im-
ported coal, there are far fewer employees in the hard coal industry. The hard coal-fired 
power plants employ roughly 4,000 to 8,000 people nationwide (see Tab. 4.2.1) 
(DIW Berlin et al. in press; Öko-Institut 2017b; Coal Industry Statistics 2017a; SRU 2017).
Indirect and induced employment effects
Indirect and induced employment effects are difficult to quantify, as not all jobs can 
be attributed clearly (SRU 2017). For example, indirect employees work for suppliers 
who provide services and intermediate goods for the coal industry. Induced employ-
ment results from the fact that employees in the coal industry spend their wages to 
the benefit of other companies. Based on a series of studies (incl. EEFA (2011, 2010)), 
RWI (2017) concludes that for every direct employee in the lignite industry, there are 
another 0.6 indirect and induced local employees (as the study does not differentiate 
clearly between coalfields and regions, the broader definition of lignite regions will 
be used below for local employment effects). For every direct employee in the lignite 
industry in Germany, there are roughly 1.8 indirect and induced employees. Accord-
ingly, the industry also currently employs roughly 33,000 persons indirectly or in 
induced jobs, roughly 11,000 of them in the lignite regions (see Tab. 4.2.1). 4,800 to 
9,600 indirect and induced employees are assumed for the hard coal sector.
As indirect and induced jobs can be partially compensated by other economic 
 developments in a transformation process over 15 to 20 years, it is to be assumed 
that most of these jobs will only be shifted, not lost. As a result, adding the direct, 
indirect and induced workplace effects overestimates the employment effect of the 
coal phase-out. In addition, the corresponding effects are generally calculated from 
historic time series, and therefore do not represent the dynamics of structural change, 
and are therefore generally overestimated (Arepo Consult 2017).
18,500 direct employees work in 
the lignite industry; there are a 
further 4,000 to 8,000 in hard 
coal-fired power plants.
As indirect and induced jobs can be 
partially compensated by other 
economic developments in a 15 to 
20-year transformation process,  
the effects of the coal phase-out on 
employment would be overestima-
ted by adding these jobs.
 » Currently, roughly 18,500 persons are employed directly in lignite-fired power plants and lignite mining. 
Another 4,000 to 8,000 employees work in hard coal-fired power plants.
 » The employment figures in the lignite industry will decrease to approx. 14,500 by 2030 without  additional 
climate policy intervention. Additional measures to implement the 2030 climate targets could lead to 
a reduction to roughly 8,000 employees.
 » Most of the direct employees in the lignite industry could also take normal retirement, even with an 
accelerated coal phase-out to reach the 2030 climate target.
 » As some indirect and induced jobs would be compensated by other economic developments in a trans-
formation process over 15 to 20 years, adding the direct, indirect and induced effects on jobs overestima-
tes the employment effect of a coal phase-out.
4.2  EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
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Decline in employment figures
Based on previous decisions, unless other measures are taken in the coal sector, 
further jobs would be lost due to reduced production of coal-based electricity and 
decreased lignite extraction. (DIW Berlin et al. in press; BCG and Prognos 2018; 
Öko-Institut, BET and HWR 2017). The Öko-Institut assumes that, taking the resolu-
tions on the lignite security reserve into account (see Chapter 5.3), the number of 
indirect employees in the lignite industry will decrease from 18,500 to approx. 14,500 
by 2030 (see Tab. 4.2.2). In the event of a linear reduction in coal-fired power  generation 
above and beyond the security reserve to achieve the 2030 sector targets, roughly 
6,500 further direct jobs would be affected (Öko-Institut 2018a). The exact extent 
and regional distribution of the decline depends on the specific structure of the 
phase-out. In the event of a coal phase-out strictly by power plant age, Rhineland 
would be affected by declining employment to a greater relative extent due to its 
older power plants than the two coalfields in Eastern Germany (DIW Berlin et al. in 
press). These figures do not yet include potential additional consequences due to the 
pending restructuring processes at RWE and E.ON, in which up to 5,000 jobs are to 
be cut at the two companies. 
Normal retirement  
A coal phase-out would not condemn all employees to unemployment. Roughly two 
thirds of the approx. 18,500 direct employees in the lignite industry are over 45 years 
of age (Coal Industry Statistics 2017d; IÖW 2017). In addition, a coal phase-out would 
also generate additional demand for labour for accelerated recultivation of the 
 open-cast mines. In the event of a linear coal phase-out trajectory to reach the 2030 
sector target, the number of employees remaining in lignite mining in the period 
until 2030 is lower than the number of jobs required in mining and recultivation, 
taking the retirement age into consideration (see Tab. 4.2.3) (Öko-Institut 2018). Many 
of the employees could therefore retire at the normal age, and would not be at risk 
of unemployment (DIW Berlin et al. in press; Öko-Institut 2018a; SRU 2017).
Tab. 4.2.1: Current employees in lignite mining and the lignite and hard coal-fired power plants
Employees


















~5,300 ~4,700 ~1,100 ~22,100 ~33,300 ~4,800– 9,600
~38,100– 
42,900
Source: Some values rounded. Own calculations based on Öko-Institut (2018a, 2017b); SRU (2017); GWS, DLR, and DIW Berlin 
(2018); RWI (2017); Coal Industry Statistics (2018).
Notes: * Lignite: Employees in lignite mines and the lignite-fired power plants for public power supply in 2017 (Coal Industry  Statistics 2018); 
Data excludes the Helmstedt coalfields and employees of the Lausitzer und Mitteldeutsche Bergbau-Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH 
(LMBV) for open-cast mine recultivation (Lusatian coalfields: 410 employees, Central German coalfields: 210 employees) (Öko- Institut 
2018a); Hard coal: 5,000 to 9,000 employees in the hard coal-fired power plants in 2016 less 800 to 1,000 employees due to job 
cuts at Steag (SRU 2017); ** Lignite: Factor 1.6 in the coalfields and 2.8 for the rest of Germany (RWI 2017); Hard coal: Factor 1.2, based 
on an average factor of 0.6 for hard coal mining (GWS, DLR, and DIW Berlin 2018) and in line with the data from Öko-Institut (2017b), 
that lignite-fired power plants generate roughly twice as much indirect employment as lignite mining.
Jobs in the coal industry will 
already decrease to approx. 14,500 
in the next few years based on the 
measures passed to date.
Two thirds of the direct employees 
in the lignite industry are over 45. 
As a result, many of the employees 
can retire at the normal age even in 
the event of an accelerated coal 
phase-out to implement the 2030 
climate targets.
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Tab. 4.2.2: Decrease in direct employment in the lignite industry due to the coal phase-out*
2015 2020 2025 2030
Employment development in the lignite 
industry* assuming previous measures (esp. 
lignite security reserve)**
20,696 16,770 16,970 14,472
Employment development in the lignite 
industry in compliance with the 2030 
climate target (linear reduction)***  
(incl. recultivation****)
20,696 16,770 12,642 8,011
Source: Öko-Institut (2018a), own calculations
Notes: * Lignite mining (incl. recultivation of the open-cast mines and lignite refinement) and lignite-fired power plants; ** As-
sumption of rising volume of lignite extracted per employee as in the past ten years; *** Assumption of constant lignite extraction 
volume per employee (no productivity advances, as the volume of lignite extracted is decreasing); **** For 30% of the jobs lost per 
annum from 2020 on, new employment will be created transitionally in recultivation (for a further four-year period).
Tab. 4.2.3: Employment development in lignite mining
Source: Öko-Institut (2018a), own calculations
Notes: * Assumption of a rising volume of lignite extracted per employee as in the past ten years;** Assumption of constant lignite 
extraction volume per employee (no productivity advances, as the volume of lignite extracted is decreasing); *** For 30% of the 
jobs lost per annum from 2020 on, employment will be created transitionally in recultivation (for a further four-year period).
2015 2020 2025 2030
i) Development of the need for employment 
in lignite mining assuming previous 
measures (esp. lignite security reserve)*
15,273 ~12,300 ~12,500 ~10,700
ii) Development of the need for employ-
ment in lignite mining in compliance with 
the 2030 climate target (linear reduction)** 
(incl. recultivation***)
15,273 ~12,300 ~9,700 ~6,400
iii) Development of employment figures in 
lignite mining taking the standard 
retirement age into consideration (without 
new hires)
15,273 ~12,300 ~8,600 ~6,000
80
Chapter 4
A targeted structural policy could reduce the negative consequences of a coal 
 phase-out. Unlike historical processes in Eastern Germany, one main advantage of 
the upcoming structural change is that it can be planned and will occur over an 
extended period of time. For a successful economic development in the coal regions, 
structural change must be shaped actively and in good time by all stakeholders 
involved (DIW Berlin et al. in press; BMWi 2017a; SRU 2017). 
Successful structural change requires measures for employees too young to retire. 
However, the priority is to secure future value creation in the regions by supporting 
existing and new companies and creating new, future-proof jobs.
Prospects for employees currently working in the lignite industry
By 2030, roughly two thirds of the around 18,500 remaining direct employees in the 
lignite industry can retire as planned. The coal phase-out will also create new demand 
for labour to dismantle power plants and for earlier remediation of the coal mines 
(see Chapter 4.2). For another 10% of the current employees, early retirement schemes 
such as full or partial retirement from the age of 55 could be possible, as is already 
usual in some of the mining companies (SRU 2017).
For the remaining quarter of the younger employees in the lignite industry – approx. 
4,000 to 5,000 – a coal phase-out will require them to consider a change of profession 
for the period after 2030. Diversified training in the mining companies can give them 
a solid foundation for this. Via a principle of rotation, like that implemented e.g. at 
Vattenfall in Berlin, trainees can learn different skills in various functions to prepare 
them for a wider range of employment opportunities.
In the short and medium term, employment could be created in the energy-focused 
building refurbishment sector. Energy-focused building refurbishment offers a high 
regional economic potential, as roughly two thirds of all buildings are over 40 years 
old. With a suitable subsidy programme and assuming a refurbishment rate of 2-3%, 
this could create an additional 19,000 to 37,000 local jobs and also contribute to 
achieving a climate-neutral building stock by 2050 (DIW Berlin et al. in press).
It is assumed that the impending shortage of skilled labour will make it easier to 
change jobs (Markwardt et al. 2016; ifo Institut 2014). In a survey of Lusatia, roughly 
40% of companies surveyed reported a lack of sufficiently qualified personnel, which 
they viewed as a risk for their medium to long-term business success. The same is 
true for a lack of specialists in craft and commercial sectors and for academic 
 specialists in business management and engineering (Markwardt et al. 2016).
However, the wage level in the lignite industry is far higher than comparable new 
Unlike the processes in Eastern 
Germany after 1990, the upcoming 
structural change can be planned 
and will occur over an extended 
period of time.
The coal phase-out will result in 
new demand for labour to 
 dismantle power plants and for the 
earlier remediation 
 of the coal mines.
Only 4,000 to 5,000 employees will 
have to find a new profession 
 after 2030.
An ambitious energy-focused 
building refurbishment program-
me could offer significant regional 
economic potential. With an 
appropriate subsidy programme, 
19,000-37,000 new local jobs 
could be created.
The future skills shortage in all 
regions will make a change of 
profession easier.
 » A successful structural change requires both measures for younger employees in the coal industry who 
cannot retire for age reasons, and investments into future-proofing the regions.
 » Structural policy must address innovations and the economic potential of all sectors, e.g. by supporting 
the economy, science, infrastructure and civil society.
 » In the short and medium terms, employment can also be created via an ambitious building  refurbishment 
subsidy programme. The foreseeable general shortage of skilled workers also offers employment  prospects.
 » The investments required for the structural change can be financed by setting up a structural change 
fund using Federal Government resources.
4.3  HOW TO MAKE THE STRUCTURAL CHANGE A SUCCESS
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areas of employment (DIW Berlin et al. in press; SRU 2017). As a result, it cannot be 
ruled out that employees will earn less when changing industry (DIW Berlin 2017a).
In addition, measures to compensate for lost income for employees affected by job 
losses are also conceivable (DIW Berlin et al. in press; SRU 2017); see Chapter 4.4 on 
potential redundancy plan costs).
Structural development measures 
Targeted and sustainable regional development is essential to future-proof the 
lignite regions, above and beyond compensating the social costs of the coal  phase-out 
(SRU 2017). Promoting the economy, science, infrastructure and civil society are ways 
to make the structural change a success:
Economy: Regional economic development in the lignite regions could focus on 
industries of the future, like renewable energy, energy efficiency, building  refurbishment, 
electromobility, digitalisation and tourism (DIW Berlin et al. in press; SRU 2017; E3G 2015). 
For example, closed open-cast mines can be repurposed for both tourism and leisure 
facilities, or as sites for wind and photovoltaic farms (DIW Berlin et al. in press, SRU 2017).
As it may be difficult to attract major new industrial developments to Lusatia, and 
the company structure is fragmented and heterogeneous with low patent and 
 start-up activities, the existing studies primarily recommend promoting innovation 
 activities in existing companies (Markwardt et al. 2016; E3G 2015; ifo Institut 2014). 
For example, corresponding measures include targeted contacting of companies for 
idea generation, promotion of partnerships between business and science or ensur-
ing seamless financial support throughout the entire innovation cycle (Markwardt 
et al. 2016). Rhineland and Central Germany offer more points of contact to existing 
industries like the chemicals and automotive industries (SRU 2017).
Science: Higher education and research institutions are significant drivers of 
 innovation and cooperation partners for the private sector (BTU 2017). As a result, 
research promotion and greater dovetailing of research and business – especially in 
small and medium-sized enterprises – and increasing the number of spin-offs from 
research institutions play a key role in developing industry-relevant projects and 
establishing new companies (DIW Berlin et al. in press). New jobs in (non-) university 
research and development could help keep young people in particular in the 
(Eastern German) lignite regions and attract or incentivise the establishment of 
companies or subsidiaries (SRU 2017).
Infrastructure: Good transport connections, fast Internet and other infrastructure 
facilities are not only important location factors for companies, they also make 
 regions attractive, especially for young people (DIW Berlin et al. in press). As a result, 
specific infrastructure projects should be promoted in the Eastern German lignite 
regions in particular. They include expansion of the digital infrastructure, better rail 
connections to metropolitan regions (e.g. Berlin and Dresden for Lusatia) and neigh-
bouring countries (Agora Energiewende 2016b, 2017a).
Soft location factors: In order to counter the existing emigration trend, soft location 
factors should also be promoted. Standards of living and attractiveness are what 
make people stay in a region and companies invest in a region, as they can find the 
staff they need here. Given the demographic changes, a structural development 
concept should also target cultural and leisure activities, support for civil society 
activities of all kinds, e.g. in the arts, culture and preserving traditions, and services 
for young families (Agora Energiewende 2016b, 2017a; SRU 2017; Wuppertal Institut 
2016). Vattenfall and RWE have been active in this area in the past (event sponsorship, 
contributions to financing kindergartens or football clubs, see Chapter 4.4). Estab-
lishment of a local endowment fund earmarked for this purpose could promote 
civil society activities sustainably and unbureaucratically in the long term 
(Lausitzer Perspektiven 2018; IRR 2017; Metropolregion Mitteldeutschland 2017).
Promoting the economy, science, 
infrastructure and soft location 
factors can make structural change 
a success.
Regional business development 
should focus on future industries 
like renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, electromobility, 
digitalisation and tourism.
Given the fragmented company 
structure with low patent and 
founding activity, support for 
innovation activities in existing 
companies is recommended for 
Lusatia.
Increased dovetailing of research 
and business and an increase in 
spin-off companies is key to attract 
new corporate developments.
In the Eastern German lignite 
regions in particular, specific 
infrastructure projects should be 
promoted.
Regional initiatives are important 




Ideas for structural development must build on the local characteristics and strengths. 
Corresponding regional initiatives will be initiated in the regions, like Zukunfts-
agentur (future agency) Rheinisches Revier (formerly Innovationsregion Rheinisches 
Revier GmbH from 2014-2018), Innovationsregion Lausitz GmbH (iRL, since 2016) and 
Europäische Metropolregion Mitteldeutschland e. V. (since 2014), which are  developing 
concepts for a future without lignite in the regions. To support the lignite regions, 
the German Federal Government launched the Unternehmen Revier (Operation 
Coalfields) subsidy programme (BMWi 2017a), which is also to draw up investment 
concepts (WL 2018; IRR 2017; Metropolregion Mitteldeutschland 2017).
Structural change fund to finance measures
Fundamentally, funding is available from the EU, the German Government and the 
Federal States, as well as the shared federal and state responsibility ‘Improvement 
of the Regional Economic Structure’ to finance structural change in the lignite regions 
(GRW) (DIW Berlin et al. in press, Wuppertal Institut 2018). For example, Lusatia 
 receives approx. 35 to 40 million euros from the European Structural and Investment 
Fund annually. This results in the following problems that must be addressed:
 • For some funds, the application and processing workload for smaller and 
 medium-sized companies is prohibitively high in some cases. Assistance with 
the application process could be improved or periods between application and 
approval could be reduced (Markwardt et al. 2016).
 • In addition to this, conventional EU structural funding aims to develop the 
 structures of structurally weak regions, not to prevent weakening of currently 
relatively prosperous regions (Markwardt et al. 2016). For example, the effects of 
a politically induced coal phase-out could be included in the calculations for the 
next funding period.
 • If existing funds are redistributed, adaptation of the corresponding European  criteria 
to benefit the lignite regions could also result in a debate on distribution with other 
structurally weak regions (Agora Energiewende 2017a; Markwardt et al. 2016).
 • The need to observe EU state aid regulations in Improvement of the Regional 
Economic Structure programme, for example, means that national funding is 
only possible to a limited extent.
A separate fund using Federal Government resources could be set up to finance 
structural change. The Coalition Agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD (2018) 
indicated that further funds will be made available for regional structural policy 
due to the coal phase-out. Coordination with the European Commission is required 
to determine how a fund specifically for the lignite regions can be created in 
 compliance with the EU state aid regulations (DIW Berlin et al. in press). Funds should 
guarantee competition for the best ideas for structural change and must define 
which stakeholders are eligible for funding. It is crucial that the recipients are 
 companies and persons tapping new, sustainable business areas with innovations.
Structural change can only succeed 
if the soft location factors are also 
improved.
EU, German Government and 
Federal State funds are available to 
finance structural change in the 
lignite regions.
A separate fund using German 
Government resources could be 
created to finance the structural 
change.
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An accelerated coal phase-out has both costs and benefits. The costs range from 
system costs in the electricity sector and redundancy plan costs, to losses of  municipal 
tax revenue. Besides climate protection, the benefits of a coal phase-out include 
avoidance of resettlements and destruction of environmentally valuable surfaces 
as well as reduced environmental and health costs due to emission of air pollutants. 
Effects on the electricity system and the electricity wholesale price
In the short term, closure of coal-fired power plants would probably lead to a slight 
increase in electricity wholesale prices (DIW Berlin 2014e; PwC 2016). The electricity 
price effects of a coal phase-out depend largely on the specific coal phase-out 
 instrument. The long-term effect of a complete phase-out of coal-fired power 
 generation by 2040 compared with a reference scenario was estimated to be 
0.18 ct/kWh (ewi 2016). For the reference scenario, the study assumes an increase in 
the electricity price to 7.59 ct/kWh in 2040. This assumption is within the range of 
standard cost trend forecasts.
One result of this medium-term increase in electricity wholesale electricity prices 
would be to bolster natural gas-fired power plants, which require higher electricity 
prices than lignite-fired power plants in particular in order to operate viably. 
 Accordingly, at 75%, purchases of natural gas form the largest individual item in the 
increased expenditure for the electricity system (ewi 2016). Statements on the increase 
in the electricity wholesale electricity prices therefore depend significantly on the 
development of raw material prices. Potential wholesale price effects of the coal 
phase-out must be considered in the context of the European electricity market, 
which compensates the effects significantly.
As rising electricity wholesale prices automatically lead to a reduced shared contri-
butions under the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), the electricity price 
effects for domestic customers and companies not exempt from the EEG shared 
contribution are only equivalent to roughly 40-60% of the change (enervis 2015; DIW 
Berlin 2015a).
Costs of compensation for employees
The trade union Ver.di had the costs of redundancy plans calculated for the event 
that none of the employees in the power plants find other employment after an 
early phase-out, and thus all receive their previous wages including further  increases 
per the collective agreement until they reach retirement age (enervis 2016). This 
represents an extreme scenario, as it is to be assumed that new jobs will be created 
in other areas, as described above (see Chapter 4.3.). For this extreme scenario, enervis 
calculated redundancy plan costs of approx. 158 million euros per annum for a  period 
from 2016 to 2050 for the power plant employees alone. The costs are calculated 
from the difference between a coal phase-out by 2040 (Agora Energiewende 2016a) 
and a reference scenario in which the last coal-fired power plant is not shut down 
An accelerated coal phase-out will 
lead to a slight increase in the 
wholesale electricity prices.
The decrease in the shared 
contributions under the German 
Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(EEG) will diminish a potential 
impact on the electricity price due 
to the coal phase-out by roughly 
50%.
As expected employment effects 
are limited, costs of potential 
redundancy plans must also be 
assumed to be correspondingly low.
 » In the short term, coal-fired plant closures would result in a slight increase in the electricity wholesale prices.
 » The decrease in employment due to the coal phase-out can lead to redundancy plan costs. Some cities 
and municipalities will be affected by losses of municipal tax revenue.
 » An accelerated coal phase-out could avoid expansion of open-cast mines and therefore resettlement, as 
well as further environmental and health problems.
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until 2050. Similar estimates apply for the employees in lignite open-cast mines 
who were not considered in this survey, but are roughly equivalent in number to 
the staff of all coal-fired power plants.
Losses of municipal tax revenue
While losses of tax revenue in the communities affected by the coal phase-out  cannot 
be fully compensated by construction of wind and solar farms, future tax revenues 
from renewable energy sources will be more broadly distributed (Michel 2018).
Municipalities which co-own coal-fired power plants must expect additional write-
downs. In the Rhineland region, for example, many municipalities hold shares in 
RWE AG. Due to poorer operating results in recent years, some of their dividend 
payments have been reduced or even suspended. Write-downs of value impairments 
caused the city of Essen to report losses of 680 million euros in its stock assessment 
in 2013 alone (Michel 2018, 2017). There are similar developments at Steag, one of the 
largest operators of hard coal-fired power plants. 
Moreover, in the past in particular Vattenfall and RWE have sponsored numerous 
events in the coal regions and also contributed to financing kindergartens or football 
clubs. Due to the weaker business position, they have cut back these activities signif-
icantly, especially since Vattenfall’s withdrawal from Lusatia. A certain compensation 
can and should be created for all of these cases from structural funds (see Chapter 4.3).
Avoided resettlements
In Germany, over 120,000 people have already had to be relocated for lignite open-
cast mining in recent decades. An accelerated coal phase-out eliminates the need 
to dig new open-cast mines or mine sections (DIW Berlin et al. in press; DIW Berlin 
2017c; SRU 2017; Öko-Institut 2017b). This can avoid further destruction of landscapes 
and resettlement of towns:
 • In Rhineland, the already approved open-cast mines Garzweiler II and/or Ham-
bach could be reduced in size, preserving villages with over 3,000 residents 
(Berverath, Westrich, Kuckum, Keyenberg, Lützerath, Immerath). In addition, the 
remaining sections of the Hambach Forest could be protected from deforesta-
tion. Hambach Forest has existed since the last ice age and, as one of the oldest 
forests in Germany, it is home to a diverse ecosystem of flora and fauna (DIW 
Berlin 2014a; Agora Energiewende 2016a; SRU 2017).
 • In Lusatia, the Mühlrose special field of the Nochten 2 open-cast mine is slated 
for redevelopment. By 2020, a decision is also to be made on whether subfield II 
of the Welzow-Süd open-cast mine is to be developed (LEAG 2017). Without the 
two new developments, the villages and districts Trebendorf, Proschim and 
Welzow could be preserved, and resettlement of roughly 1,000 people could 
therefore be avoided (Klima-Allianz Deutschland 2017; Agora Energiewende 
2016a; SRU 2017).
 • In Central Germany, expansion of the Vereinigtes Schleenhain open-cast mine 
would no longer be necessary (SRU 2017; DIW Berlin 2017c). As a result, the  villages 
of Pödelwitz and Obertitz, with a population of roughly 80 people, would no 
longer have to be resettled (DIW Berlin 2014a; Öko-Institut 2017b). In addition, 
development of the Lützen open-cast mine, which would require resettlement 
of 930 people in the towns or villages of Stößwitz, Sössen, Gostau, Kölzen, Röcken, 
Michlitz, Bothfeld, Schweßwitz and Lützen, could be avoided (Klima-Allianz 
Deutschland 2017).
Reduced environmental and health problems
International studies show that a coal phase-out would lead to significant positive 
effects for the environment and health (J. Casey et al. 2018; J. A. Casey et al. 2018). 
The coal phase-out will cause 
losses of trade tax revenue in the 
affected communities.
Municipal owners or stakeholders 
e.g. in RWE AG or Steag 
must expect write-downs and 
dividend cuts.
A coal phase-out endangers the 
financing of smaller local projects 
by the coal companies.
Resettlement of approx. 5,000 
people and deforestation of the 
remainder of Hambach Forest 
could be avoided.
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Overall, the environmental costs for electricity from lignite and hard coal in  Germany 
in 2016 were roughly 46 billion euros (UBA 2017b). Only a fraction of these  specific 
environmental costs of coal-fired power generation are already internalised via 
emissions trading and the energy tax (FÖS 2018). For example, over half of Germany’s 
mercury emissions and a large part of Germany’s sulphur dioxide emissions came 
from coal-fired power plants (see Tab. 4.4.1). In terms of particulate matter, note that 
coal-fired power plants primarily emit ultra-fine particulate (particle diameters of 
less than 0.1 μm), which are not yet recorded adequately due to their low mass (SRU 
2017). Air pollutants are primarily local in nature, but can also be transported long 
distances in certain circumstances (UBA 2017b; SRU 2017). They are linked with a 
series of environmental impacts and illnesses, which could be reduced by a coal 
phase-out. They include (UBA 2017b; SRU 2017; BMWi 2018a):
 • Aggravated respiratory illnesses (like asthma, chronic bronchitis) and  cardiovascular 
illnesses (like high blood pressure, heart attacks) due to nitrogen dioxide  emissions, 
low-lying ozone and particulate matter;
 • Chronic effects on the nervous system and neurocognitive restrictions among 
children due to introduction of mercury into the food chain;
 • Excessive fertilisation and acidification of soils and bodies of water via nitrogen 
oxide emissions, with negative consequences for biodiversity.
Other environmental costs of lignite open-cast mines are caused by lower  groundwater 
levels and iron ochre sedimentation of bodies of water (DIW Berlin 2014e). As a result, 
the electricity wholesale price paid for a kilowatt hour is not even one quarter of the 
true external costs, which are largely paid by the general public (see Fig. 4.4.1).
Tab. 4.4.1: Emissions of selected air pollutants in 2016
Coal-fired power 
plants Germany
Mercury (Hg) Tonnes ~5.6 9.8
Sulphur dioxide  (SO2) Thousands of tonnes ~143* 356
Nitrogen oxides  (NOx) Thousands of tonnes ~155 1,217
Particulate matter  (PM10) Thousands of tonnes ~7 203
Note: * SOx
Sources: UBA (2018c, 2018d, 2018b), own calculations
Fig. 4.4.1: Specific environmental costs (incl. health costs) and achievable electricity 
wholesale prices for lignite and hard coal-based power generation compared
Reducing emissions of air 
pollutants is expected to have 
positive effects on the environment 
and health. The environmental 
costs of coal-fired power 
 generation in Germany were 
roughly 46 billion euros in 2016.
The environmental and health costs 
of coal-fired power generation are 














Greenhouse gases Air pollutants
Lignite-based power generation Hardcoal-Based power generation
5,07 5,62 4,55
3,98 3,40 3,25 2,92 3,35
Source: Own compilation based on UBA (2017b), UBA (2012) and Fraunhofer ISE (2018b) 
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Operators of lignite mines are obliged to bear the follow-up costs of lignite mining 
(Section 55 of the German Federal Mining Act (BBergG), version dated 30/11/2016), 
and to form corresponding provisions in their balance sheets. The follow-up costs 
include in particular recultivation of open-cast mines after the end of lignite  extraction 
(DIW Berlin 2017c). The provisions formed by the end of 2016 totalled roughly 4 
billion euros. Of that, 2.4 billion euros were contributed by RWE, 1.5 million euros by 
LEAG and 0.14 billion euros by Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft mbH 
(MIBRAG) (DIW Berlin 2017c). To date, the total follow-up costs of mining have not 
been studied against the backdrop of an early phase-out of coal-fired power  generation. 
In addition, it is not certain that the existing provision system ensures that the 
operators will actually bear the follow-up costs. .
Overview of the pending follow-up costs of mining
The majority of the follow-up costs of lignite mining will be incurred in the future, 
making them difficult to estimate (SRU 2017; DIW Berlin 2017c). The corresponding 
provisions are calculated based on the cost estimates by operators according to 
detailed subsequent use plans (FÖS and IASS Potsdam 2016; SRU 2017).
RWE commissioned and published three dedicated reports on the required provisions 
(RWE Power, RWTH, and BET 2017; RWE Power and KPMG 2016; MTC 2017). These reports 
indicate that 80% of the costs of recultivating the Rhineland coalfields will not be 
incurred until an open-cast mine is closed. While rehabilitation accounts for 74% of 
the costs, resettlements and relocations only make up 8% of the costs. RWE reports 
that the company has already formed approx. 70-80% of the necessary provisions. 
However these reports do not indicate how the provisions have been formed, and they 
do not contain any estimates of how the required provisions and other balance sheet 
items would change in the event of an early coal phase-out.
Efforts should be made to have independent and transparent cost estimates produced 
for a more precise evaluation of the costs in the event of an early phase-out of coal-
fired power generation (Agora Energiewende 2016a; DIW Berlin 2017c; SRU 2017). A 
report commissioned by government agencies could provide clarity with regard to 
the total volume and maturity of the follow-up costs, and ensuring that they are 
covered. The results of previous studies by operators and Federal States should 
 influence this study so that costs can be estimated and measures to ensure the costs 
are covered can be assessed on this basis. The remediation reports by Lausitzer und 
Mitteldeutsche Bergbau-Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH (LMBV), which is responsible 
for remediation of the GDR open-cast mines, provide further information on the 
follow-up costs. 
To date, the operators of the lignite 
open-cast mines have formed 
provisions of approx. 4 billion euros 
to cover the follow-up costs of 
lignite mining.
The provisions were calculated 
based on the operators’ cost 
estimates.
RWE indicates that 80% of the 
follow-up costs are not incurred 
until after an open-cast mine is 
shut down, and that it has already 
formed roughly 70-80% of the 
necessary provisions.
A report commissioned by 
government agencies could provide 
clarity on the total volume and 
maturity date of the follow-up 
costs, and how they are secured.
 » Operators of lignite mines are obliged to bear the follow-up costs of mining, and form corresponding 
provisions.
 » To date, the total follow-up costs of mining have not been studied against the backdrop of an early 
 termination of energy use of coal.
 » There is a risk that the previous provision system will not be adequate, in particular in the context of 
an accelerated coal phase-out.
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Minimisation of the risks for financing of the follow-up costs
The balance sheet provisions formed by the open-cast mine operators to finance the 
follow-up costs of mining reflect the future burdens of payment based on their 
calculated cash value.
The total of the provisions therefore no longer depends only on estimates of the 
follow-up costs, but also on when they are due, the inflation rate and the discount-
ing rates (DIW Berlin 2017c). If recultivation starts earlier (e.g. due to an accelerated 
coal phase-out ), the requirements for recultivation measures increase, price increase 
rates are higher or discounting rates are lower, and the operators would have to 
increase the provisions (DIW Berlin 2017c; SRU 2017).
Provisions are liabilities that must be matched by assets in balance sheets. In some 
cases, the mining companies’ assets are investments in conventional power plants 
or open-cast mining infrastructure. If these assets lose value at a faster rate, as would 
be expected in the event of a coal phase-out, other assets would have to be provided 
as collateral for the provisions. In recent years, conventional power plants have 
 already had to make additional write-downs (SRU 2017).
To date, the provisions are not insolvency-proof, i.e. they could be lost if the operator 
becomes insolvent (Agora Energiewende 2016a; FÖS and IASS Potsdam 2016; DIW 
Berlin 2017c). If the operator is a subsidiary, the parent company is fundamentally 
liable for the costs if there are controlling and profit transfer agreements. However, 
under certain circumstances, the parent company can avoid liability by terminating 
these agreements in good time or by restructuring under company law ((DIW Berlin 
2017c), (FÖS and IASS Potsdam 2016), Section 303 of the German Stock Corporation 
Act (AktienG), version dated 10/05/2016). Due to its company structure, liability 
concerns have been expressed with regard to EPH, which owns LEAG and MIBRAG 
via a series of intermediate companies ((DIW Berlin 2017c; Öko-Institut 2017b). EPH 
itself confirmed that it is not currently liable for LEAG’s debts (Steinmann 2017).
Ensuring the polluter pays principle
There are many proposals for minimising risks in mining-related provisions, and 
thus guaranteeing that operators will bear the follow-up costs of lignite mining. 
Besides independent cost estimates, this includes in particular the following  measures 
(Agora Energiewende 2016a; FÖS and IASS Potsdam 2016; DIW Berlin 2017c; SRU 2017):
 • Follow-up liability law: As in the nuclear sector, a follow-up liability law could 
ensure that the parent corporations would be liable for their subsidiaries’  follow-up 
costs of mining even after restructuring.
 • Collateral in accordance with the German Federal Mining Act: Per Section 56 of 
the German Federal Mining Act (BBergG), the responsible mining authority could 
demand insolvency-proof collateral, like insurance, bank guarantees or a letter 
of comfort from the parent company instead of balance sheet provisions. For 
example, at the end of December 2017, the Upper Mining Authority determined 
that the Nochten open-cast mine must provide collateral in the form of special 
assets (Pinka 2018).
 • Public-law funds: As in the nuclear sector, a public law fund resourced from the 
finances of the mining companies could be imposed.
A public law fund would be the most transparent solution with the highest  insolvency 
protection for particularly long-term follow-up costs (FÖS and IASS Potsdam 2016; 
DIW Berlin 2017c). For example, a levy could be imposed on lignite extracted in the 
future to finance it (Agora Energiewende 2016a).
If recultivation starts earlier, the 
operators would have to increase 
the provisions.
The previous practice of hedging 
provisions primarily by investing in 
conventional power plants and 
open-cast mine infrastructure 
entails risks, in particular in the 
context of a coal phase-out.
Moreover, the provisions already 
formed are not insolvency-proof.
Additional measures are required 
to ensure that the follow-up costs 
are borne by the operators.
A public law fund could be formed 
at regular intervals by the 
operators e.g. via a lignite levy.
German coal-fired power plants are subject to various policy instruments, specifically the European 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) and various regulations on emissions of other pollutants. To reach 
the climate policy targets (cf. Chapter 2.5) and remove barriers to the implementation of the energy 
transition (cf. Chapter 1.4), additional measures are required to achieve a reduction and phase-out of 
coal-fired power generation. A reliable, structured and continuous reduction of coal-fired power 
 generation cannot be ensured with the current instruments alone.
Chapter 5.1 introduces the main instruments that currently apply to the use of coal in energy  generation 
(ETS and EU Industrial Emissions Directive). The subsequent chapters present potential further  policy 
instruments suitable to achieve a reduction of coal-fired power generation: Chapter 5.2 deals with the 
CO2 minimum price and other price instruments, Chapter 5.3 with the closure of power plant  capacities 
and Chapter 5.4 with the capping of annual production at coal-fired power plants, while Chapter 5.5 
introduces instrument combinations.
EMISSIONS TRADING
The ETS pushes up the cost of emission-intensive energy generation through capping and pricing CO2 
emissions. However, there will be no significant emission reductions unless the price of emission 
allowances consistently raises the cost of coal-fired power generation (i.e. the marginal costs) above 
the cost of gas-fired power generation. The CO2 price required to achieve this aim mainly depends on 
the difference in various fuel prices and on power plant efficiency. In the past, the so-called fuel switch 
price has been extremely volatile, fluctuating between approx. 5 euros/t of CO2 for old hard coal-fired 
power plants and up to 100 euros/t of CO2 for new lignite-fired power plants. 
The current emission allowance price of around 20 euros/t of CO2 (August 2018) and the current fuel 
switch prices have already pushed some hard coal-fired power plants, especially older ones, out of the 
market for a considerable number of hours and modern combined-cycle power plants have profited. 
To fully replace lignite-based power as well, the ETS price must remain consistently at an even  higher 
level, which is however not expected before 2030.
PROS AND CONS OF POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Hence, a continuous and reliable coal phase-out requires the implementation of further instruments. 
A distinction is made between instruments which work indirectly via pricing and regulatory  approaches 
which apply directly to certain power plants or certain types of power plants.
Analysis has shown that stakeholders’ control over the transformation process is highest when 
 coal-fired power plant capacities are shut down according to a predetermined order. Controllability 
is crucial, in particular with regard to impacts on security of supply and structural change. Control-
lability also ensures reliable planning conditions for investments in the new energy system. Due to 
the high concentration of lignite-based jobs in a small number of regions, it would be advisable to 
select instruments which ensure that both lignite-fired power plants and hard coal-fired power plants 
contribute to CO2 reductions from the start. Given that price-based instruments, such as the CO2 
minimum price, always interact with other market factors, it is more difficult to estimate their concrete 
effects on individual power plants. The choice of instruments thus involves a trade-off between reli-
able planning conditions and flexibility. For instance, if transferable or tradable residual amounts of 
electricity or CO2 emissions are defined for each power plant instead of fixed phase-out years, planning 
conditions will be less reliable. 
As an alternative to immediate closure, coal-fired power plants can also be transferred to a reserve. 
However, this option is associated with high costs for the public.
INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING THE USE OF
COAL IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
Summary
If predetermined closure is combined with caps on annual generation for remaining power plants, 
compliance with a defined total CO2 budget will be more accurate. The caps ensure that the initial 
closures will indeed reduce emissions by avoiding higher electricity production at the remaining 
coal-fired power plants. The drawback associated with combined instruments is increased  complexity 
which may delay the political negotiation process.
LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY AND WATER BED EFFECT
Expert appraisals published so far assume that the closure of coal-fired power plants is legal and 
principally requires no compensation if the investments have fully paid off. However, operators should 
be granted a transitional period of one or two years. By contrast, it is not assured that the EU would 
approve an expansion of the lignite security reserve. Certain legal risks arise from capping electricity 
generation at active power plants: In the absence of transfer options, the maximum limits must still 
allow for profitable operations, thereby placing tight restrictions on the instrument’s design.  According 
to experts, raising energy taxes exclusively in the field of coal-fired power generation would be 
 problematic on legal grounds. By contrast, there is no legal impediment to raising taxation of all 
fossil fuels, e.g. for the purpose of introducing a CO2 minimum price.
After the ETS reform, it has become much less likely that a reduction in coal-fired power generation 
in Germany will lead to a surplus in emission allowances in the ETS (so-called water bed effect), either 
in the short- or the medium-term. On the one hand, the new EU Emissions Trading Directive allows 
governments to cancel certificates in the amount of the emissions saved. On the other hand, the 
market stability reserve works against the water bed effect due to its automatic withdrawal of a 
certain quantity of excess emission allowances (cf. Chapter 5.1 and 5.3).
Fig. 5.0.1: Potential elements for policy instruments to reduce the use of coal in the energy sector
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Source: Ecologic Institute based on IZES (2015), p. 141, SRU(2017), p. 32, Öko-Institut (2017), p. 53.
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The European Emissions Trading System
Introduced in 2005, the ETS is the central climate policy instrument at the European 
level. A progressively declining cap applies to the CO2 volumes emitted by the plants 
in the system. Under the ETS, one emission allowance (or certificate) must be  submitted 
to the responsible government authority for each tonne of CO2 emitted in the fields 
of power generation and energy-intensive industries. Emission  allowances can be 
bought and are fully fungible, resulting in the formation of a price per tonne of CO2 
emissions. At present, the price is approx. 20 euros/t of CO2 (August 2018 (EEX 2018a, 2018b)). 
As a result, electricity generation becomes more expensive the higher the CO2 content 
of the underlying fuel and the lower the efficiency of the plant. This provides an in-
centive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and switch to lower-carbon fuels (fuel 
switch). The ETS thus aims to integrate the environmental costs of CO2 emissions and 
climate change into the price-setting process on the electricity market. This approach 
mitigates the price advantages of CO2-intensive coal against lower-carbon natural 
gas, which arise if such external costs are not internalised.
Following several years of negotiations, an ETS reform entered into force in April 
2018. Primarily, the system was reformed to address the approx. 1.7 billion surplus 
certificates that had formed on the emission allowance market under the previous 
rules (as per 2016, (European Commission 2017b; Sandbag 2017)). Due to the surplus, 
the emission allowance price hovered below 10 euros/t of CO2 from 2012 until the 
beginning of 2018. At times, it even dropped below 5 euros.
In the period 2021 to 2030 (fourth trading period), the reformed system now provides 
for a 2.2% cutback of the total emission allowances issued per year instead of the 
previous 1.7%. In 2015, the EU had also decided to introduce a so-called ‘market stabil-
ity reserve’ to reduce surplus emission allowances. This instrument is designed to 
draw part of the surplus off the market as of 2019. Under the reform, the instrument 
was beefed up: In the period 2019 to 2023, the market stability reserve is to absorb 24% 
of surplus certificates a year – double the original amount. As of 2024, this proportion 
will decline to 12%. Moreover, as of 2023, all emission allowances within the market 
stability reserve that exceed the previous year’s auction quantity will be deleted. This 
will result in the deletion of over 2 billion certificates (Thomson Reuters 2017b).
The regulatory parameters for 
coal-fired power generation are 
currently provided by the EU in the 
form of the Emissions Trading 
System and the Industrial 
Emissions Directive.
The ETS reform passed in 2018 will 
gradually reduce the number of 
surplus certificates and should 
thereby trigger higher CO2 prices.
 » The European Emissions Trading System (ETS) is currently the central EU climate policy instrument in the 
electricity sector. Under the system, CO2 emissions pricing is to provide an incentive for emission reductions.
 » Under the ETS, electricity generators are motivated to switch fuel when the price of emission  allowances 
raises the cost of coal-fired power generation (specifically the marginal costs) above the cost of gas, 
thereby affecting the merit order on the electricity market. The price level required for a fuel switch in 
Germany depends predominantly on fuel prices and the efficiency of the power plants. In the past few 
years, the fuel switch price has been very volatile.
 » It is difficult to predict the trend in energy prices and the development of the CO2 price, and forecasts 
were often wrong in the past. Consequently, it is unclear when and for which period the price level 
 necessary for a fuel switch will be reached. Even after the ETS reform, the CO2 price signal alone is there-
fore insufficient to ensure a reliable and continuous reduction of coal-fired power generation in  Germany.
 » In the majority of cases, the limit values applying to pollutants (nitrogen oxide, mercury) that arise from 
the EU Industrial Emissions Directive can be complied with through combustion measures and techno-
logical upgrades. Hence, the Directive is not suitable to ensure a reliable coal phase-out.
5.1  EXISTING INSTRUMENTS
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Box 5.1: Elimination of the water bed effect
In the debate about national climate change mitigation measures in ETS sectors, 
it is often argued that the emission allowances released by such measures lead to 
additional emissions abroad (so-called ‘water bed effect’). This, so the argument 
goes, neutralises the mitigation effect of national instruments. The ETS reform 
addresses the water bed effect on two different levels:
Firstly, the revised 2018 ETS Directive allows member states which shut down 
national generation capacities to reduce the auction volumes of emission  allowances 
in the ETS by the corresponding amount. Governments can thus ensure that ad-
ditional domestic measures do not result in more emissions abroad.
Secondly, the beefed-up market stability reserve also counteracts the water bed 
effect: Instead of creating an additional supply of emission allowances abroad, 
supplementary national measures raise the reserve that is withdrawn from the 
market. Given the deletion of surplus emission allowances within the reserve as 
of 2023 the risk of carbon leakage is limited (Öko-Institut 2018b).
Changing the merit order on the electricity market
A fuel switch occurs when the CO2 price triggers a sufficient change in the power 
plants’ generation costs (relevant are the marginal costs) to modify the merit order 
on the electricity market (see Chapter 1.3). Lower-carbon power plants will be  preferred 
to more CO2-intensive plants. Primarily, this involves a switch from coal-fired to 
gas-fired power plants (so-called ‘fuel switch’).
Aside from the cost of CO2 emissions under the ETS, two further factors affect the 
marginal costs, namely the price difference between the various fuels and the 
 efficiency of the power plants. With fuel prices subject to fluctuations, the fuel switch 
price also changes constantly: The larger the price difference between hard coal or 
lignite and natural gas, the higher the CO2 price needs to rise and remain over time 
in order to permanently change the merit order on the electricity market. The  lower 
the efficiency of the coal-fired plants (hence the higher the cost of their power 
 generation), the lower the CO2 price necessary to trigger the fuel switch to more 
efficient gas-fired power plants. Hence, when the CO2 price goes up, older and less 
efficient coal-fired plants are increasingly pushed out of the merit order. More  efficient 
coal-fired plants, however, can hold on longer and require a higher CO2 price to 
 become more expensive than gas-fired power plants.
Fig. 5.1.1 presents various forecasts of the trend in ETS certificate prices until 2030. 
The forecasts were produced in 2018 and 2017 (after the adoption of the ETS reform). 
This shows that expectations of future emission allowance price levels vary  considerably 
– although there is overall agreement that the trend is rising. In 2020, certificate 
prices are expected to range between 10 euros and 23 euros/t, in 2025 between approx. 
14 and 35 euros/t and in 2030 between 22 and 35 euros/t. The diagram compares the 
price forecasts with the past fuel switch prices necessary to effect a change from old 
and new hard coal / lignite-fired power plants to modern combined-cycle power 
plants in the period 2003 to early 2018. In the last 15 years, fuel switch prices for hard 
coal fluctuated between approx. 5 and 55 euros/t for old power plants and approx. 
25 and 105 euros/t for new power plants. A considerably higher CO2 price level is 
required to push lignite out of the market: In the period 2003 to early 2018, the price 
ranged between approx. 25 and 85 euros/t for old power plants and around 35 to 125 
euros/t for new power plants (Öko-Institut 2018b).
The revised ETS Directive allows 
member states to reduce the 
auction volumes for emission 
allowances in the amount 
corresponding to the emissions of 
the generation capacities 
they shut down.
Emissions trading is expected to 
contribute to a switch from hard 
coal to gas in power generation. 




At present, the switch from hard coal to gas-fired power plants occurs at CO2 prices 
of just under euros 10/t (see Chapter 1.3). Propelled by current emission allowance 
prices within the ETS (around euros 20/t of CO2, August 2018), the first hard coal-fired 
power plants in Germany, specifically older ones, are slipping behind gas-fired  power 
plants in the merit order on the electricity market. Based on current market  conditions 
(specifically fuel prices), gas-fired power plants would push out all German hard 
coal-fired power plants at a price of euros 40/t of CO2 or above. In the case of lignite, 
the switch point currently approximates euros 20/t for older plants and euros 50/t 
for the most efficient modern lignite-fired power plants (see Chapter 1.3). Hence, it 
is clear that the ETS can contribute to the switch from hard coal-based electricity 
generation to gas, especially where older power plants are concerned. But it is  unlikely 
that emission allowance prices will trigger a comprehensive switch from lignite to 
gas-fired power plants in the coming ten years.
Change in profitability
However, as well as having the potential to change the merit order on the  electricity 
market during certain hours, the CO2 price also affects the profitability of lignite-fired 
power generation. To a large degree, lignite-fired power plants and lignite open-cast 
mines are run by the same companies (integrated enterprises). Due to the mining 
operations fix costs make up a high percentage of the total costs  these companies 
face (Öko-Institut 2017b) (see Chapter 1.2). They cover these fixed costs via  contribution 
margins generated from electricity sales. According to the Öko-Institut, a CO2 price 
of euros 15/t is sufficient to put the profitability of older lignite plants at risk in the 
medium term, as the additional CO2 cost pushes down the contribution margins. 
Given a long-term stable price level of euros 25/t or above, old lignite-fired power 
plants could be shut down within a few years (Öko-Institut 2018b).
Uncertainties
However, both the trend in fuel switch prices and the future level of the CO2 price 
are subject to uncertainty. Past projections have often turned out to be wrong. This 
is due to the fact that the CO2 price is driven by a range of different factors, including, 
among others, the price of the different energy sources, the macroeconomic trend, 
the expansion of renewable energy and the promotion of energy efficiency. Experts 
argue that further factors are involved. In the past, the perceived reliability of the 
CO2 reduction targets and the long-term commitment to these targets may also have 
affected the price trend (MCC 2017; Koch et al. 2014).
Although the ETS ensures that the EU does not exceed a certain emission quantity 
in a specific period, the system is not designed to guarantee a fuel switch.
A CO2 price of 15 euros /t or above 
puts the profitability of older 
lignite plants at risk. Given a stable 
price level of 25 euros/t or above, 
old lignite-fired power plants could 
be shut down within a few years.
Future trends in CO2 prices and fuel 
switch prices are subject to 
significant uncertainty.
The ETS is not designed to 
guarantee a fuel switch.







































































Hard coal LigniteThe marked bandwidths reflect the 
expected price of emission 
allowances. The colours present the 
ranges of historical switch prices: 
red and brown for old coal-fired 
power plants, blue and brown for 
new power plants.
Fig. 5.1.1: Forecasts of ETS certificate prices until 2030 and range of historical fuel switch 
prices for old coal-fired power plants to combined-cycle power plants, 2003 to 2018
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On top of this, the indirect impact the ETS exerts via the electricity market does not 
allow policy-makers to control the pace and spatial distribution of the coal  phase-out. 
However, control is crucial both for the timely achievement of the emission  reductions 
under the adopted climate targets and for a technologically and  economically sound 
advancement of the energy sector transformation (see Chapter 1.4 and Chapter 3.3). 
Regional control plays a central role where the impact of local structural change and 
aspects of security of supply are concerned (see Chapter 4 and 3.5). 
Thus, despite the recent reform and signs that effectiveness will increase, the ETS 
alone cannot guarantee a reliable, structured and continuous reduction of coal-fired 
power generation in Germany. At most, it can contribute to this objective.
Options of strenghtening EU emissions trading
With the ETS reform just taking effect, EU member states are currently unlikely to 
agree on any strengthening of the system, e.g. via the introduction of an EU-wide 
minimum price or a more ambitious cap reduction. It is true that an amendment of 
the ETS may result from the EU’s obligations under the UN process. The reformed 
ETS Directive calls on the Commission to carry out regular reviews of the constituent 
provisions in connection with the global stocktaking requirement under the Paris 
Agreement. This includes both the cap and the linear reduction factor. In 2018, the 
first review is due in the context of the Talanoa dialogue. However, it is unlikely that 
substantial amendments will be adopted on this occasion. The probability of further 
reforms is higher in the context of the subsequent global stocktake in 2023. On top 
of this, the parameters governing the market stability reserve will be reviewed as 
early as 2021 (Carbon Brief 2017; European Commission 2018a).
EU Industrial Emissions Directive (IED)
In addition to the ETS, coal-fired power generation in Germany is also subject to 
Directive 2010/75/EU on Industrial Emissions (IED). Among others, the Directive 
applies to large combustion plants with a furnace heating capacity exceeding 300 
MWth. This covers the majority of German coal-fired power plants. The Directive 
includes minimum environmental criteria, specifically in terms of air pollutant 
emissions. EU-wide minimum thresholds are determined on the basis of the best 
available technology (BAT). In 2017, the BAT requirements applying to coal-fired 
power plants were updated, introducing new environmental standards for large 
combustion plants. These include stricter standards for emissions of dust, sulphur 
and nitrogen dioxides as well as the first-ever emission standards for mercury under 
European law (European Commission 2017a). The new environmental standards 
must be transposed into national law within four years (by 2021) and existing plants 
will be obliged to adhere to them by this date.
While in regard of sulphur dioxide and dust, the operating data of large combustion 
plants in Germany already comply with the emission limit values specified in the 
updated BAT leaflet, the new nitrogen oxide and mercury standards require power 
plants to make adjustments.
Lignite-fired power plants in particular will require upgrades to meet the required 
annual average values. At 160 to 190 mg/m3, the annual average values for nitrogen 
dioxide at current large lignite-fired power plants frequently exceed the new limit 
values (SRU 2017). According to the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), at present 
no more than four lignite-fired units in Germany would comply with this threshold 
even if the national average limit is set at the upper end (175 mg/m3). This means 
that combustion measures (e.g. optimisation of combustion conditions) or  emission-based 
upgrades may become necessary, depending on the limit values that will be set 
under the Federal Emission Control Act and the permit requirements at the power 
plant sites (SRU 2017). The EU mercury emission requirements will also necessitate 
measures in many cases. Whether or not a measure will pay off for a specific site is 
In addition, emissions trading does 
not allow for any control on where 
or when coal-fired power capacity 
is shut down.
In the next few years, EU member 
states are unlikely to agree another 
reform of the emissions trading 
system.
Although stricter emission limits 
for air pollutants will require some 
power plants to upgrade, the 
instrument is not suitable to 
ensure a structured coal phase-out.
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primarily an economic decision that must be taken by the power plant operator. 
This is why the Directive and its national implementation is not a suitable instrument 
to ensure a reliable, structured and continuous reduction in coal-fired power  generation. 
It is difficult to say to what extent higher limit values will lead to optimisation, upgrades 
or closures of power plants.
Pollutant Type of power plant (current plants) Annal average threshold values
Nitrogen oxides
Fluidised bed combustion (lignite and hard 
coal), lignite dust firing, over 300 MWth
< 85–175 mg/Nm3 
Mercury
Hard coal dust firing, over 300 MWth 65–150 mg/Nm3
Lignite-fired power plants < 1–7 μg/Nm3
Hard coal-fired power plants < 1–4 μg/Nm3
Tab. 5.1.1: Annual average threshold values for nitrogen oxide and mercury emissions, 
current large combustion plants with more than 1,500 operating hours a year, applicable 
as of 2021
Source: European Commission (2017a)
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Price or market-based instruments make fossil energy generation more expensive 
in relation to climate-friendly options. Principally, this can be achieved via  quantitative 
limits and pricing, as in the case of the ETS, or via additional levies. Several EU 
 countries are currently discussing a minimum CO2 price for the electricity market 
as a supplement to the ETS. Further feasible instruments include higher energy 
taxes on coal and the ‘climate contribution’ proposed by the Federal Ministry of 
Economics in 2015. In principle, the above-mentioned instruments initially aim to 
make electricity generation by emission-intensive power plants, specifically  coal-fired 
plants, more expensive, resulting in lower production levels. If the price is  sufficiently 
high, the instruments can also lead to closures.
National minimum CO2 price in the electricity sector
One of the options for supplementing carbon pricing under the ETS is the  introduction 
of a minimum CO2 price in the electricity sector. Under this approach, a fixed price 
level is guaranteed via a flexible surcharge on the certificate price. This removes 
uncertainty about future price levels in the ETS. In contrast to the ETS scheme  without 
minimum price, it also provides incentives to cut emissions at an early stage. 
 Depending on the form and level of the minimum CO2 price, this could cause a fuel 
switch from hard coal and lignite to gas. The price level necessary to achieve  changes 
in the merit order depends on the price difference between the various fuel prices 
and on power plant efficiency (see Chapter 5.1). Under current conditions, hard coal-
fired power generation would decline if the price is around 10 euros/t of CO2 or above. 
A price level of 20 euros or above would currently be required to reduce the use of 
lignite in the electricity mix. Hence, if a minimum CO2 price were the only instrument 
in operation, it would initially tend to push hard coal out of the market. Compared 
to a fixed sequence of closures (see Chapter 5.3), the minimum CO2 price has the 
advantage that intervention into basic ownership rights is less pronounced. Yet, for 
managing structural change and security of supply, the instrument is associated 
with a number of risks since there is very little room to control where plants are 
shut down.
Regional minimum CO2 price in the electricity sector
Various EU member states are currently considering the introduction of a minimum 
CO2 price in the electricity sector, among them France, Sweden and the Netherlands 
(icap n.d.; Carbon Market Watch 2013; euobserver 2017; The Guardian 2016). In the 
Price-based instruments make 
CO2-intensive electricity more 
expensive.
5.2     CO2 MINIMUM PRICE AND OTHER PRICE INSTRUMENTS
 » Fixing a minimum CO2 price for the electricity sector can provide early and permanent incentives to 
avoid emissions. If set at the right level, the price will change the merit order on the electricity market 
and thereby reduce coal-fired power generation. However, it does not allows for control over the coal 
phase-out’s impact on single regions.
 » An exclusively national CO2 price could make German power plants less competitive in Europe and thus 
reduce the amount of electricity they generate. To mitigate these leakage effects, it would make sense 
to introduce a minimum price in conjunction with neighbouring member states. However, this may 
result in delays.
 » Further approaches involving a reduction of coal-fired power generation via pricing include the ‘climate 
contribution’ proposed by the Federal Ministry of Economics in 2015 on the one hand and higher energy 
taxes on the other. However, not only are both instruments affected by legal risks, they are also  relatively 
complex.
The minimum CO2 price can push 
coal-based electricity out of the 
market but does not allow 
control ling where and when 




UK, the instrument has already been in force since 2013 (see Box 5.2). Cooperation 
between several European countries could have a number of advantages. On coupled 
electricity markets, such a regional approach would prevent German power plants 
from losing competitiveness compared to European rivals and thus losing market 
share. According to modelling results for the year 2020, an exclusively national 
minimum price of 25 euros/t of CO2 would already change Germany from a net 
exporter to an importer of approx. 40 TWh of electricity a year (Öko-Institut 2018b). 
There is also a risk of carbon leakage: Assuming an exclusively national minimum 
price, the extra electricity produced abroad would be predominantly hard coal and 
gas-based. This transfer of emissions to other countries would eliminate over half 
of Germany’s emission reductions (Öko-Institut 2018b).
To prevent this, the joint introduction of a minimum price by a group of countries 
would be preferable, e.g. the central-western European electricity market consisting 
of Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. 
In this scenario, a minimum price amounting to 25 euros/t of CO2 would reduce net 
electricity imports to Germany to approx. 17 TWh (Öko-Institut 2018b). Gas-fired 
power plants abroad would benefit from the changes in import-export flows. As a 
result, gas-fired power plants abroad would push out German coal-fired power plants 
and the proportion of German emission reductions offset by extra emissions abroad 
would decline to one-quarter. Additional generation of nuclear power is not likely 
since, thanks to its low marginal costs, nuclear power is already at the top of the 
merit order (Öko-Institut 2018b).
To a large extent, the emission allowances released in the case of a regional minimum 
CO2 price would be absorbed by the ETS market stability reserve, which in turn 
 reduces the water bed effect (see Chapter 5.1). Although the revised 2018 Emissions 
Trading Directive allows countries to downscale the auctioning volume of emission 
allowances when national measures reduce generating capacity (see Box 5.1), it is 
unclear whether this regulation would also apply in the case of a minimum CO2 price.
One drawback associated with the regional approach is the need for increased 
 coordination. Even if there is basic agreement, the concrete implementation is  likely 
to throw up a number of questions and may delay introduction compared to a na-
tional solution.
Impact on the electricity price
According to modelling results for the year 2020, a minimum CO2 price as part of a 
regional approach will lead an increase in electricity wholesale prices, but the impact 
depends on the set level. The increase will vary from 6 euros/MWh (0.6 ct/kWh) if 
the minimum price is 15 euros/t CO2 to approx. 20 euros/MWh (2 ct/kWh) if the 
 minimum price is 35 euros/t CO2 (Öko-Institut 2018b). It should be noted that  electricity 
wholesale prices have dropped significantly in the last few years due to the expansion 
of renewable energy. The rise in prices affecting consumers who pay the EEG levy is 
mitigated by a decline of the levy as renewable energy-based plants generate  higher 
income due to higher wholesale prices. This effect offsets approx. one half of the rise 
in electricity prices (see Chapter 1.3). If the government wanted to avoid any further 
strain on households, the additional income generated from the minimum price 
could, for instance, be used to lower the electricity tax. Energy-intensive industries 
which compete at the international level could receive compensation for additional 
electricity costs. The current electricity price compensation scheme already  compensates 
affected companies for the so-called indirect CO2 costs, i.e. the share of the electricity 
price that relates to the CO2 costs arising from the ETS. This approach should also be 
compatible with EU state aid regulation if used together with a minimum CO2 price 
(Öko-Institut 2018b). As a result, European companies can be protected against 
 competitive distortion even if the CO2 price is not harmonised within the G20 - as 
called for by the industrial sector (IG BCE 2018).
A minimum price introduced in 
conjunction with neighbouring 
countries prevents economic 
disadvantages and reduces carbon 
leakage.
The need for coordination is likely 
to delay introduction compared to 
a national solution.
An effective minimum price leads 
to a moderate increase in electricity 
wholesale prices. Effects on end 
consumers can be compensated for.
97
INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING THE USE OF COAL IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
Box 5.2: Minimum CO2 price in the UK
A minimum CO2 price for all power generation plants that are subject to the European 
ETS has been in force in the UK since April 2013. On top of the ETS emission allowances, 
electricity suppliers also pay a fuel tax, the so-called ‘carbon price support’, whose amount 
is determined in advance for three-year periods. The level of the tax is set such that the 
minimum price is reached via the combination of both components. At present, the 
surtax is £ 18/t of CO2 [20.71 euros]. In the financial year 2016/2017, this brought in ad-
ditional government income of £ 1 billion [1.1 billion euros] (House of Commons 2018).
At the time the minimum price was first introduced, the government planned to raise 
it gradually to £ 30/t of CO2 [34.52 euros] by 2020 and to £ 70/t CO2 [80.55 euros] by 2030 
(Sandbag 2013). However, since the ETS certificate price remained low, the surtax was 
frozen at £ 18/t of CO2 and will not be raised any further until 2021. This is to guarantee 
the UK’s competitiveness compared to other EU countries. On top of this, energy-inten-
sive industrial companies receive compensation for rising  electricity prices. As a minimum, 
the instrument will be retained until the completion of the coal phase-out in 2025 
(House of Commons 2018, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2018).
The use of coal in UK power generation has declined significantly since 2013. While 
coal-fired power plants still accounted for 22% of total power generation in 2015, they 
generated no more than 2% in the second quarter of 2017. The minimum price is con-
sidered to be one of the drivers of this trend, although the expansion of renewable 
energy and stricter environmental requirements also contributed (Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 2018). However, since the German electricity 
market is much more intertwined with its neighbours than the UK, this model cannot 
be copied on a one-to-one basis.
Extension and increase of energy tax on coal
At present, the use of coal for power generation is not subject to taxation if used in 
plants with a nominal capacity above 2 MW. The government could extend taxation 
to include the use of coal in larger power plants, thereby providing another price 
signal in addition to the ETS. However, Rodi (2017) has previously pointed out that a 
tax equity problem could arise from a hike in energy taxation that applies  exclusively 
to coal-fired power generation. If this was true, the possible imposition of energy 
tax on hard coal alone could also be problematic under constitutional law.
However, a CO2-based hike on all fossil fuels should be less problematic if it involves 
a consistent tax structure and consistent tax rates. Such application to all power 
generation fuels would represent a de facto introduction of a minimum CO2 price. 
Tax level could be linked to the price of ETS emission allowances (see Box 5.2).
Climate contribution
The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy proposed the ‘climate  contribution’ 
in 2015 with the aim of reducing the proportion of old CO2-intensive coal-fired power 
plants in total power generation. In contrast to a general minimum CO2 price in the 
electricity sector, the climate contribution specifically increases the cost of electricity 
generated by old lignite-fired power plants, while hard coal and gas-fired power plants, 
which set the price in the merit order, are initially not affected (UBA 2015a). According 
to modelling, this scheme would have resulted in a minimal increase in electricity 
prices of around 2 euros/MWh (0.2 ct/kWh) (Öko-Institut and Prognos 2015).
The proposal met with massive resistance from unions and power plant operators. 
In the end, the proposal was dropped. Instead, the Federal Government introduced 
the so-called ‘lignite security reserve’ in combination with the subsequent closure 
of affected lignite-fired power plants as a first short-term step towards reducing 
coal-fired power generation.
Taxing coal while exempting other 
energy sources is problematic on 
legal grounds. Taxation of all fuels 
is a feasible option of implemen-
ting a minimum CO2 price.
The climate contribution would 
specifically raise the price of 




The shut-down of coal-fired generation capacity can be achieved by setting concrete 
dates for the closure of individual plants or plant units, determining thresholds for 
residual electricity or residual CO2 volumes or transferring power plants to a reserve 
(Öko-Institut 2017; SRU 2017; IZES 2015).
Fixed sequence of closures
Analogous to the nuclear phase-out, a fixed schedule of closures could be drawn up 
for coal-fired power plants (residual lifespans). In addition, it should be clearly  stated 
that new coal-fired power plants and open-cast mines will no longer be approved. 
The sequence of closures can be linked to various criteria, e.g. power plant age or 
CO2 intensity (so-called specific emissions).
Due to the direct impact of the closures, it is possible to accurately control a shut-down 
process that is based on a fixed schedule. The instrument thus offers very reliable 
planning conditions for all stakeholders (UBA 2017f), including plant operators and 
local regions. Clear parameters also make it easier for grid operators to plan and 
 guarantee security of supply. Furthermore, the impact of closures is independent of 
the trend in energy prices, changes in CO2 prices or fluctuations in electricity demand. 
However, the emission reduction achievable through closures depends on the trend 
in capacity utilisation at the remaining power plants. Hence, to increase accuracy, 
combinations with further instruments are currently being discussed (see Chapter 5.5).
Constitutional law and EU law
The expert appraisals published to date assume that a coal phase-out involving a 
fixed sequence of closures can be implemented in compliance with constitutional 
law. Since power plants are shut down on environmental grounds and are not  serving 
a public function, the instrument involves a legal regulation of property according 
to Art. 14 of the German Basic Law rather than an expropriation. Pursuant to Art. 14 
(1) sentence 2, the legislator may determine the content of the property law. Leaving 
the content of adopted legal positions intact in perpetuity is not a requirement 
under the ownership guarantee. However, the regulation of property must comply 
with the principle of proportionality. This means that it must be both suitable and 
necessary for the objective that is being pursued. Moreover, the burden on the  owner 
A fixed sequence of closures 
provides reliable planning 
conditions for grid expansion, 
security of supply and regional 
development. 
The closure of coal-fired power 
plants is a legitimate regulation of 
property if it is proportionate to the 
pursued objectives.
5.3     SHUT-DOWN OF GENERATION CAPACITY
 » The shut-down of generation capacity facilitates control over the coal phase-out process, in particular 
with regard to security of supply and structural change. The instrument also ensures reliable planning 
conditions for investments in the new energy supply system.
 » Plant operators would benefit from additional flexibility if a transfer or trading option for electricity or 
CO2 quotas were introduced. However, at the same time, this would affect controllability and planning 
security.
 » The expert appraisals published to date assume that a coal phase-out involving a fixed sequence of  closures 
can be compensation-free, at least in the case of power plants that have already paid for themselves.
 » Transferring power plants to a reserve is very costly for the government. On top of this, it is uncertain 
whether the European Commission would approve such transfers on state aid grounds.
 » To ensure legal security, the sequence of closures must be based on objective criteria. Justified unequal 
treatment, e.g. to guarantee security of supply, is admissible.
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must be in proportion with the interests pursued by the regulation (BBH 2016; IZES 
2015; Rodi 2017; Ziehm 2017; Schomerus and Franßen, forthcoming).
Any regulation in compliance with the constitution must take account of the  principle 
of equality according to Art. 3 of the German Basic Law, i.e. the sequence of closures 
must adhere to uniform standards. By contrast, unequal treatment justified by 
 objective reasons, for instance to ensure security of supply, is admissible (BBH 2016; 
Ziehm 2017; Schomerus and Franßen, forthcoming).
Legal action can be avoided if government and operators agree on a joint strategy for 
the sequence of closures (SRU 2017). From a constitutional point of view, such consen-
sus is not required to initiate a reduction in coal-fired power generation (BBH 2016).
The shut-down of coal-fired power plants via a coal phase-out act is also likely to 
conform with EU law. Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) allows member states to choose between various energy sources and 
decide on the conditions of their use as well as the general energy supply structure 
(Klinski 2017, BBH 2016). In addition, the revision of the Emissions Trading Directive 
expressly allows for national shut-down measures (Schomerus and Franßen, forthcoming).
Transition periods and amortisation of investments
As regards the proportionality requirement governing the regulation of property, it 
is not yet clear to what extent operators are entitled to the amortisation of their 
investments and how many years of useful life are required to reach this point. 
According to calculations carried out by the UBA (2009), initial investments in coal-
fired power plants pay off after 15 to 20 years of operations, while adequate profits 
should be generated after 25 years. The average age of German lignite-fired power 
plants is 35 years. Hard coal-fired power plants have an average age of 30 
years (see Chapter 1.1). BBH (2016) assumes that closures after 25 years of operations 
can be effected within a transition period of one year without requiring  compensation. 
Power plants with heat extraction or long-term supply contracts, as well as the af-
filiated open-cast mines, may require longer transition periods or compensation 
payments (BBH 2016). Schomerus and Franßen (forthcoming) also conclude that 
amortised power plant units can generally be shut down without requiring com-
pensation. However, they also believe that a transition period may be necessary 
since power plant operators often conclude supply contracts for future periods based 
on expected generation volumes. Transition periods could therefore prevent poten-
tial economic losses. Pursuant to Schomerus and Franßen, a period of up to two years 
is sufficient to allow operators to adjust their marketing strategies to the closure.
Transfer and trade of residual electricity or CO2 volumes
Fixed closure schedules can be combined with the stipulation of residual electricity 
volumes or residual CO2 volumes that can be transferred from one power plant to 
another or sold to a different operator. The benefit of this trading or transfer option 
is greater flexibility for operators as they respond to the requirements of the  electricity 
market and choose the most profitable strategy. However, companies would  probably 
price in allocated residual electricity or CO2 volumes even if they are allocated free 
of charge. This is one of the lessons learned from the ETS. Since prices are much more 
frequently set by coal-fired power plants than by nuclear power plants, the expect-
ed impact on the electricity price is much higher than for allocations of residual 
electricity volumes to nuclear power plants under the nuclear phase-out programme.
Furthermore, the transfer and trading of residual electricity or CO2 volumes restricts 
the government’s options of controlling the transformation process and reduces 
planning security for regions and grid operators (Klinski 2017). Trading or transfer 
options could be made subject to approval to ensure that they do not have any 
 significant adverse effects at the local level, or jeopardise security of supply.
According to the principle of 
equality, the sequence of closures 
must be based on factual criteria. 
The revised EU Emissions Trading 
Directive expressly allows for 
national shut-down measures in 
parallel to the Emissions Trading 
System.
It is not yet clear to what extent 
operators are entitled to the 
amortisation of their investments. 
However, experts believe that 
start-up investments in coal-fired 
power plants pay off after 15 to 20 
years.
Expert appraisals state that one to 
two years represent an adequate 
transition period.
While the transfer or trade of 
residual electricity or CO2  quantities 
provides power plant operators 
with greater flexibility, it reduces 
planning security for everyone else.
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CO2 limit values 
Current discussions of further approaches to shutting down coal-fired power plants 
also include the stipulation of CO2 limit values in the sense of minimum  technological 
requirements (Rodi 2017; DIW Berlin 2014c). CO2 limit values would primarily be 
problematic for older lignite-fired power plants. In terms of European law, the 
 Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) leaves it up to the member states to set  efficiency 
requirements. However, the formulation of Art. 9 of the Directive is not clear on the 
admissibility of CO2 limit values (Klinski 2017). Experts argue that the introduction 
of national CO2 limit values for power plants may be admissible thanks to the 
 protective measures clause under Art. 193 of the TFEU. However, this assessment is 
not undisputed (Rodi 2017; IZES 2015; Klinski 2017; Ziehm 2014). Where conformity 
with EU law is concerned, the introduction of CO2 limit values is thus associated 
with a higher level of uncertainty than fixed closure schedules based on a coal 
phase-out act (Schomerus and Franßen, forthcoming). At present, Section 5 Par. 2 of 
the German Federal Emissions Control Act (BlmSchG) excludes the introduction of 
CO2 limit values.
Transfer of coal-based generation capacities to a reserve
Instead of immediate closures, coal-fired power plants can also be transferred to a 
reserve. In this case, the power plants would cease regular production and would 
operate exclusively to remove supply shortages. Operators would receive compen-
sation for keeping guaranteed capacity available. In 2016, the Federal Government 
chose this option in the context of the introduction of the so-called lignite security 
reserve. Throughout the period 2016 to 2019, lignite-fired power plants with a 
 combined capacity of 2.7 GW are gradually being transferred to this reserve before 
being shut down after a cycle of four years.
From a technological perspective, the relevance of this reserve to security of supply 
is somewhat doubtful since coal-fired power plants have long lead times and cannot 
react fast enough when temporary shortfalls arise (IZES 2016). Moreover, a number 
of reserves have already been set up to ensure security of supply (see Chapter 1.1). 
On top of this, the lignite security reserve is expensive, with total expected costs 
amounting to approx. euros 590 million/GW of shut-down capacity (Bundesregierung 
2016). Critics also believe that this scheme creates incentives to keep plants on the 
grid beyond the point of profitability.
In terms of EU law, capacity reserves are considered to be state aid and must be 
approved by the European Commission. To date, the Commission has approved 
various capacity mechanisms to maintain security of supply, among others in 
 Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Poland and Germany (European Commission 2018b). 
The EU Commission’s approval under state aid law has been granted exclusively on 
the grounds of climate policy benefits and minor intervention in the competitive 
structure. Contributions to security of supply have not been mentioned by the 
 Commission (European Commission 2016). Should the security reserve be expanded 
to a substantial degree, intervention in the competitive structure will be more 
 significant and approval is therefore uncertain.
CO2 limit values affect older 
lignite-fired power plants first.
CO2 limit values are associated with 
higher legal uncertainty than the 
fixed sequence of closures.
Keeping generation capacity in 
reserve is rather expensive: The 
cost of the current lignite security 
reserve is expected to be approx. 
euros 590 million/GW of 
 shut-down capacity.
It is uncertain whether the 
European Commission would 
approve a massive expansion of 
the security reserve.
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The limitation of power production at coal-fired power plants can relate either to 
the amount of electricity fed into the grid, the CO2 emissions or the full-load hours 
and can be determined on an annual basis. Below the maximum threshold, operators 
are free to decide which amount of electricity they produce at what time. The result 
is a reduction of coal-based power generation without direct closures of generation 
facilities.
As an alternative, the limit could be imposed on power plants above a certain age 
(Öko-Institut 2017; DIW Berlin 2015). DIW Berlin (2014c), for instance, suggests an 
emission limit of 3,154 t of CO2  a year per MW of installed capacity for power plants 
over the age of 30. Depending on plant’s efficiency, the limit restricts annual  capacity 
utilisation of lignite-fired power plants to 31-39% and of hard coal-fired power plants 
to 40-49%, while the impact on gas-fired power plants would be minimal at 89-100%. 
As a result, CO2 emissions arising from coal-fired power generation could drop by 
66% by the year 2040.
How it works
A moderate annual production limit can also have benefits in terms of structural 
policy since the effects on employment can be spread more evenly over power plants 
and open-cast mines and can be gradual in nature (UBA 2017b; SRU 2017). From an 
energy system perspective, the instrument could be beneficial in that it specifically 
forces lignite-fired power plants to adopt a (more) flexible mode of operation. This 
is based on the assumption that the plants would generate during hours with high 
electricity prices when few renewable energy plants feed into the grid. Experts 
believe that even older lignite-fired power plants can operate more flexibly either 
without any upgrades or with minor upgrades only (UBA 2017f). Given the current 
framework conditions, plant operators do not often use these capabilities as ramp-
ing up and down puts additional strain on the plant. 
As regards the climate impact, it is not yet clear how carbon leakage to other  member 
states could be avoided (water bed effect). In the short and medium-term, no carbon 
leakage is expected to occur thanks to the new market stability reserve regulation. 
In addition, the revised Emissions Trading Directive allows for the cancellation of 
emission allowances when power plants are shut down which can ensure that there 
is no water bed effect, even in the long term (see Chapter 5.3). However, at present 
it is unclear to what extent this applies to production limits.
Moderate production limits can be 
beneficial in structural policy terms 
as the effects on employment can 
be spread more evenly.
5.4      LIMITATION OF ANNUAL PRODUCTION BY COAL-FIRED 
POWER PLANTS 
 » As an alternative to the closure of coal-fired power plants, the government could also provide for the 
limitation and continuous reduction of production volumes at individual plants. This could be imple-
mented via maximum annual electricity feed-in quantities, emission budgets or full-load hours. How-
ever, in legal terms, it is likely that production limits are only admissible to the extent that power plants 
can still be operated on a profitable basis.
 » The instrument would be beneficial in terms of structural policy since employment effects could be 
spread out. However, this advantage is cancelled out when operators are given the option of transferring 
or trading quotas between power plants.
 » Hence, an annual limitation of production at individual plants is not a suitable instrument to reduce 




In terms of constitutional law, annual limits on electricity feed-in quantities,  emission 
volumes or full-load hours represent a legal regulation of property pursuant to Art. 
14 of the German Basic Law just as fixed closure sequences. Such a regulation must 
be proportional and must comply with the principle of equality pursuant to Art. 3 
of the German Basic Law (see Chapter 5.3). However, annual limits harbour the risk 
that power plants become unprofitable and have to be shut down. It is difficult for 
the legislator to accurately calculate the profitability threshold for each power plant 
(or even each unit). Hence, there is a risk of disproportionality as power plants may 
have to be shut down on profitability grounds before their closure would be  justifiable 
on grounds of climate change mitigation. This could lead to a compensation duty 
for the government. However, if operators are given the option of transferring or 
trading their annual quotas with other power plants, the instrument would be 
admissible under constitutional law (Schomerus and Franßen 2018).
Some experts believe that fixed annual limits on emissions, electricity volumes or 
full-load hours may be incompatible with EU law (BBH 2016; IZES 2015). This is based 
on the assumption that the Emissions Trading Directive does not permit national 
measures with similar objectives. Furthermore, there may be a conflict with a 
 provision under the IED which excludes CO2 limit values. If one assumes that even 
national CO2 limit values can be justified via the protective measures clause under 
Art. 193 of the TFEU (see Chapter 5.4), other CO2 limits should also be admissible 
(Klinski 2017; Ziehm 2014). However, this argument is disputed (BBH 2016).
Transfer and trading option
If the annual quotas can be transferred or traded between power plants, operators 
enjoy a higher level of flexibility. This can mitigate economic hardship (Schomerus 
and Franßen 2018). The disadvantage associated with this flexibility option is that 
operators could transfer all of their allocated quotas to a small number of power 
plants and shut down the other facilities. This would restrict the government’s 
 capacity to control where and when the transformation takes place and deteriorate 
planning conditions for regions and grid operators. The advantages of the quota 
system, i.e. the spread of potential job losses and the coercion of power plants to 
adopt flexible modes of operation, would be cancelled out.
Annual production limits are 
subject to legal uncertainty which 
could be solved by including a 
transfer or trading option.
The compatibility of production 
limits with European law is 
disputed.
The transfer or trading of produc-
tion volumes conflicts with the 
controllability of the 
 transformation and reduces 
planning security for regions and 
grid operators.
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The combination of various instruments can result in the pooling of the respective 
advantages. Feasible combinations could involve several regulatory instruments 
together or regulatory instruments combined with price-based instruments (see 
Chapters 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 for the advantages and disadvantages associated with indi-
vidual instruments.) On the other hand, combinations of political instruments 
usually raise the level of complexity. This may prolong the political negotiation 
process necessary to define the details for any instrument combination.
Combination of closures and limits on annual production
Closures can lead to significantly higher emission reductions if combined with 
annual production limits for those coal-fired power plants that remain in operation. 
Production limits can ensure that closures are indeed effective in reducing emissions 
since they avoid a situation where remaining coal-fired power plants, which were 
previously running below full capacity, simply raise their production volumes. 
Moreover, the combination is robust as it is not influenced by energy price trends, 
changes in CO2 prices and fluctuations in electricity demand (UBA 2017f).
Combination of regional minimum CO2 prices in the electricity sector and closures
It has also been proposed to combine a regional minimum CO2 price in the  electricity 
sector with closures (Öko-Institut 2018b). While the minimum CO2 price would ini-
tially affect hard coal-fired power plants only, lignite-fired power plants could be 
addressed via stipulated closures. The resulting income could be used in the coal 
phase-out context, e.g. for structural development or as compensation for faster 
closures.
The combination of closures with 
annual production limits improves 
accuracy for reaching target CO2 
reduction volumes.
The combination of minimum CO2 
prices with closures would ensure 
that both hard coal and lignite plants 
contribute to emission reductions. 
Moreover, this combination would 
generate additional income.
5.5  COMBINING INSTRUMENTS
 » A combination of the closure and production limit instruments would ensure greater accuracy in at-
taining the overall target budget for CO2 emissions in the electricity sector.
 » Furthermore, there have been suggestions of combined regional minimum CO2 prices and closures. In 
contrast to the minimum CO2 price as the only instrument, both lignite and hard coal-fired power plants 
would contribute to emission reductions. The resulting income could be used in the coal phase-out context.
 » However, the drawback associated with combined instruments is increased complexity which may 
delay the political negotiation process.
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BAT Best Available Technologies
BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft  
(Federal Association of the German Gas and Water Industries)
BlmSchG Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz (German Federal Imission Control Act)
BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety)
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie  
(German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy)
BNetzA Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency)
CCPP Combined-cycle power plant
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
CHP Combined Heat and Power Generation
CO2 Carbon dioxide
EEG Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (German Renewable Energy Sources Act)
EnWG Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (German Energy Industry Act)
EPH Energetický a průmyslový holding
ETS European Emissions Trading System
EU European Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GG Grundgesetz (Basic law)
GHG Greenhouse gases
GRW Joint Task ‘Improvement of Regional Economic Structure’
IEA International Energy Agency
IED EU Directive 2010/75/EU on Industrial Emissions
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LEAG Lausitz Energie Bergbau AG
LMBV Lausitzer und Mitteldeutsche Bergbau-Verwaltungsgesellschaft
MEWS Mining, Energy and Water Supply
Mibrag Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft mbH




TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TSO Transmission System Operator
UBA Umweltbundesamt (Federal Environment Agency)
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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